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Abstract 
Two philosophical positions seem evident in post-war American fiction: one 
realist, one anti-realist. Using the terms 'revelation' and 'apocalypse' to reflect the 
former, and 'entropy' the latter, this thesis proposes that distinctions between the two 
can be made by analysis of a text's treatment of the nexus between laughter and 
madness. 
After an Overview that identifies and defines key terms, the Introduction 
considers various theoretical treatments of laughter from which its function can be 
ascertained as being both to reinforce stability within social groups and to explore 
new altematives to existing modes of thought. Madness being defined as an inability 
to balance the opposing forces of system and anti-system, laughter is therefore vital 
to maintain sanity. The Fool emerges as a crucial figure in this process. 
Chapter One explores, with reference to Heller's Catch-22, Kesey's One Flew 
Over the Cuckoo's Nest and Kerouac's On The Road, the Laughter of Revelation: a 
laughing relationship between a Protagonist who is trapped within the system of an 
Institution and a Fool who communicates to the Protagonist (through laughter) a 
means of escape. Chapter Two then discusses, with reference to Blatty's The 
Exorcist, King's It, Morrison's Sula, and Nabokov's Lolita, the Laughter of 
Apocalypse: a laughing relationship in which the Fool's laughter (as mockery) is 
potentially destructive of both the Protagonist's sanity and the stability of the 
Institution. Chapter Three explores, with reference to Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-5, 
Ellis's American Psycho, and Heller's Closing Time, the Laughter of Entropy: the 
failure of the laughing relationship that obtains when the dialectic between Institution 
(as system) and Fool (as anti-system) collapses. 
The concluding remarks reflect the metafictional implications of the foregoing 
analyses. It is suggested that, with the collapse of this dialectic (expressed by the 
Laughter of Entropy), the traditional relationship between Author and Reader 
becomes problematic. 
Abbreviations 
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references to the primary texts are cited within the body of the thesis as Mows: 
C-22 Catch-22 
CN One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest 
OR On The Road 
17-v 
I-J. & The Exorcist 
it it 
Su Sula 
Lo Lolita 
S-5 Slaughterhouse-5 
AP American Ps cho y 
CT Closing Time 
OVERVIEW 
The soul is the perceiver and revealer of truth. We know truth when we see 
it, let skeptic and scoffer say what they choose. Foolish people ask you, 
when you have spoken what they do not wish to hear, 'How do you know it 
is truth, and not an error ofyour own? ' We know truth when we see it, ftom 
opinion, as we know when we are awake that we are awake [ ... ] In the book I read, the good thought returns to me, as every truth will, the image of the 
whole soul. To the bad thought which Ifind in it, the same soul becomes a 
discerning, separating sword, and lops it away. We are wiser than we 
know. ' 
American literature has a history of focusing the cultural and philosophical 
concerns of its European counterpart. Ideas whose origins are in other countries are 
rapidly incorporated into American culture and appear with extraordinary clarity in its 
literature. The sense of Man's 'manifest destiny' to control and organise the material 
world that dominated nineteenth-century America, for example, is indicative of an 
n, k abiding confidence in the view of a human-centred universe whose truths are 
accessible and meaningful. This post-enlightenment view is reflected even in the 
essentially anti-materialistic thought of Transcendentalists such as Emerson, whose 
confidence in a clear, structured metaphysical world from which we can learn and 
grow is evident in the quotation that begins this overview. Both attitudes, the 
materialistic and the spiritual, are essentially realist (in the philosophical rather than 
the literary sense) in that they display the same confidence in the existence and 
accessibility of a 'world as it exists in itself, independent of human perception and 
thought, leading to a feeling of being a part (some would say, the most important 
part) of a much larger, but still coherent, system. 
' Ralph Waldo Emerson, 'The Over-Soul', in Self-Reliance and Other Essays (New York: Dover, 
1993), pp. 51-64 (p. 57). 
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In America as in Europe, however, this confidence has become increasingly 
unsteady as ever more violent social upheavals, coinciding with a widespread loss of 
faith in the dogma of established religion and the linearity of established science, have 
led to the development of a world view that doubts the existence not only of a 
coherent external reality, but even of the self The move from humanism to solipsism 
to nihilism, from a trust in cosmos to an embracing of chaos, is reflected in American 
literature, especial-ly in novels published since the Second World War, where A these 
world views appear in the work of different authors within a relatively short space of 
time. 
A popular method for exploring such large philosophical issues in fiction is to 
examine the latter's representation of madness. What is seen to be mad shifts as the 
cultural world view shifts, instances of madness in literature thereby providing clues 
to the underlying assumptions that inform them. Of particular interest in this context 
is the role that laughter plays in association with madness. By analysing the form that 
this laughter takes (who is laughing, and about what? ) it is possible to reveal the 
dynamics that occur among diverse and often competing representations of madness 
in a given text, from which conclusions about that text's position on fundamental 
philosophical questions can be drawn. It should be noted here that I shall be dealing 
exclusively with the overt occurrence of laughter in the text, rather than with the 
issue of whether or not a given work is 'fimny'. Although a great deal of critical 
thought has been applied to such notions as the social function of literary comedy or 
the psychology of, for example, wit and irony, these issues are treated as having only 
peripheral relevance to the main argument of this thesis. 
Madness is, of course, a perennial theme not just m Amencan literature but in 
all literatures, and throughout the history of storytelling. Laughter also is a word of 
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such widespread, indeed invasive, occurrence and multiplicity of meaning that it may 
in itself seem either mad or laughable to try to combine the two in a limited arena. It 
should therefore come as no surprise that I shall be talking here about specific uses of 
these terms, and, more importantly, about a particular relationship between the two 
that, I shall argue, sheds light on some of the major phenomena of post-war 
American fiction. I make no claims for a complete exposition of the many theories, 
psychological, social, or literary, that involve questions of sanity or laughter, 
although I shall indicate relevant source materials where questions of space or clarity 
forbid more lengthy description. This is especially true of theories relating to 
madness, since the primary focus of attention in this thesis is laughter. Neither do I 
make any claims for the relationship I suggest being unique to the chosen place or 
period. Nevertheless, I will show by the analysis of several post-war novels that 
American literature in the last half of the twentieth century deals with longstanding 
questions in a unique way. 
To give context and structure to the treatment of this relationship between 
laughter and madness, it is necessary to clarify certain key terms that will recur 
throughout this thesis: 'revelation', 'apocalypse' and 'entropy'. David Ketterer notes 
the frequent occurrence of biblical imagery in American literature, citing R. W. B. 
Lewis and Charles Feidelson Jr. as providing the authoritative texts on the theme of 
an American Adam inhabiting 'an unfallen Eden in the New World'. ' Feidelson in 
particular deals with the theme in terms of the influence of Puritan thought which led 
2 'The Apocalyptic Imagination, Science Fiction, and American Literature', in New Worldsfor Old, 
David Ketterer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 3-14 (p. 3)-, Lewis, The 
American Adam. - Innocence, Tragedy, and Tradition in the Nineteenth Century (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1955); Feidelson, Symbolism andAmerican Literature (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1953). 
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in the nineteenth century to the confidence in manifest destiny mentioned above. As 
America proved not to be the Promised Land anticipated by the original Christian 
settlers, however, other books of the bible began to seem more appropriate as source 
material for its literature. Exodus, for example, provides a convenient parallel for the 
increasing number of Americans who feel disadvantaged or marginalised, while, 
particularly since the country's Civil War, American literature has abounded with 
Christ-figures (Ketterer, Pp. 3-4). 
Increasingly, as Ketterer notes, it is the Revelation of St John the Divine that 
has become the primary biblical source-text. While 'shades of the Apocalypse have 
colored literature at least from Chaucer onward' it is in twentieth-century America, 
and especially under the threat of modem global warfare, that the theme appears as a 
regular and persistent influence (Ketterer, p. 4). The Greek word apokalupsis, which 
provides an alternative title for the Book of Revelation, is defined by T. F. Glasson as 
implying 'an unveiling, either, (a) of future events, or (b) of the unseen realms of 
heaven and hell'? In this book St John experiences a series of visions that reveal to 
him the future of the world,, in which plagues and disasters herald the three-and-a- 
half-year reign of the Antichrist. Following the defeat of Satan by Christ at the battle 
of Armageddon, a thousand-year period of heaven on earth takes place (the 
millennium), after which, during the brief reappearance of Satan, the world is 
destroyed by fire and the Last Judgement occurs. With chaos ended, a new heaven 
and a new earth appear (the 'new Jerusalem'). 
3 introductory to The Revelation ofJohn, ed. by T. F. Glasson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1965), p. 1. It should be noted that while St John's is the most fully realised version of the 
myth, it is simply the best known of a large number of similar works, many of them pre-Christian in 
origin (see Ketterer, p. 5). 
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Clearly, then, the original myth (of which St John's is the best-known version) 
involves the idea of the apprehension of destruction and regeneration as part of an 
ongoing process (as do, for example, Egyptian and Norse mythologies). However, 
while the two words describe the same mythical events or processes, they have 
become separated in the popular imagination, so that 'revelation' has come to mean 
simply an enlightening experience of a positive, creative, sort, while 'apocalypse' is 
almost invariably considered to be synonymous with 'catastrophe' (see Ketterer, 
p. 7). While I shall (in Chapters One and Two respectively) consider revelation and 
apocalypse in a way that reflects these popular usages, underlying this treatment of 
the two as separate terms is the recognition that they are, at root, the same. 
Functioning as different aspects of the same eternal cycle, both concern the 
apprehension of a truth, thereby reflecting the realist Position that such truths exist 
independently of Mankind and are accessible to human thought. As Ketterer says, 
'the term apocalyptic allows for a dialectic, conflict, or tension of oppositions - and a 
dialectic, conflict, or tension of opposites is the stuff of literature', seeing this as part 
of 'a larger American literary dialectic, such as that abrupt oscillation between the 
pragmatic or the material and the speculative or the transcendental' (Ketterer, 
pp. 7-8). 
Several critics, a large proportion of whom are concerned with analyses of 
American literature, employ the idea of apocalypse, and they too show a tendency to 
take the word in either its positive or its negative aspect. Those critics who argue 
from the positive position include William Blake, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Northrop 
Frye and Frank Kermode. As Ketterer argues, 'the American and French revolutions 
were interpreted [by many] as the premillennial upheavals prophesied m the 
Apocalypse', and therefore heralded not 'catastrophe but [ ... ] triumphant social 
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transformation' (Ketterer, p. 10). Blake's philosophy, for example, portrays 'what 
M. H. Abrams has termed "apocalypses of imagination" that celebrate a compensatory 
grand new world', while Emerson uses the analogous term, 'the apocalypse of the 
mind' in Nature (Ketterer, p. 10). 
4 Frye presents three archetypal images for the 
apocalyptic world - the city of Jerusalem, the Arcadian garden, and the sheepfold - 
which are set against the demonic (i. e. negative) world of 'dark cities, forests and 
wastelands, and beasts' (Ketterer, p. 11). ' Kermode, whom Ketterer considers to 
provide the 'ultirnate extension of the positive implications of the term apocalyptic', 
argues that 'throughout recorded time, man has always thought of his own age as the 
dark before the dawn' (Ketterer, p. 
11). 6 
More often, however, perhaps because of 'the popular equation of the 
apocalyptic with the catastrophic', critics have had a tendency to apply a negative 
connotation to the term (Ketterer, p. 7). Among these are D. H. Lawrence, who 'sees 
the Revelation quite simply as the product of the spiteful wish fulfifflment of the 
underprivileged', Alvin Keman and R. W. B. Lewis, who see apocalypse in terms of 
satire, and Ihab Hassan, whose interpretation is so negative as to equate apocalyptic 
4 M. H. Abrams, 'English Romanticism: The Spirit of the Age', in Romanticism Reconsidered, ed. 
by Northrop Frye (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 53-60; The Complete Works of 
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Centenary Edition, 12 vols (Boston, MA: Houghton, Miflin; London: 
Constable, 1903-15), vol. 1, p. 48. 
Frye, Anatomy of Criticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957). 
' Kermode, The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1967). 
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literature with what he calls 'the literature of silence' (Ketterer, pp. 8-9). 7 As Ketterer 
describes it, Hassan's argument is that 
apocalyptic or silent literature [ ... ] 
involves a sense of outrage at the void 
and an expression of the nullity or chaotic fragmentation of human 
experience. The ultimate critical negative extension of the word apocalyptic, 
then, connotes chaos or non-meaning. (Ketterer, pp. 9-10) 
This argument actuaRy has more in common with the third (or, taking 
revelation and apocalypse to reflect the same outlook, the second) position to be 
examined in this thesis; that is, entropy. The term originaUy derives from the second 
law of thermodynamics, proposed in the nineteenth-century by French engineer Sadi 
Carnot and later developed by German mathematician and physicist Rudolf Clausius. 
This law concerns 'the irreversibility of processes', and states that 'it is impossible to 
produce work by transferring heat from a cold body to a hot body in any self- 
sustaining process 8 The result of this inability of heat (energy) to pass from a cold to 
a hotter body is a gradual, and inexorable, cooling of the systern, until it is in a state 
of total stasis and disorder (work being obtainable only from order). In other words, 
heat will eventually become uniformly distributed across the system with the result 
that, on the one hand, change is no longer possible (thus the system is static) and on 
the other, that complex structures, being the product of exchanges of energy, can no 
longer exist (thus the system is disordered). Entropy being a measure of the disorder 
7 Lawrence, Apocalypse, intro. by Richard Aldington (New York: Viking Press, 1932); Kernan, The 
Plot of Satire (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1965); Lewis, 'Days of Wrath and Laughter', 
in Trials of the World. - Essays in American Literature and the Humanistic Tradition (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1965); Hassan, The Literature ofSilence (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1967). 
8 The Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought, ed. by Alan Bullock, Oliver Stallybrass and Stephen 
Trombley, 2nd edition (London: Fontana, 1988), p. 859. 
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of any given system, the argument is thus that, in any organised structure, entropy 
will always increase (see Modern Thought, p. 275, p. 378). Taken to its logical 
conclusion, this concept has been interpreted as suggesting that the universe as a 
whole (which, being infinite, must act as a closed and self-sustaining system), will 
therefore, eventually, become both static and disordered. Obviously, this theory is 
completely at odds with the regenerative, constantly cycling view to be found in 
religious mythology, and the word has come to be used in more general terms to 
express the idea that all things are coming to an irrevocable end. Once a system is 
static, it will exist in this state indefinitely providing no new energy is introduced, so 
that 'end' in this context means the end of work, of the creation of complex 
structures, rather than the actual destruction of any matter. 
Many contemporary thinkers seem to employ the idea of entropy in their 
mterpretation of the human condition, suggesting that this combined state of stasis 
and disorder, rather than being the result of a teleological process, is an ever-present 
predicament that renders human endeavour exhausted (in the sense that John Barth 
uses the term). The years after World War Two produced a large number of books 
from many different disciplines that reflect this view. In 1959, Henry Farnham May 
wrote of The End ofAmerican Innocence, Daniel Bell wrote of The End of Ideology 
in 1960, while Martin Heidegger wrote of The End of Philosophy in 1973. 
This sense of ending, of everything tending towards total disorder, leads in turn 
to the view that life is ultimately chaotic and meaningless, in much the way that 
Hassan's argument describes. It seems significant that such a theory should arise, and 
catch the public imagination, at just the moment that confidence in an ordered 
universe is crumbling. Moreover, because of the theory's basis in the behaviour of 
closed systems, it has proved a popular analogy to describe the results of a loss of 
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faith in the existence of a meaningful external reality, beyond the 'self-sustainirig 
process' of individual thought. 
Using the terms 'revelation', 'apocalypse' and 'entropy' as a theoretical 
framework, I shall initially take a realist position and define madness as being loss of 
balance, or, to put it another way, the inability to recognise or accept the continuous 
cycle that, overall, maintains balance between cosmos and chaos, between system and 
anti-system. Madness can therefore be described as foflows: from the perspective of 
the individual, a mad personality is one in which either the impulsive, unstructured 
anti-system or the rule-based, structured system holds sway, to the detriment of the 
personality as a whole. In the former instance this might appear in the form of 
uncontrolled, frenetic behaviour, in the latter as obsessive repetition of a pattern or 
act. Similarly, from the social perspective, a mad society is one fallen entirely into 
anarchy or one in which the controlling conventions are so strong as to prevent 
change. Both extremes, from both perspectives, lead to stasis, either through there 
being so rigid a structure that no movement is possible or through there being no 
structure at all, giving no point from which to move in any meaningful direction. 
Where the concept of an independently existing reality becomes important, in 
this model, is in the means by which balance or orientation may be regained. Seeing 
solipsism as essentiaRy a closed system (and thus static), and nihilism as a chaotic 
anti-system (and thus disordered), this realist definition of madness suggests that 
transcendence of the self, or of the conventions of society, is essential to balance, to 
sanity. I shall analyse examples in literature of unbalanced personalities who, through 
a relationship with a character who exceeds norms of behaviour and offers new 
perspectives, new truths, are enabled to develop in a meaningful way. 
10 
In the Introduction, with this framework in mind, I shall outline the various 
theories that have been put forward over the centuries to explain the phenomenon of 
laughter. I shall argue that there are two basic approaches to laughter, one primarily 
social, the other conceptual. The first concerns collective behaviour and pertains to 
such issues as group identity, bonding, and group defence. The second deals more 
with the way the individual sees the world and is affected by it, and encompasses 
issues such as incongruity and ambivalence. In both cases, I shall argue, laughter 
serves an essentially orientating function, helping individuals to maintain balance 
i within themselves and find their place in either community or universe. Clearly, then, 
laughter is closely linked to madness as it is defined above. 
Of particular importance in this context is the laughter of the Fool. Being 
dependent on society while at the same time exceeding its nomis, the Fool has both 
access to new truths and the means of communicating them to others, thereby serving 
as the main orientating force. It will be suggested that, in this, the Fool has much in 
common with the Artist, conceived of as one whose independence from convention 
enables him or her to see things as they really are, unmediated by everyday 
constraints. The social nature of laughter is essential to this, as it is through shared 
laughter (what I shall call a 'laughing relationship') that such truths are 
communicated. As I shall discuss in the Introduction, the Fool may take many forms,, 
some creative, some destructive. To explore this idea further, I identify two types of 
laughing relationship, Laughter of Revelation and Laughter of Apocalypse, which I 
shall examine in Chapters One and Two. The Introduction, therefore, serves a double 
purpose. First, it sets out the background material relevant to the analysis (in 
Chapters One and Two) of texts that support, through their use of laughter, a realist 
stance. Second, it identifies issues that distinguish the crucial differences between 
these texts and those that suggest an entropic outlook (analysed in Chapter Three). 
In Chapter One I shall look at three examples of a relationship where a 
character, trapped within the conventions of a society that are shown to be inhibitory 
to or destructive of the self, is shown a way out by the laughter of a Fool. This 
laughter provides a sudden insight into an alternative way of seeing the world, and to 
this end I shall refer to it as the Laughter of Revelation. In all three instances the 
emphasis is on escape from rather than destruction of society (although the escape in 
itself serves to undermine its control), and Laughter of Revelation can therefore be 
seen as expressing the idea of transcendence as an open system that encourages 
creativity and growth. While the parallel between the Fool and the Artist is clear in 
these examples, an alternative view of the Artist as Author appears that concems the 
teller of the Fool's tale. The character whose escape is facilitated by the Fool's 
example, in two out of the three novels under discussion in Chapter One, is the 
narrator, suggesting that the telling is at least of equal significance to the revelation 
itself. 
In Chapter Two I shall explore examples of a laughing relationship in which the 
Fool is destructive rather than creative. Here the Fool is a direct threat both to 
society and to the individual, his or her laugh occurring in the form of mockery, and 
the laughter response is defensive or protective. Revelation is still important, but in 
these examples the revelation is typically that of characters' own weaknesses, fear or 
guilt. The Fool as demon tries, by the mockery of these hidden weaknesses, to 
destroy both individual sanity and a sense of community, and it is only when 
characters are able to accept responsibility, defeating the Fool's destructive intent, 
that they are able to escape his or her influence. The demoruc Fool also acts as a 
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personification of a society's sins, so that, in destroying the Fool, that society is 
cleansed. This, then, I shall call the Laughter of Apocalypse, in that it describes 
transcendence in terms of the destruction of a corrupt or static system in order, 
ultimately, to create a better world. Again, the parallel between the Fool and the 
Artist is apparent, particularly if one thinks in terms of the function of satire (which, 
as we have seen above, is how both Kernan and Lewis use the term 'apocalypse'). By 
breaking taboos and mocking hidden transgressions, the Fool functions, as does the 
satirist, rather to stabilise than to undermine society. Again, however, there exists an 
alternative depiction of the Artist as analogous to those characters who confront the 
Fool as demon and 'survive to tell the tale'. 
The fundamental quality of both the Laughter of Revelation and the Laughter 
of Apocalypse is that they form a relationship between two (or more) vital characters. 
Chapter Three explores examples of novels that contain both laughter and potential 
Fools, but without the essential 'laughing relationship'. Where this relationship is 
absent, even if the other conditions I describe are present in a text, neither revelation 
nor apocalypse is achievable. Without the moment of epiphany that a fully realised 
laughing relationship achieves, in examples such as these either circularity or 
ambiguity emerges, both of which lack the sense of resolution that the reader may 
expect from a narrative. This result is analogous to the theoretical result of entropy; 
without the introduction of a new element into the system (in this case, the laughter 
of a Fool), the narrative as system becomes either static (circling indefinitely) or 
disordered (ambiguous and therefore without a coherent conclusion). The failure of 
the laughing relationship, I shall argue, indicates an underlying conviction that 
existence within an external reality, and even communication with an 'otherl is no 
longer possible in any meaningful way. 
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The abortive or solipsistic laughter that appears in these works produces, I shall 
argue, the fiction that has been called Black Humour, and I shall therefore deal with 
this topic in Chapter Three rather than in the discussion of laughter theories in the 
Introduction. Given the extremely varied and often contradictory critical treatments 
of this subject, I shall suggest a more precise term to describe such literature: 
'Laughter of Entropy'. While many theorists use the term 'Black Humour' to 
describe literature that is, in effect, an extreme form of satire (and is, therefore, a 
form of Laughter of Apocalypse), Laughter of Entropy more specifically indicates the 
feeling of 'things coming (or come) to an end' that is diametrically opposed to either 
revelation or apocalypse as I describe them. Again it should be noted that 'end' here 
involves a final state from which no ftirther change is possible. Although a closed 
system could continue to circle in its meaningless way forever, it produces nothing 
new, no creativity is possible. In making this distinction, I shall, incidentally, be 
arguing that many texts of this period that have traditionally appeared in anthologies 
of Black Humour do not belong there. 
Another important effect of entropic texts is that they themselves function as 
closed systems; their lack of an ending or feeling of closure, in the traditional sense, 
disrupts the reader's expectations. Having suggested an analogy between the roles of 
the Fool and the Artist in respect to the Laughter of Revelation and the Laughter of 
Apocalypse, I will propose that entropic literature seems to destabilise this analogy 
by dismantling not only the textual relationship between the Fool and another 
character, but also the traditional relationship between the (implied) author and the 
(impfied) reader. 
This metafictional result of the failure of the laughing relationship raises the 
question of the status of the role of Author in recent literature as a whole. The 
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traditional realist position - illustrated by Emerson's confidence in 'the book I read' - 
provides no appropriate means to approach such texts, except negatively, and I will 
thus consider in the Conclusion to this thesis whether entropic literature is merely a 
negation of previous novelistic forms, or whether a new way of reading, a new 
relationship with the author that reflects the implied change in world view, is 
necessary to understand these novels. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the Overview I outlined the proposal that by analysing the nexus between laughter 
and madness as it appears in a novel it is possible to determine some of the 
fundamental philosophical assumptions that that novel represents. In this Introduction 
I shall look in more detail at some of the theories that have been put forward to 
explain laughter, in particular its combination with madness in the figure of the Fool. 
Two aspects of the Fool emerge, each with a separate function, highlighting an 
intrinsic ambivalence which is an important aspect of the Fool as a fictional character. 
While from the social perspective the Fool is described in terms of social control, in 
that by breaking rules he or she may only serve to reinforce them, from the individual 
perspective this figure represents, by example, the possibility of escape from the 
closed system of society's conventions. The two manifestations of the type, one 
acting as an agent of stability, the other as an agent of change, will be designated as 
'Made Fool' and 'Transcendent Fool' respectively, although it should be noted that 
these designations are invariably externally derived interpretations of the same 
character (in other words, they are a function of how others see him or her). It will be 
argued that the Fool, by virtue of the potential expressed by his or her laughter, is a 
creative force, finding and communicating new ways of seeing the world. In this 
essentially realist model, it is proposed that the creative role of the Fool takes place 
through a process of enlightenment, in that a character who is at first perceived as a 
Made Fool (in other words, as having a place and function solely within the 
conventions of society) is gradually revealed to have access to truths that transcend 
those conventions. It is in the communication of these new truths to someone who is 
in a position to understand and accept them that the Fool reveals his or her 
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transcendence. The character with whom the Fool communicates in this way thus 
acts as a Protagonist, in the discrete sense of being an advocate or champion (rather 
than in the more general literary sense). The notion of balance between system and 
anti-system that I briefly discussed in the Overview can therefore only be achieved by 
a relationship between a character who transcends society's norms (a Fool) and a 
character who functions within society, but is aware that other possibilities may exist 
(a Protagonist). 
From the analyses of theories of laughter I shall then draw together the 
common threads to propose definitions of two laughing relationships that exist in the 
novels to be discussed in Chapters One and Two between a Fool and a Protagonist: 
Laughter of Revelation and Laughter of Apocalypse. These definitions rely on the 
proposal that madness constitutes a loss of balance between the opposing influences 
of system and anti-system. 
Theories of Laughter 
For more than two millennia laughter has been the subject of heated debate, on 
grounds ranging from the evolutionary to the moral, and from the physiological to the 
literary. To identify the key elements that are common to these various approaches I 
shall briefly describe laughter within three frameworks in turn; the biological, the 
individual and the social. 
Jonathan MiRer, as president of 'Section V at the 1987 British Association for 
the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting, introduced the theme of humour by 
considering it as a biological process. Comparing laughter to a cough or sneeze he 
says that 
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laughter is involuntary in the sense that we cannot start it, even though we 
can stop it. Laughter has to be started by putting oneself in a situation where 
the stimulus is provided. But the stimulus to laughter is not like the stimulus 
to sneeze. We do not have to be in a frame of mind in order to sneeze, we 
simply have to have our noses tickled. But a frame of mind is required for 
laughter. This is because laughter is a 'top-down' concept; in other words, it 
comes from higher, cognitive levels of the nervous system, as opposed to 
the other involuntary actions which attack the nervous system from the 
'bottom up'. ' 
Evidence for the origins of laughter being sited in the 'higher' levels of the 
brain can be found in the case of a severely epileptic patient, Autumn Deaton, who 
underwent treatment in a Los Angeles hospital in 1998. Neurologist Itzhak Fried 
discovered when investigating her brain functions that when a particular part of her 
cerebral cortex was stimulated, she began to laugh. Moreover, he found that this was 
not simply a motor response since Autumn was, evidently, actually amused, and, 
when asked why she was laughing, was able to provide (albeit rather odd-sounding) 
rationalisations for her laughter. 
The theory that Miller develops from his observation is a convincing one. 
Briefly put, he considers that 'the value of humour may he in the fact that it involves 
the rehearsal of alternative categories and classifications of the world in which we 
find ourselves' (Miller, p. 11). In other words, humour enables us to practice 
flexibility in our conceptions about the world, an invaluable skiH and one which is an 
essential quality of the adaptability of the htunan species. He continues, 
when we conduct our ordinary business in the world, our practical affairs, 
we deal with things for the most part by rule of thumb; we mediate our 
1 'Jokes and Joking: A Serious Laughing Matter', in Laughing Matters: A Serious Look at Humour, 
ed. by John Durant and Jonathan Miller (New York: Longman Scientific and Technical, 1988), 
pp. 5-16 (pp. 7-8). 
Horizon, 'Beyond a Joke', BBC2,9.25 pm, 5 November 1998. A transcript of this programme is 
available on the internet at http: //www. bbc-co. uk/horizonibeyondtrans. shtmi. 
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relationships with one another through a series of categories and concepts 
which are sufficiently stable to enable us to go about our business fairly 
successfully. But if we were rigidly locked on to these categories and 
concepts, if we were inflexibly attached to then-4 we would not continue to 
be a successful, productive and above all socially cooperative species. 
(Miller, pp. II- 12) 
In this he closely follows the arguments of Henri Bergson (1911), who 
considers that the appreciation of humour is necessarily human and essentially social. 
Bergson argues that not only are objects only laughable in so far as they remind us of 
something human, we laugh at people who behave like objects, in that they have 
failed to adapt to a new situation, or are (as Miller puts it) 
in situations where they revert to a more automatic type of behaviour. When 
the herd observes a reduction in the versatility and flexibility of one of its 
members, it goes through loud respiratory convulsions which as it were ask 
the offending individual to 'puff its socks up'. A less flexible, less versatile 
individual endangers the biological integrity of the herd; and so the herd acts 
to protect itself (Miller, p. 10) 
Appealing as this argument may be, Miller's description of laughter as a wholly 
'top-down' reaction is misleading, and the reason why is implicit in his emphasis on 
social co-operation. His analysis relies on siting the initiation of laughter in the 
cognitive regions of the brain, which, in evolutionary terms, have developed relatively 
recently, yet there is strong evidence to suggest that we have been a socially co- 
operative species, and that laughter has fori-ned an essential part of this, for far 
longer. Charles Darwin (1872) points out that there is a pattern to laughter that easily 
3 
distinguishes it from a snarl of aggression or cry of distress. Recent research by 
Robert Provine, a developmental neuroscientist, takes up this observation and, 
3 Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, 2nd edition (London: John Murray, 
1890), p. 211. 
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treating laughter like any other animal 'call' . looks for consistent patterns by 
analysing it electronically (Horizon). He has found that laughter always follows a 
sequence of repeated, short bursts of noise ('ha-ha-ha', or 'ho-ho-ho'), different from 
the more drawn-out noise made, for exaraple, by crying (of course, this involves a 
degree ofludgement about what constitutes a short or a long noise; as I discuss later, 
the precise demarcation between laughing and crying is not so clear cut as this). 
If laughter is an ancient social response, it would seem reasonable to look for 
evidence of its occurrence in other social mammals. Following this logic, Jaak 
Panksepp, another neuroscientist, has used high-frequency apparatus to record the 
noises that rats make and discovered that, when they are tickled, the result is exactly 
the same pattern of short bursts of noise (Horizon). From this he argues that there 
exists a primitive laughter that is an ancient response, common to all social mammals. 
This apparently contradicts Miller's assessment (after Bergson) that laughter is 
produced in the cognitive regions of the brain, these being unique to human beings so 
that laughter, too, should be unique to our own species. 
Provine, having produced the evidence that laughter is a distinct 'call' in his 
laboratory, then went on to study laughter 'in the field', approaching groups of 
people in social situations and asking them what they were laughing about. He found 
that no-one he interviewed really knew why they were laughing, and when asked, 
they applied just such rationalisations, to their behaviour as Autumn Deaton did when 
her cerebral cortex was stimulated. People, he discovered, laugh as part of social 
mtercourse, very rarely at actual 'jokes' (Horizon). The public, visible and audible 
nature of laughter has been used to support this view that laughter is primarily to do 
with social interaction. It has been noticed that laughter is contagious and that eye 
contact is an important element of it. It has also been asserted that people rarely 
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laugh alone; J. Y. T. Greig (1923), for example, argues that even in small children, 
laughter only occurs when 'some person is near and is apparently noticed by the 
infant 
Miller mentions two examples of laughter which would be described in his 
terms as 'bottom up'; giggling at a funeral and being tickled. Laughter at a funeral, he 
says, deserves social approbation because it is preventable, while laughing because 
one is tickled is merely mentioned then discounted on the grounds that the experience 
is not necessarily pleasurable and therefore has nothing to do with 'real' laughter 
(Miller, p. 7). Laughter as a reaction to emotional discomfort (as when facing death 
in the ritualised form of a funeral) is a subject I shall return to in a moment; first it is 
important to say something more about the activity of tickling. Many theorists have 
noted the importance of tickling as a form of play between adults and young children 
(for example, David Hartley (1749), Charles Darwin (1872), Harald H6ffding (189 1), 
Stanley Hall and Arthur Allin (1897), James Sully (1902), J. Y. T. Greig (1923)). 
Roughly, the arguments trace the following pattern: laughter initially, and 
instinctively, occurs as an expression of pleasure at the satisfaction of a physical need, 
most obviously the satisfaction of hunger during breast-feeding, but also at the feeling 
of safety and comfort of being held by the mother. This response to a tactile stimulus 
then develops as a way of forming more general social relationships. Different from 
for example, cuddling, tickling is a form of physical contact which could be 
threatening and must therefore be performed in such a way that the child comes to 
recogruse it not as attack but as bonding. The distinct sound that laughter makes, 
4 The Psychology of Laughter and Comedy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1923), p. 30. It should 
also be noted that in those rare situations where adults do laugh alone, they have a tendency to 
construct a social context in which an 'other' is implied. 
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together with its accompanying facial expressions, is learned by the child to indicate 
that the person tickling him or her means no harm, and the child in turn learns to 
laugh back to indicate that he or she knows this. The possibility of threat is, however, 
an essential element of tickling, as it serves both as a safe rehearsal of real fighting 
(which may prove an invaluable skill as the child grows up), and as a way for children 
to establish their place in the social hierarchy (in that it is clear that an adult could 
hurt a child, but in this case does not). This sort of play, according to Panksepp, 
'takes you to the perimeter of your knowledge', and in doing so, teaches children 
(and indeed, he would argue, the young of any social manimal) self-control, winning, 
losing and indeed many important aspects of social behaviour (Horizon). 
In biological terms then, the evidence argues for two sources of laughter; as a 
primitive physical response to pleasure that is common to all social mammals and in a 
more recently developed, cognitive form that is closely linked to abstract thought and 
is, apparently, unique to human beings. It is argued that primitive laughter exists to 
create a basic level of social interaction serving, initially through tickling, to bond 
children to their social group, and also to teach them how to establish their place 
within that group. The cognitive form then develops from this, enabling, especially 
through language, more subtle modes of behaviour which allow the flexibility of 
response and interaction that are essential to the development of the human species. 
Moreover, while laughter is distinct from other emotional reactions, it is closely 
related to them, enabling each member of a social group to adjust his or her own 
behaviour, or recognise an outside threat, according to the reactions of the others. it 
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has been noticed (by W. Preyer (1892), for example) that children only laugh when 
being tickled if they are contented. In other words, tickling is only pleasurable (and so 
produces laughter) when the child knows he or she is safe. As David Hartley (1749) 
observes, 'if the same surprise, which makes young children laugh, be a very little 
increased, they will cry'. 6 This phenomenon indicates not only the existence of an 
emotional continuum, with laughter at one point and tears at another; it suggests that, 
depending upon the situation of a subject, the same stimulus can provoke laughter or 
fear. Laughter therefore involves a degree of emotional flexibility as well as social or 
conceptual flexibility. William Hazlitt (1870) considers laughter and tears to be 
closely associated, arguing that tears are 
the natural and involuntary resource of the mind overcome by some sudden 
and violent emotion before it has had time to reconcile its feelings to the 
change of circumstances: while laughter may be defined to be the same sort 
of convulsive and involuntary movement, occasioned by mere surprise or 
contrast (in the absence of any more serious emotion) before it has time to 
reconcile its belief to contradictory appearances. ' 
Of course, what constitutes 'serious emotion' is entirely relative and may not 
be at all clear cut, so that not only is it impossible to generalise about whether a 
particular event will make an individual laugh or cry, it will not always be clear to 
that individual which response is the most appropriate. Hazlitt considers that 'the 
essence of the laughable [ ... ] is the incongruous, the 
disconnecting one idea from 
another, or the jostling of one feeling against another' (Hazlitt, p. 6). This assumes 
5 The Mind of the Child, 2 vols (New York: Appleton, 1892), vol. 1, 'The Sense and the Will', 
p. 298. 
6 Observations on Man: his Frame, his Duty, and his Expectations, 2 vols (London: [n. pub. ], 1749), 
vol. 1, p. 437. 
7 'On Wit and Hurnour', in Lectures on the English Poets, and the English Comic Writers (London: 
Bel I and Daldy, 1870), introductory to the English Comic Writers section, pp. 1-36 (p. 2). 
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that the contrast between ambivalent feelings will always provoke laughter, but if the 
strength of these mixed emotions is not always clear, neither is it always clear that 
laughter will be the reaction to them. Thus there exists a fundamental ambivalence in 
laughter, not only in that its focus is the association of two disparate ideas or 
emotions, but also in that the reaction to the perception of this association is often 
mixed. 
Of the physiological accounts of laughter, the one most cited and developed by 
later theorists is Herbert Spencer's release of 'surplus nervous energy' theory 
(1860). ' Briefly put, his proposal is that excess nervous energy builds up in the body 
and needs to find an outlet, which is provided by the physical exertion and expression 
of laughter. The pleasure of laughter is thus due to relief at the return of the body to 
its normal state. Sigmund Freud (1916,1928) proposes a similar (and equally 
influential) theory, arguing that laughter allows the indirect release of forbidden 
sexual or aggressive behaviour in a form that expends the least psychic energy. 9 
Although some critics (for example, Donald Hayworth') have suggested that there 
are plenty of other ways in which the body could release such excesses of energy, 
there exists much empirical evidence to support such views. Darwin, for example, 
observed that soldiers, after 'exposure to extreme danger, were particularly apt to 
burst into loud laughter at the smallest joke' (Darwin, p. 209). Also, to return to 
Miller's example, if one is in a situation that involves strong emotions (for example 
8 'The Physiology of Laughter', Macmillan's Magazine, I (March 1860), [p. 395?, unclear in 
source]. 
See, for example, Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, trans. by Joan Rivi&e (London: 
George AI len & Unwin, 1916), pp. 143-54; 'On Humour', International Journal of Psychoanalysis 
9 (1928), 1-6. 
" 'The Social Origin and Function of Laughter', Psychological Review, 35: 5 [n. d. ], 367-84. 
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one5s feelings about death, and particularly the death of someone one knows), but 
one9s opportunity to express these emotions is repressed by the social etiquette of 
(English) funerals that requires very formal behaviour, the urge to giggle can be 
explained in Spencerian terms as the necessary release of the repressed nervous 
energy. 
These two aspects of laughter, ambivalence and relief, may be seen as 
manifestations of what Miller would call 'bottom up' laughter in the individual. James 
Beattie (1776), like Miller, discounts as relatively unimportant the primitive (which 
he calls 'animal') laughter that is due to tickling or pleasure and 'unnatural' or 
nervous laughter which he describes as being the equivalent of a boy whistling as he 
passes a graveyard. Instead he concentrates on what he calls 'sentimental' (Miller's 
'top-down' or cognitive) laughter, that is, the appreciation of ludicrous ideas. Beattie 
considers that 
laughter arises from the view of two or more inconsistent, unsuitable, or 
incongruous parts or circumstances, considered as united in one complex 
object or assemblage, or as acquiring a sort of mutual relation from the 
peculiar manner in which the mind takes notice of them. " 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1819) considers that the importance of incongruity in 
laughter is that it highlights the limitations of the concepts we develop to describe 
and organise experience. Our initial relationship with the world is, he argues, 
mediated through our sensory experience, from which we then form generalisations 
and categories which tend, on ftulher experience, to prove inadequate. Conceptual 
knowledge, he continues, approximates to sensuous, or perceptual, knowledge 'as 
" 'On Laughter and Ludicrous Composition in Essays (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1776), pp. 
583-705 (p. 602). 
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mosaic approximates to painting' and laughter consists in the recognition of the 
resultant anomalies. 12 This makes us laugh, argues Schopenhauer, in celebration of 
our ability to overcome inadequate concepts and remain true to what we perceive. 
Perception, he says, being 'the original kind of knowledge inseparable from animal 
nature, in which everything that gives direct satisfaction to the will presents itself', 
we therefore get pleasure from the 'victory of knowledge of perception over 
-) 13 thought . 
Bergson takes this a step further by considering the world as it really is, 
unmediated by our sensory experience. Ralph Piddington paraphrases Bergson's long 
discussion on the subject as f6flows: 
the selective nature of our consciousness prevents us from attaining a full 
appreciation of the reality and individuality of any object. Our perceptions 
are determined by the utilitarian considerations of life. 14 
Implicit in Bergson's argument is the view that, being aware that our sensory 
experience is of a world that has its own existence separate from our perception of it, 
we are able to intuit (conceptualise) things as they exist in themselves. The Artist, he 
argues, is detached from such utilitarian considerations and therefore stands between 
nature (the world as it exists in itself) and life; 'the practice of his art enables us to 
attain a better appreciation of the individual reality of things, which in the practical 
12 The World as Will and Idea, trans. by R. B. Haldane and I Kemp, The English and Foreign 
Philosophical Library, 22,3 vols (London: TrObner, 1883), vol. 1, chap. 3, pp. 76-80 (p. 76). 
" The World as Will and Idea, trans. by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, The English and Foreign 
Philosophical Library, 23,3 vols (London: TrUbner., 1886), vol. 2, chap. 8, pp. 270-84, (pp. 279- 
80). 
" The Psychology of Laughter. - A Study in Social Adaptation (New York: Gamut Press, 1963), 
p. 193. Piddington refers to Bergson, Laughter, An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. by 
Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell (London: Macmillan, 1911) pp. 150-63. 
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affairs of life we classify in accordance with conventional needs' (paraphrased by 
Piddington, p. 193). This view is very similar to Miller's observation that humour 
enables us to practise flexibility, rather than relying entirely on 'rules of thumb', and 
significantly, Bergson argues that comedy stands in a similar relation to us as does 
art, that is, between nature and life. It is in this interpretation of hwnour, which relies 
on the concept of the possibility of a relationship between an individual and an 
external reality, that laughter and artistic endeavour are both intrinsically linked to 
creativity. The artist and the humorist both mediate between a particular aspect of 
external reality and their 'audience', creating a new concept, a new truth, in the mind 
of that 'audience'. By arguing that our perceptions are, in fact, limited by 'utilitarian 
considerations', Bergson therefore underniines Schopenhauer's sense of a 'victory of 
knowledge of perception over thought', proposing instead a relationship with an 
extraordinary individual whose freedom from everyday convention allows him or her, 
as it were, to have a foot in both worlds. This, of course, when applied to the role of 
the Artist, reflects a long history of critical thought which considers that the artist, 
the author, the genius and so on, hold a privileged position in society due to some 
special facility or vision which the rest of us lack. 
J. B. Baillie (192 1) develops Bergson's proposal by arguing that, since we 
cannot directly apprehend the 'world as it is', unmediated by the categories we create 
to make sense of it, it is perceived as chaos, and thus any incongruity we come across 
for the first time can be described as an instance of that chaos. Face to face with the 
problem of how to deal with the incongruous, we adopt a mental attitude to it 
(humour) in order to avoid chaos, and the delight evident in laughter is because we 
have 'triwnphed over the incoherent, we have kept our belief in the end which holds 
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its own, and we have preserved ourselves in face of the incongruous'. " Again, this 
argument is based on the assumption that the incongruous (the hitherto unknown) 
only appears chaotic because we have not yet assimilated it. Peter Jones points out 
that this ability of laughter to assimilate and so triumph over chaos has an 
emotional as well as a conceptual aspect. Writing in the context of humour during 
warfare, he says 
in a mad world, laughter is the only feasible response [ ... 
] George Santayana 
notes that the comic response can handle situations too bleak for tragedy. 
Humor offers a safety valve for pressures that might otherwise unbalance 
reason. 16 
While Schopenhauer argues that laughter celebrates our ability to maintain 
flexibility in our concepts by trusting our sensory experience, Baillie argues that it 
celebrates our ability to assimilate and therefore overcome the perceived chaos of the 
'world as it is', irrespective of how it strikes our senses, and thus apprehend new 
truths. Similarly, Jones argues that when one's immediate surroundings (rather than 
the full weight of the universe) appear chaotic, laughter can become a method of 
assimilating the experience and thus retaining (or regaining) one's balance (sanity). 
From the point of view of the individual, then, laughter can be seen in terms of 
ambivalence, relief and incongruity. Each of these accounts fundamentally concerns 
orientation. On the one hand laughter enables the individual to orientate him or 
herself emotionally, working through rrýxed feelings to question the appropriateness 
15 Studies in Human Nature (London: Bell, 1921), p. 291. A similar view can be found in Paul E. 
McGhee, 'On the Cognitive Origins of Incongruity Humor: Fantasy Assimilation versus Reality 
Assimilation', in The Psychology of Humor: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Issues, ed. by 
Jeffrey H. Goldstein and Paul E. McGhee (New York: Academic Press, 1972), pp. 61-80. 
" War and The Novelist (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1976), p. 48. 
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of his or her reactions, or promoting, through the release of stress, a return to a more 
balanced frame of mind. On the other, laughter allows us to explore our relationships 
not only with others, but with the 'world as it is', enabling us to assimilate new 
experiences and so grow conceptuaRy. Greig, as we have seen, considers that an 
'other' is essential to laughter, and Bergson argues that this 'other' holds a similar 
position to the Artist, mediating between an apparently chaotic reality and our 
'conventional needs' in order that we may develop. The underlying argument in all 
these accounts is that this process of orientation is not possible for one individual 
alone, and that a relationship with something (-one) outside the self is essential to 
laughter. 
The Fool 
It would seem obvious to suggest at this point that the 'other' necessary to laughter 
can be found within a community of individuals working together. The problem, 
however, is that, just as an individual behaves for the most part according to 
conventional needs, so too does society. Although much social laughter has to do 
with reaffirming and stabilising these needs, in order to introduce any truly new 
element (and thus guarantee that particular society's continued 
development) 
society's conventions must also be transcended. Here the role of the 
Fool becomes 
important, since his or her very function is to break society's rules. William 
Martineau divides the sociology of humour into three groups: joking relationships 
('the creation and reinforcement of a sense of solidarity and intimacy within groups'), 
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intergroup conflict, and intragroup control, which he calls 'fool making'. " In the first 
of these, laughter serves to bond the members of a social group together by mutual 
recognition of common knowledge, pleasure and affection, as evidenced by the 
laughter within a group that is not 'about' anything except the social dynamics of that 
group (as Provine's research indicates). The boundaries of such bonding are mediated 
by the links between humour and distress; one member of a group will always know 
if he or she has 'gone too far' by the response of the others. 
In the second, laughter serves to protect the group from outside threats, for 
example by mocking the habits or appearance of other races. In this context laughter 
has been seen by many as a symbolic form of aggression (for example, Horace Kaflen 
(1911), J. W. Crile (1916), Y. Delage (1919), A. M. Ludovici (1932), A. Rapp (1947, 
1949,195 1)). As Patricia Keith-Spiegel argues, 
gradually laughter and humor became a substitute for actual assault. The 
similarity of bodily stance (exposed teeth, contorted face, sprawling 
movements of the limbs, etc. ) in both fighting and laughing is pointed to as 
evidence. " 
Laughter (especially as mockery) can thus be used as a weapon; as Michael 
Neve says in an analysis of Freud's theory ofjoking behaviour, it is 'a civilised 
version of a lethal instinct'. 19 J. H. Burma argues that this is due to the flexibility that 
laughter allows, proposing, as Martineau puts it, that 'humor is well suited as a 
17 'A Model of the Social Functions of Humor', in The Psychology of Humor: Theoretical 
Perspectives and Empirical Issues, ed. by Jeffrey H. Goldstein and Paul E. McGhee (New York: 
Academic Press, 1972), pp. 10 1 -25 (p. 108). 
18 'Early Conceptions of Humor: Varieties and Issues' in Goldstein and McGhee, pp. 4-39 (p. 6). 
'9 'Freud's Theory of Humour, Wit and Jokes' in Durant and Miller, pp. 35-43 (p. 36). See also 
Freud, Wit and its Relation to the Unconscious, trans. with intro. by A. A. Brill (London: Fisher 
Unwin, 1916). 
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conflict device because of its adaptability to varying subject matters and its potential 
20 for subtly conveying malice' . 
The third aspect of social laughter is to serve a corrective or disciplinary 
function within the group in order to confirm the prevailing mores. As W. D. Wallis 
puts it, 'laughter is the jolly policeman who keeps the social traffic going after the 
approved manner'. 2' The simplest way to do this is to turn intergroup conflict devices 
inwards to mock those members of the group whose behaviour and attitudes are by 
consensus considered unacceptable. Many theorists have noticed that laughter has a 
tendency to identify a victim (for example, Rene Descartes (1649), David Hartley 
(1749), A. Bain (1859), James Sully (1902), Henri Bergson (1911), L. Cooper 
(1922), A. M. Ludovici (1932)). While the idea that laughter arises through a feeling 
of superiority has adherents as far back as Aristotle (whose Poetics are the main 
focus of Cooper's argument), the most famous discourse on the subject is, of course, 
Thomas Hobbes's 1650 account of laughter as 'sudden glory arising from some 
sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves; by comparison with the iffirmity 
of others'. 22 This is a powerful argument, most particularly perhaps because the idea 
of 'superiority' can be so broadly applied. Georg Hegel, for example, deals with it in 
ternis of incongruity in contending that 
every contrast between what is essential and its appearance, the object and 
its instrument, may be ridiculous [... but laughter in general is] little more 
" Martineau, p. 106, paraphrasing Burma, 'Humor as a Technique in Race Conflict', American 
Sociological Review, II (1946) 710-15. 
21 'Why do we LaughT, Scientific Monthly, 15 (1922), 343-47 (p. 344). 
" Humane Nature (London: T. Newcom for Fra. Bowman, 1650) chap. 9, p. 103. See also Hobbes's 
Leviathan (London: Crooke, 165 1 ), part 1, chap. 6, p. 27. 
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than an expression of self-satisfied shrewdness, a sign that [one has] 
sufficient wit to recognise such a fact and [is] aware of the fact. " 
It is clear from this argument that Hegel, too, considers that laughter has to do 
with the relationship between the 'essence' of an object and our perception of it (its 
4appearance'). This feeling of self-satisfaction implies a tendency to laugh at those 
whose behaviour shows that they have not noticed such a contrast between 
appearance and reality. To use CamMe Melinand's example, we might laugh at a man 
forcing a door that we know to be unlocked partly because of the incongruity of the 
idea of forcing an unlocked door, but mainly because we know it to be unlocked and 
24 he does not . 
For Harald H6ffding (189 1) on the other hand 'the mere possibility of 
employing laughter as a weapon shows that it presupposes power'. " He argues that 
the feeling of pleasure, which is the simplest cause of laughter, is from the 
nature of the case very often, and at a primitive stage ahnost exclusively, 
produced by impressions which satisfy the instinct of self preservation and 
appeal to the love of self Life is above all things a struggle for existence. 
(H6ffding, p. 292) 
In our struggle to preserve our own existence, he continues, such self- 
preservation may seem threatened by those with more power than ours, and so in 
order to satisfy this instinct we look for faults in authority figures. 
2' The Philosophy of Fine Art, trans., with notes, by F. P. B. Osmaston, 4 vols (London: G. Bell, 
1920), vol. 4, pp. 301-02. 
24 'Pourquoi rit-on? ', Revue des Deux Mondes, 137 (February 1895), [p. 612?, unclear in source]. 
25 Outlines of Psychology, trans. by Mary E. Lowndes (London: Macm i Ilan, 189 1), chap. 6, pp. 290- 
98 (p. 294). 
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Laughter is [therefore] not so much an expression of superior power. as an 
expression of deliverance [ ... ] The bare fact of anything occurring without 
the consent of the controlling authority suffices to arouse the consciousness 
of freedom. Authorities that have almost lost their power become the natural 
objects of the feeling of the ridiculous. (Hbffding, p. 294) 
Several theorists argue that since laughter involves the freedom of ideas that is 
associate with play, it expresses liberty rather than constraint (for example, A. 
Penjon (1893), and Charles Renouvier and L. Prat (1899)). Interpreted in political 
terms, this shows that laughter, as well as reinforcing social rules, can be used to 
criticise those rules, to break free from the strictures of authority and celebrate the 
individual. Thus the very victim identified as suitable for punishment by mockery for 
the good of society can at the same time be seen as a hero whose eccentricities 
deliver us from rigid convention. 
It is in this context that the Fool becomes an important figure. Martineau, 
considering the social functions of laughter, offers the following analysis of 0. 
Klapp's observations about fool making: 
To the group 'the fool represents values which are rejected by the group: 
causes that are lost, incompetence, failure, and fiasco. ' His position is lowly, 
yet valued, and he serves as a scapegoat, butt of humor, and cathartic 
symbol of aggression. He has the social license to depart from the group 
norms of propriety, which are ordinarily subject to sanction. Through the 
ridicule of his behaviour, he acts as a control mechanism (i. e., a negative 
example) enforcing the very propriety which he violates. Klapp's reference 
to fool making as a social process, however, appears to have even broader 
and more significant implications. He suggests that there is a continuous, 
collective process of ascribing the role of fool to people as a means of 
enforcing conformity, pressuring for status adjustment, or simply eliminating 
the deviant. Klapp's contribution integrates humor with a general 
understanding of participation in the process of social organization. 
26 
26 Martineau, p. 106, quoting Klapp, 'The Fool as a Social Type', American Journal of Sociology 55 
(1950), 157-62. 
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The Fool displays faults that are exaggerations of our own, thus reminding us 
of the proper way to behave. This role, which Martineau sees as essential in any 
society, has, of course, a specific instantiation in the medieval figure of the jester. For 
example, in a sermon given by Philip Cradelius in 1619 at the funeral of court jester J 
Hans Miesko, 'the preacher exhorted his congregation to treat such creatures kindly 
and use them as looking-glasses for their own weaknesses'. 27 
How the mentally or physically abnormal came traditionally to take this role 
sheds light on the second role, that of hero or saviour, that is indicated above. Noting 
the widespread use of smaH figures of grotesques of various kinds as protection 
against evil, Enid Welsford suggests that 'live' grotesques were kept by rich families 
for much the same purpose (Welsford, p. 61). 
A fool or dwarf was naturally lucky and might transfer his good luck to you 
while you transferred your bad luck to him. Now, this lucky-unlucky 
creature would be valuable as a permanent inmate of a household, and 
particularly in request as a safeguard for the King. He would also be very 
much in request to ward off the Evil Eye from the priests who were 
performing important ritual acts by parodying their rites and ridiculing their 
sacred persons. But here he would be on very dangerous ground. He might 
have to do this as a duty and yet have to be punished for his irreverence, or 
again, if the central rite was the solemn slaying of the King himself, he might 
prove a very convenient substitute. At this point he would be drawn into the 
ritual and so become the type of scapegoat who was periodically 
excommunicated or put to death. (Welsford, p. 74) 
It thus becomes clear why those 'too stupid or helpless' to defend themselves, 
or be of other use to society, were used for this purpose (Welsford, p. 67). Another 
widespread superstition exists, however, that considers the mad to have supernatural 
powers. 
2' Enid Welsford, The Fool: His Social & Literary History (London: Faber and Faber, 1935), pp. 
148-49. 
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The lunatic is an awe-inspiring figure whose reason has ceased to function 
normally because he has become the mouthpiece of a spirit, or power 
external to himself, and so has access to hidden knowledge - especially knowledge of the future. (Welsford, p. 76) 
In Arab culture an example of this belief can be found in tales of possession by 
djinns, supernatural beings who give knowledge but also bring madness. One such 
tells of Buhlul-al-Madjnun (or Buhlul the 'Djinn-inspired'), a ninth century court 
adviser to the Caliph Haroun-ar-Rashid, whose name came in time to be used as a 
noun meaning 'a kind of fool-saint who was apt to express himself by great bursts of 
laughter' (Welsford, pp. 80-8 1). Not only is the madness itself a sign of unusual 
knowledge, the possession of this knowledge is expressed by laughter, which, as has 
previously been argued, is also linked to the ability to perceive things inaccessible to 
the rest of us. 
A significant shift is detectable between the position in court of the jester 
Miesko and that of the advisor Buhlul. Where the former merely serves as a mirror 
for our existing behaviour (i. e., as a Made Fool), the latter is in a position to teach us 
new things (in other words, he functions as a Transcendent Fool). The Fool, 'in the 
paradoxical position of virtual outlawry combined with utter dependence on the 
support of the social group to which he belongs' is at liberty to experiment with the 
mundane in ways that the rest of us are not (Welsford, p. 55). Because of our 
biological urge constantly to develop, we can therefore delight in the skill of such 
eccentricity as is displayed by the music hall clown Grock in his autobiography when 
he says that 
all kinds of inanimate objects have had a way of looking at me reproachfully 
and whispering to me in unguarded moments: 'We"ve been waiting for you 
... at 
last you've come ... take us now, and turn us 
into something 
different. ' ... To use onions 
for nothing but ftying and making into sauce ... 
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how humdrum 
... 
how unimaginative! [ ... ] This mastering by will-power, t1fis transforming the fittle, every-day annoyances, not only overcoming, but 
actually transforming them into something strange and terrific [makes his, 
he claims, the best job in the world]. (Quoted in Welsford, pp. 3 09-10) 
The value of this ability to see ordinary things in an extraordinary new light fies 
not only in its ability to entertain, but also in its great creative potential. Henry David 
Thoreau acknowledges in his journals the necessity sometimes to take a holiday from 
serious endeavour and inject a note of chaos into one's thinking. He argues that this 
does not just take the form of a release of pressure, it also provides insights that 
would otherwise not occur. 
By spells seriousness will be forced to cut capers, and drink a deep and 
refreshing draught of silliness; to turn this sedate day [Sunday] of Lucifer's 
and Apollo's, into an all fools' day for Harlequin and Cornwallis. The sun 
does not grudge his rays to either, but they are alike patronized by the gods. 
Like over-tasked school-boys, all my members and nerves and sinews 
petition Thought for a recess, and my very thigh-bones itch to slip away 
from under me, and run and join the melee. I exult in stark inanity, leering on 
nature and the soul. We think the gods reveal themselves only to sedate and 
musing gentlemen. But not so; the buffoon in the ri-ýidst of his antics catches 
unobserved glimpses, which he treasures for the lonely hour. When I have 
been playing tomfool, I have been driven to exchange the old for a more 
liberal and catholic philosophy. " 
From the social perspective, then, we see that laughter serves three purposes; 
bonding together members of a group, protecting that group from outside threats and 
acting to correct faults within the group. The activity of identifying a victim who 
represents these faults and is then punished on soeiety's behalf has been called fool 
making. However, because of the way laughter works from the individual perspective 
- that is, enabling one to come to terms with incongruities 
in order to expand one's 
" Journal entry for 24 January, 184 1, cited in Critical Essays on American Humor, ed. by Wi II iam 
Bedford Clark and W. Craig Turner (Boston, MA: G. K. Hall, 1984), p. 1. 
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horizons - the Fool has a second role. In representing those things that he outside the 
bounds of normal behaviour, and especiaRy, through association with madness, such 
knowledge of the world as is inaccessible to those of us trapped within the everyday 
social order, the Fool becomes a prophet. Moreover, in the communication of this 
knowledge to us, he reveals himself to be an Artist. 
We have seen in the foregoing arguments that, complex as the phenomenon of 
laughter is, several key elements emerge that serve to define its function. These are: 
its importance for social orientation, its place on an emotional continuum that closely 
relates it to other emotions such as fear or anger, and the role of incongruity in 
enabling the individual to rehearse new and different ways of seeing the world. 
Laughter, whether discussed in terms of biology, philosophy, sociology or literature, 
has therefore to do with boundaries, with the limits of what is knowable or doable. In 
this there are strong links between laughter and madness, which is also concerned 
with the limits of thought and behaviour and those who exceed those limits, a 
position characterised by the figure of the Fool. 
Laughter of Revelation and Laughter of ApocaIVse 
Technical distinctions between sanity and insanity have historically proven 
problematic, chiefly because the apparently simple notion of 'normality' is so difficult 
to quantify. '9 It is clear, however, that there exists a pragmatic conception of 
normality against which one may judge situations and behaviour. The easiest way to 
show this is by looking at the everyday language used to describe madness. The mad 
29 See, for example, Roy Porter's discussion on this subject in A Social History of Madness: Stories 
of the Insane (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987), chap. 2, 'Madness and Psychiatry Talking: 
A Flistorical Dialogue', pp. 8-38. 
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are 'cracked% 'unhinged', 'unbalanced', they have gone 'to pieces' or 'out of their 
minds% they have suffered 'coflapse' or 'breakdown', they are 'disturbed', 
'deranged', 'upset'. What is obvious immediately is that these metaphors can be 
divided into the broader thematic groups of unity and balance, the normal individual 
being both 'wholesome' and 'well-balanced'. Further, one talks of the mad as being 
'away with the fairies', 'out to lunch' and 'round the bend'. Where being 'out of 
one"s mind' or 'beside oneself indicate an unhealthy separation within the individual, 
such metaphors finiher intimate a separation from community, an 'apartness', that 
highlights the fact that this ideal balance is social as well as personal. It also, 
incidentally, indicates ('away with the fairies') the long association of the mad with 
the supematural. 
What is particularly interesting in the context of the present discussion is that 
the metaphors used to describe laughter follow exactly the same pattern. One 'falls 
about' laughing, laughs one's 'head ofT, 'cracks up' with laughter. One loses control 
of oneself to the extent that people talk of 'pissing themselves' laughing, of 'going 
into fits' of laughter. Given this similarity between madness vocabulary and laughter 
vocabulary, it is therefore no surprise that one may also laugh 'like a loon', or 'like a 
maniac'. Indeed, the fundamental link between the two is indicated by the stock 
playground response to a claim that something is ftmy: 'do you mean fimny-ha-ha or 
ftmny-peculiar? ' 
Clearly, ideas of rationality and irrationality have much to do with these 
descriptions. By associating the rational with the controlled, systematic and organised 
and the irrational with the chaotic, metaphors of breakage or loss of balance express 
an anxiety of disintegration into chaos, of loss of control. It seems clear that, 
particularly in post-Enfightenment Europe, society is constructed around the ideal of 
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a rational, responsible adult who goes about his or her business in a logical manner 
while in constant danger (both internally and externally derived) from the forces of 
chaos. Probably the earliest expression of the idea that norniality constitutes such an 
ideal state can be found in Aristotle's Ethics, in which he describes virtue as 
a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined 
by a rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to 
determine it. It is a mean between two kinds of vice, one of excess and the 
other of deficiency; and also for this reason, that whereas these vices fan 
short of or exceed the right measure in both feelings and actions, virtue 
discovers the mean and chooses it. 'O 
Aristotle sees his 'doctrine of the mean' as entailing, 'as the Pythagoreans 
represented it, [that evil] is a form of the Unlimited, and good of the Limited' 
(Ethics, p. 10 1). He therefore seems to argue that virtue entails system, while 
manifestations of anti-system are necessarily evil. The Pythagorean distinction 
between the Unlimited and the Limited can, however, be taken to represent a more 
general distinction between chaos and cosmos, where human virtue (wisdom, 
normality, sanity) is the touchstone by which we keep our bearings, both socially and 
in the world as a whole. Evil then can be described as simply 'losing one's way' (as 
indeed in many cultures it is). In this context, it seems unsurprising that the mad and 
the evil are often depicted as emissaries of chaos and as coming from 'outside'. 
'Sanity' is here conflated with 'virtue'. Aristotle is describing the position that the 
(. prudent man' would naturally take, balanced in all circumstances between two 
possible extremes, both of which are vices. The 'rational principle' and the 'prudent' 
" The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by J. A. K. Thomson (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), 
pp. 10 1 -02. 
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man that applies it have their opposites in the 'irrational' and the 'foolish' - both of 
which, of course, are as closely associated with madness as they are with evil. 
Bertrand Russell has argued that, should such a 'prudent man) actually exist, he 
would be a phenomenal bore, and that this definition of virtue makes all powerful 
emotions and displays of creative genius evil. As he says, 
the [Ethics] appeals to the respectable middle-aged, and has been used by 
them, especially since the seventeenth century, to repress the ardours and 
enthusiasms of the young. But to a man with any depth of feeling it is likely 
to be repulsive. " 
Aristotle does allow in his theories for the needs of the individual, saying, for 
example, that what would constitute gluttony in an unfit person would be proper 
appetite in an athlete, which may undermine somewhat Russell's remarks about the 
different needs of the middle-aged and the young. What Russell means by 'depth of 
feeling', however, implies the ability we have seen in the Artist or Fool to look 
beyond the 'prudent' and is more akin to the sudden, uncontrolled and unpredictable 
emotions that are experienced in moments of inspiration, epiphany or revelation than 
to any putative steady state. Given the foregoing suggestions about the links between 
madness and laughter, Russell's criticism of the Aristotelian mode of thought could 
therefore be equaRy weU expressed by saying that the 'prudent man' has no sense of 
humour. An important aim of this thesis is to argue that this is no smaH problem, as 
laughter, especially shared laughter, is fundamental to both creativity and 
development. 
History of Western Philosophy, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 196 1) p. 185. 
40 
While Aristotle does argue that one should 'kill [one's] opponents' earnestness 
with jesting and their jesting with earnestness', 32 Russell's criticism still holds, as the 
former's observation only applies within the rules of society and more specifically 
within the rules of rhetoric, a highly ritualised fonn of contest for contest's sake. As 
we have seen, the value of the Fool's laughter is that it is creative in that it works 
outside the normal rules. Joseph Addison also argues that laughter restores balance, 
asserting that 'a man should not live as though there were no God in the world; nor, 
at the same time, as if there were no men in iti. 33 By 'God' (in this context) I take 
Addison to mean something more like the 'world as it exists in itself in the realist 
sense, than, for example, the Church as an Institution. By introducing this idea of 
God into the argument, Addison takes us outside the sphere of the world of Men, 
thus addressing the problem inherent in the Aristotelian view. Balance is important,, 
however, because, as Hartley argues in a sinfilar approach to that later used by 
Schopenhauer, laughter gets at the reality of things by examining incongruities. 
Consequently, 
persons who give themselves much to Mirth, Wit, and Humour, must 
thereby greatly disqualify their Understandings for the Search after Truth; 
inasmuch as by the perpetual hunting after apparent and partial Agreements 
and Disagreements [ ... 
] whilst the true Natures of the Things themselves 
afford real Agreements and Disagreements, that are very different, or quite 
opposite, a Man must by degrees pervert all his Notions of Things 
themselves, and become unable to see them as they really are. 
(Hartley, p. 440) 
" Piddington, p. 134, citing Roberts's translation of Aristotle's Rhetorica. 
33 Addison, The Spectator, 598, quoted by Piddington, p. 160. 
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H6ffding, in his discussion of the relationship between laughter and the sublime 
that was touched on earlier, argues that we establish our position in the universe by 
orientating ourselves between these two extremes. 
The feeling of the ridiculous, then, depends, like the feeling of the sublime, 
on a contrast. But the two feelings stand, besides, in a relation of contrast to 
one another. They both rest on one and the same fundamental relation, on 
the relation between greatness and insignificance, looked at from opposite 
sides. For man's real position is this, that he must bring his force to bear on 
his surroundings, must overcome and crush resistance, while at the same 
time he must feel his insignificance in face of the great powers of nature and 
history. (H6ffding, pp. 297-98) 
This observation highlights a philosophical problem that also explains much of 
the ambivalence towards madness that is evident both in everyday life and in 
literature. This problem is the simple yet universal one of the position of the 
individual. While desiring to belong to a community, we struggle to maintain our 
identity within it. While wishing to understand the workings of the Universe, we are 
unable to because the very acts of perception and cognition that might allow us to do 
this keep us separate from it. While acknowledging our resemblance to the rest of the 
animal kingdom, we inevitably feel that we are not quite like other animals. 
These contradictions are present in us even without such things as iflness, 
damage or stunted development. The free thinker can be admired for his or her 
individuality; the person who sees visions seems to be in touch with parts of the 
Universe that are inaccessible to the rest of us; someone who howls like a wolf may 
seem in touch with some important instinct that the rest of us have lost. On the other 
hand, the anarchist is a threat to the fabric of society; the visionary makes no sense 
and is therefore mad; the wolfinan has lost his facility for rational thought and can 
42 
therefore hardly be seen as human at all. The Fool is a figure that has long been used 
to describe this problem to ourselves, as Welsford points out. 
Fundamentally the clown depends, not upon the external confficts of hostile 
groups, but upon a certain inner contradiction in the soul of every man. In 
the first place we are creatures of the earth, propagating our species like 
other animals, in need of food, clothing and shelter and of the money that 
procures them. Yet if we need money, are we so wholly creatures of the 
earth? If we need to cover our nakedness by material clothes or spiritual 
ideals, are we so like the other animals? This incongruity is exploited by the 
Fool. The Fool is an unabashed glutton and coward and knave, he is - as we 
say -a natural; we laugh at him and enjoy a pleasant sense of superiority; he 
looks at us oddly and we suspect that he is our alter ego; he winks at us and 
we are delighted at the discovery that we also are gluttons and cowards and 
knaves. The rogue has freed us from shame [ ... ] We laugh to find that we 
are as natural as the fool, but we laugh also because we are normal enough 
to know how very unnatural it is to be as natural as all that. 
(Welsford, p. 318) 
The situation is fijrther complicated by the nature of the conununity in which an 
individual finds him- or herself Being an artificial structure, any society is open to 
criticism and is unlikely (particularly since it wiU always be composed of individuals) 
to be universaffy seen as perfect. The need for structure, the fear of anarchy and 
chaos that most of us feel, however, leads us to cling to whichever set of rules we 
find ourselves bom into. In some (usually those in power, who have a vested interest 
in maintaining the status quo) this becomes so entrenched that it can be easily 
forgotten that the structure is artificial. Morals and attitudes whose origins have been 
forgotten are taken as absolutes and transgressors are seen, not as social critics, but 
as dangerous and subversive voices from the void. Madness, indeed, whether or not 
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one is seen to be mad at all,, is therefore fundamentally linked to the society in which 
one finds oneself 
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Welsford continues, 
pitted against Leviathan, against the system that his group has created, the 
individual is ahnost as helpless as he is when pitted against the laws of 
Nature - and here, too, there is an inner contradiction. The normal man wills 
the existence of Leviathan because it is essential to his self-preservation, but 
the normal man has also a latent, subconscious antagonism to Leviathan 
because it is always threatening to swallow him whole, it thwarts, opposes 
and limits him, both as a 'natural' and as an original personality. 
(Welsford, p. 318) 
Clearly, what are being described here are the contradictions inherent in the 
human condition expressed from the individual and the social perspectives. What is 
interesting is Welsford's observation that the role of the Fool is primarily to orientate 
the individual as regards his or her place within either 'Nature' or society. Taken 
alongside the previous observation that the function of laughter is to exercise 
flexibility in our conceptions so as not to become trapped by conventional thinking, 
the Fool then comes to represent the possibility of escape from the closed system that 
'Leviathan' creates. 
I have defined madness, in its broadest terms, initiafly as nothing more than 
deviancy from the norm. The conimon-sense perception of this norm is supported by 
the metaphors of breakage or disorientation used in everyday language and can be 
defined by Aristotle's 'doctrine of the mean'. However, as Russell's criticism of this 
doctrine shows, creativity must by necessity deviate from the norm. Since such 
creativity, as we have seen in the foregoing arguments about the function of laughter, 
is essential to the adaptability of the human species, deviancy must also be interpreted 
Michel Foucault discusses this at length in Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the 
Age oV'Reason, trans. by Richard Howard (London: Tavistock, 1967). 
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as an essential aspect of human behaviour. I have also shown that madness as an idea 
appeals to us because it touches on the contradictions inherent in our position in 
society and in nature (the world as it exists in itself) that are a universal condition of 
humanity. Since this is an ongoing and vital process, a second definition of madness 
emerges that concerns not deviancy, but stagnation. Because adaptability is so crucial 
to our long-term existence, becoming entirely grounded in automatic behaviour or 
ritualised social habits can also be defined as mad. 
In order to clarify these issues I shall consider madness from three perspectives. 
The first of these, which I shall call 'Institutional', describes a society so bounded by 
ritual and rule-systems that it has reached a point of stagnation. The Institution is a 
closed system, with no means of interpreting the world other than through its long- 
established (and often inappropriate) rules. Anything it experiences that falls outside 
these strict boundaries is, therefore, seen by the Institution as either meaningless or 
threatening. 
The second perspective from which madness can be viewed is the point of view 
of an individual who, although he or she exists within an Institution, finds him- or 
herself unable or unwilling to comply with the rules of the systen-4 and who is thus in 
the liminal position of recognising the madness (as limitation) of the Institution while 
being perceived as mad (as deviant) by that Institution. Typically, such characters, the 
Protagonists, initially have a role within the Institution, and only gradually come to 
realise the dangers inherent in its restrictions. Despite this recognition, however, the 
Protagonist by him- or herself is unable to escape the Institution's influence to 
achieve a more open and balanced existence. This can only be accomplished through 
a laughing relationship with a character whose transcendence of the Institution can 
teach the Protagonist new ways of seeing: the Fool. 
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The third perspective concerns the madness of the Fool. Existing outside the 
structured system of the Institution, the Fool represents madness as chaotic anti- 
system. Resisting defmition, containment within the structures of language, the Fool 
is an ambiguous figure whose limitless potential can be misleadingly identified with 
chaos or meaninglessness. It is crucial, therefore, that such figures should first be 
perceived by the Protagonist in terms that are bounded and meaningful (though 
limited). Because they initially function within the Institution, the Protagonist first 
understands the Fool in terms that are meaningful to the Institution: as Made Fool. 
Then, due to the Protagonist's own lininal position, he or she is open to a broader 
understanding of what the Fool represents, who is then revealed as Transcendent. By 
learning just enough from the Transcendent Fool's laughter to re-orientate him- or 
herself, the Protagonist can thus escape the stagnant Institution without conunitting 
him- or herself fully to chaos. 
Seen from these three perspectives, madness emerges first as being stuck in the 
inflexibility of a closed system, second as ineffective struggle against that system, and 
third as the potentiaRy chaotic yet at the same time potentiaHy creative force that can 
reveal a way out of the system and so make the struggle meaningful and directed. As 
I have suggested above, it is the relationship between the second and third 
interpretations of madness that creates meaning rather than chaos, and it is this 
relationship that I will now define. 
Laughter, as I have argued, depends upon the assimilation of new experiences 
or ideas in concert with an 'other'. Thus the essence of the function of laughter can 
be seen as entailing a 'laughing relationship' between someone who is prepared to 
assimilate such experiences and someone who has access to them and can therefore 
communicate them. I shall identify two types of laughing relationship that, while 
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exhibiting the same basic dynamics, produce different results. The first of these 
concerns what I shall call the Laughter of Revelation, examples of which are analysed 
in Chapter One. It involves an individual's recovery or growth assisted by a Fool. 
The Fool transcends the Institution with its problems and restrictions and either 
enters another him-or herself or, by example, allows another to enter. Another way of 
describing this movement is to see it as escape. Crucially, it is the laughter of the 
Fool, and the understanding of it by the Protagonist, that communicates this 
possibility. In this way, revelation can be described as 'getting the joke'. The 
communication of this revelation, this 'joke', to the reader leads to the designation of 
the Protagonist as advocate or champion of the Fool's message. 
The second type of laughing relationship (which is analysed in Chapter Two) I 
call the Laughter of Apocalypse. Typically, the Fool in these examples appears as a 
demon, and his or her laughter takes the form of mockery. The apocalyptic Fool's 
airn is, or is perceived to be, destructive both of the individual and of social bonds. 
Institutional, or closed, thinking, because of its lack of flexibility, is ill-equipped to 
deal with the threat that this type of Fool poses. The Protagonists, therefore, emerge 
as those characters who are imaginative or creative enough to understand the Fool's 
laughter and respond to it with a balancing, defensive, laugh. Thus while the sense of 
Protagonist as advocate for the Fool's message to the reader still holds, there is also 
a sense in which the Protagonist acts as champion for his or her community, 
defending it against the Fool as demon. The Laughter of Apocalypse therefore takes 
the fonn not of a relationship in the sense described in Chapter One, but of a battle 
between two opposing forces, both of which are often destroyed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: LAUGHTER OF REVELATION 
Introduction 
In this chapter I shall explore three examples of the laughing relationship that 
constitutes the Laughter of Revelation. The novels discussed here illustrate the 
pattern I described in the Introduction, in which a Protagonist, trapped in the closed 
system of an Institution, is shown a way out by the laughter of a Fool. In each case., 
the Protagonist (who in all three of these examples is male) comes to realise that his 
situation is untenable, although he is initially unable to understand why, or to do 
anything about it by himself This puts him in a Eminal position that enables him to 
understand the alternatives that the Fool represents. 
To distinguish between the perception of the Fool from the point of view of the 
Institution and from the point of view of the Protagonist, I shall refer to him (again, 
all three of the Fools discussed in this chapter are male) as either a Made Fool 
(resulting from the notion of 'fool-making' described in the Introduction) or as a 
Transcendent Fool. In this way, the same character, seen by an Institution in terms of 
fool-making, and therefore as having a strictly limited function, may also be seen by 
the Protagonist (and thus revealed to the reader) as a Transcendent Fool, with a 
much broader creative potential. Transcendence here implies an existence outside the 
closed system of the Institution, although it is important that the Fool is first 
perceived as 'made' because, in order for the Protagonist to understand the 
revelation, he must first understand the Fool in the terms of the Institution in which 
he is trapped. The Laughter of Revelation is therefore a process of enlightenment, in 
which a Protagonist who has already rejected an Institution but has, as yet, no means 
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of fmding new tenns on which to live, is gradually enabled, through recognition of 
the transcendence of the Fool, to accept a more open existence. 
Catch-22 
When Joseph Heller created his vision of the American Air Corps, and by analogy the 
state of American society in the years following the Second World War, he produced 
an image so powerful, and so familiar, that the title phrase rapidly entered the 
language as a way to describe the ultimate in closed systems. Catch-22 (1961) 
describes the life of several Air Corps squadrons based on the island of Pianosa off 
the coast of Italy towards the end of a war that has, to all intents and purposes, 
already been won, and the actions of the Institution, in this case the American war 
machine, although originally meaningful, have become little more than an exercise in 
self-perpetuation. Realising that the missions they fly, while still threatening their 
lives, no longer serve any purpose other than to increase the glory of officers who 
stay on the ground writing memoranda to one another, many of the men begin to feel 
trapped in a pointless and dangerous circle over which they have no control. 
It is in this context that we follow bombardier Captain John Yossarian's 
ap arently chaotic progress through the narrative. When asked in interview which IT 
aspects of the novel were the most important, Heller replied, 
the theme of insanity accepted without any eye-blinking, the feeling of 
frustration - of impotence, actually -a succession of scenes where the 
characters just can't do anything, physical or mental [ ... 
] The truth - the 
dangers - are so obvious and so simple, yet [Yossarian] can't make himself 
understood [ ... ]I want to keep this sense of 
injustice - the element of the 
49 
tribe - the judges waiting to judge, having this tremendous amount of power 
of force behind them. ' 
Although much of the narrative centres around those characters who rebel 
against the system, the cycle of meaningless and arbitrary action becomes so powerful 
that eventually even those officers who generate this self-perpetuation are at its 
mercy. The prime example of this is when Generals Peckem and Dreedle, who battle 
one another for bureaucratic supremacy throughout the novel, are suddenly both 
ousted by the promotion of Scheisskopf, an officer so out of touch with the realities 
of warfare that his one ambition is to create the perfect parade. 
The more the Institution becomes divorced from its original function of waging 
war, the more it becomes a creature of language, detached from anything that the 
language could be said to signify. Heller has created a world where he can play out, 
as Sanford Pinsker puts it, his 'dark, satirical conviction that language is power, that 
language is what passes for reality, and that the Real and the Rational have, at best, a 
slim chance for a hearing'. 2 Gary Davis argues that language is always discontinuous 
with reality, and that the importance of Catch-22 as a novel is that it overtly 
expresses this, thus demythologising our everyday assumptions about discourse. 
Quoting Eugenio Donato, Davis says that interpretation 'is nothing but sedimenting 
' Paul Krassner, 'An Impolite Interview with Joseph Heller', in A Catch-22 Casebook, ed. by 
Frederick Kiley and Walter McDonald (New York: Crowell, 1973), pp. 273-93 (p. 293). Although 
retrospective analyses by authors of their own work can be problematic, this seems a valid summary 
of the novel. 
Understanding Joseph Heller (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 199 1), p. 12. 
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one layer of language upon another to produce an illusory depth which gives us the 
temporary spectacle of things beyond words'. 
The Army's [sic] entire administrative procedure arises from this ability to 
put purposeless, self-reflexive discourse into action within its field of 
activity. Ultimately its self-contained organization and action define a closed 
world whose 'illusory depth' becomes its inhabitants' only 'reality'. 
(Davis, p. 70) 
To manipulate this 'reality', and thus keep its inhabitants permanently trapped 
in illusion, the Air Corps need apply only one rule; the linguistic conundrum of 
Catch-22. Early in the novel, Yossarian asks the squadron medic, Doc Daneeka, to 
relieve him of duty and is told that for this to be possible Yossarian must be certified 
insane. Pointing out that his tent-mate, Orr, is insane, Yossarian argues that he 
should, therefore, be grounded. Perhaps, concedes Daneeka, but there is a catch. 
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which specified that a 
concern for one's own safety in the face of dangers that were real and 
immediate was the process of a rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be 
grounded. All he had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no 
longer be crazy and would have to fly more missions. 4 
The 'theme of insanity', pervaded by the iflusory qualities of Catch-22, is 
presented in such a way as to make it notoriously difficult to make sense of the 
novel's narrative. Clinton S. Burhans Jr. divides the critics into two groups, those 
who consider the novel to be organised and methodical, and those who see it as 
3 'Catch-22 and the Language of Discontinuity', Novel, 12: 1 (1978), 66-77 (p. 67) (repr. in Critical 
Essays on Joseph Heller, ed. by James Nagel (Boston, MA: G. K. Hall, 1984), pp. 62-74). Davis 
quotes from Donato, 'The Two Languages of Criticism', in The Languages of Criticism and the 
Sciences of Man: The Structuralist Controversy, ed. by Richard A. Macksey and Eugenio Donato 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), p. 96. 
4(, 
, atch-22 
(New York: Dell, 1962), p. 47. Subsequent references appear in parentheses within the 
text. 
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'episodic and formless'. ' James Nagel, Jan Solomon and Doug Gaukroger are the 
best known exponents of the view that Catch-22 is structured, each of them having 
conducted painstaking analyses of either Heller's working methods (Nagel) or of the 
novel itself (Solomon and Gaukroger). 6 Of those critics who have accused Heller of 
formlessness, perhaps the most scathing are Norman Mailer and Joseph Waldmeir. ' 
Robert Brustein, on the other hand, while still seeing the novel as formless, sees this 
as a positive attribute, arguing that 
[Heller] is concerned entirely with that thin boundary of the surreal, the 
borderline between hilarity and horror, which, much like the apparent 
formlessness of the unconscious, has its own special integrity and 
coherence. ' 
Burhans argues that the two views are not mutually exclusive. While the 
structure and chronology appear chaotic, leaping without warning between incidents 
that happen many months apart and often returning to the same scene, the novel 
overall exhibits a series of tonal shifts from the superficially comic at the start, 
through ever more dark, disturbing and violent scenes to a denouement which, while 
having much tonafly in common with the beginning, is, naturafly, affected by what has 
' 'Spindrift and the Sea: Structural Patterns and Unifying Elements in Catch-22', in Nagel 1984, 
pp. 40-51 (p. 40) (first publ. in Twentieth-Century Literature, 19 (1973), 239-50). 
6 Nagel, 'The Catch-22 Note Cards', Studies in the Novel 8 (1976), 394-405 (repr. in Nagel 1984, 
pp. 51-61); Solomon, 'The Structure of Joseph Heller's Catch-22', Critique: Studies in Modern 
Fiction 9: 2 (1967), 46-57 (repr. in Kiley and McDonald, pp. 122-32); Gaukroger, 'Time Structure 
in Catch-22', Critique: Studies in Modern Fiction 12: 2 (1970), 70-85 (repr. in Kiley and 
McDonald, pp. 132-44). See also David M. Craig; Tilting at Mortality: Narrative Strategies in 
Joseph Heller's Fiction (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1997), who reproduces at A3 size 
Heller's incredibly detailed plan of the novel. 
7 Mailer, 'Some Children of the Goddess' in Contemporary American Novelists, ed. by Harry T. 
Moore (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964), pp. 13-14; Waldmeir, 'Two 
Novelists of the Absurd: Heller and Kesey', Wisconsin Studies in Contemporary Literature 5: 3 
(1964), 192-204. 
8 'Catch-22: the Logic of Survival in a Lunatic World', in Nagel 1984, pp. 27-31 (p. 30). 
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come in between. 9 HeHer has stated that it was, in fact, his intention to produce a 
work that combines chaos and structure in this way. 
I tried to give it a structure that would reflect and complement the content 
of the book itself, and the content of the book really derives from our 
present atmosphere, which is one of chaos, of disorganisation, of absurdity, 
of cruelty, of brutality, of insensitivity, but at the same time one in which 
people, even the worst people, I think are basically good, are motivated by 
humane impulses [ ... ] It was constructed almost meticulously, and with a 
meticulous concern to give the appearance of a formless novel. (Krassner, 
pp. 276-77, see note 1) 
That this appearance of formlessness has been meticulously constructed is 
evident in the way Heller has used certain key elements to indicate a sense of 
progress through the novel. Jan Solomon, for example, has pointed out that two 
important chronologies in Catch-22 are the number of missions the men are required 
to fly and Yossarian's visits to hospital. Although he sees these as contradictory, 
Doug Gaukroger refutes this, arguing that the novel's time scheme is 'both plausible 
and logical'. 'O Both chronological schemata are important because they are examples 
of the way Catch-22 works as a closed system as seen from both the social and the 
individual perspectives. Because the men can never quite reach the required number 
before it is raised again, Pinsker observes, 'the bombing missions [ ... ] have the look 
of futile circles'; they exist only to keep the men exactly where they are. Siýnilarly 
futile, he argues, are Yossarian's attempts to escape these circles by 'hiding out in the 
9 W. K. Thomas has produced a comprehensive mythological analysis of Catch-22 that depends 
largely on the idea of seasonal cycles, through which he also argues that the novel exhibits these 
shifts of tone; 'The Mythic Dimension of Catch-22', Texas Studies in Literature and Language 15 
(1973), 189-98. 
'0 Solomon 'The Structure of Joseph Heller's Catch-22', in Kiley and McDonald, pp. 123-24., 
Gaukroger, 'Time Structure in Catch-22', in Kiley and McDonald, p. 144. John w. Hunt also 
recognises that the number of missions required functions in this way; 'Comic Escape and Anti- 
Vision: Joseph Heller's Catch-22', in Kiley and McDonald 1973, pp. 242-47 (p. 124). 
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infirmary' (p. 32, p. 29). An important distinction does, however. need to be drawn 
between the two chronologies, as, while the number of missions climbs regularly and 
inexorably, Yossarian's hospital visits echo the increasing violence identified by 
Burhans, since on each occasion he is admitted for a more serious, and finafly life- 
threatening, complaint. Thus, while Yossarian continues to employ the strategy of 
'hiding out' in an envirom-nent that he perceives to be safe, it is shown to be 
inadequate to protect him from an increasingly dangerous reality. This has crucial 
implications for the development of Yossarian's character. 
The novel opens with Yossarian. in hospital, malingering with a fake liver 
complaint to avoid flying more than his 44 missions. It is here that he first meets 
Chaplain Albert Tappman, who clearly thinks he is dealing with a paranoid lunatic. 
'Be careful in those other wards, Father, ' Yossarian warned. 'That's 
where they keep the mental cases. They're filled with lunatics' [ ... ] 
'M. P. s won't protect you, because they're craziest of all. I'd go with you 
myself, but I'm scared stiff. Insanity is contagious. This is the only sane 
ward in the whole hospital. Everybody is crazy but us. This is probably the 
only sane ward in the whole world for that matter. ' 
The chaplain rose quickly and edged away from Yossarian's bed, and 
then nodded with a conciliating smile and promised to conduct himself with 
appropriate caution. (C-22, p. 14) 
In these opening pages of the novel, as Morris Dickstein points out, Yossarian 
is a fully functioning part of the Air Corps' lunatic system. 
" Officers in the hospital 
are ordered to censor the letters of enlisted-men patients and, finding that their fives 
are only slightly more interesting than his own, Yossarian invents gatnes to pass the 
time. 
" 'Black Humor and History: Fiction in the Sixties', in Black Humor: Critical Essays, ed. by Alan 
R. Pratt (New York: Garland, 1993), pp. 123-53 (p. 139) (orig. publ. in The Partisan Review, 43 
(1975), 185-211). 
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Death to all modifiers, he declared one day, and out of every letter that 
passed through his hands went every adverb and every adjective. The next 
day he made war on articles. He reached a much higher plane of creativity 
the following day when he blacked out everything in the letters but a, an and 
the. That erected more dynamic intralinear tensions, he felt, and in just about 
every case left a message far more universal. (C-22, p. 8) 
As Davis points out, this treatment of language as though it is reality 
(Yossarian also destroys whole towns merely by blacking out their names) and the 
reduction of everything by this means to useless universals is exactly what is involved 
in adhering to the principles of Catch-22 (Davis, p. 69). A few pages later, however, 
when Yossarian leaves the hospital and returns to active duty, Heller forces the 
reader to reassess his status by repeating, in different circumstances, the image of the 
Chaplain edging nervously away from him. 
Outside the hospital there was still nothing funny going on. The only thing 
going on was a war, and no one seemed to notice but Yossarian and 
Dunbar. And when Yossarian tried to remind people, they drew away from 
him and thought he was crazy. Even Clevinger, who should have known 
better but didn't. had told him he was crazy the last time they had seen each 
other, which was just before Yossarian had fled into the hospital. 
(C-22, p. 17) 
Although Yossarian's absurd logic in the ensuing argument does nothing to 
convince Clevinger, the reader is prepared to agree with his assessment if only 
because, seen from his own, individual, perspective, he is absolutely right. 
Everywhere he looked was a nut, and it was all a sensible young gentleman 
like himself could do to maintain his perspective amid so much madness. 
And it was urgent that he did, for he knew his life was in peril. (C-22, p. 2 1) 
It is an important element of Yossarian's apparent madness that he always acts 
as an individual. Although, in the early stages of the novel, his actions are 
recognisable as a part of the system of Catch-22, he is never 
homogenised within that 
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system. He may initially employ the same strategies, but always to preserve himself 
rather than the Institution, and this is perceived by its more unquestioning members 
as a threat. As Pinsker points out, 
Clevinger's opinion is widely shared by those who come to hate and fear 
Yossarian's increasingly desperate efforts to survive; for them war is not 
only necessary, but, more important, also perfectly sane, and those who 
throw monkey wrenches into its bureaucratic machinery must by definition 
be crazy. (Pinsker, p. 19) 
Indeed, Frederick R. Karl goes so far as to argue that the book appeals to 
readers who 'calling themselves social animals, and arguing that every individual 
must be part of society [ ... ] 
hate society and distrust any individual who is a social 
animal-). 12 W hile this may overstate the case, Karl does go on to refer to Yossarian as 
can open character in a closed society' (p. 138), which expresses his increasing 
importance, as an individual, to the other individuals trapped by the Institution. As 
the novel progresses, Yossarian comes to represent the interests of all the other 
characters who feel as trapped as he does, but are too afraid to act,, so that the 
affirmation of his basic sanity begins to come, significantly, from characters other 
than Yossarian himself, and often when he is not present. 
"at couldyou do? Major Major asked himself again. What could you 
do with a man who looked you squarely in the eye and said he would rather 
die than be killed in combat, a man who was at least as mature and 
intelligent as you were and who you had to pretend was not? (C-22, p. 106) 
'He's not so crazy', Dunbar said. 'He swears he's not going to fly to 
Bologna. ' 
, That's just what I mean, ' Dr Stubbs answered. 'That crazy bastard may 
be the only sane one left. ' (C-22, p. 114) 
12 'Joseph Heller's Catch-22: Only Fools Walk in Darkness', in Contemporary American Novelists, 
ed. by Harry T. Moore (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1964), pp. 13442 (p. 135). 
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As Dickstein argues, Yossarian's madness actually goes through several stages, 
matching the tonal shifts identified by Burhans, as his character develops. His 
functioning as part of the Institution in the censoring of the enlisted men's letters is 
f6flowed by a period when 'the insanity of the system [ ... ] breeds a defensive 
counter-insanity of the system, a mentality of organized survival that mirrors the 
whole system of rationalized human waste and devaluation' (Dickstein, pp. 140-4 1). 
During this period, when Yossarian turns up naked to receive a medal and walks 
backwards -around the camp, brandishing a gun, we see that while he has become 
aware of the threat of Catch-22, he is as yet unable to escape it, indeed to do 
anything but react against it in its own irrationally rational terms. As Vance Ramsey 
points out, 'Yossarian not only fives on the edge of the void as the others do, but 
fives in constant knowledge of that void'. " 
This is followed by Yossarian's realisation that it is not only his own life, his 
own self, that is imperilled by the system, and as despair sets in he becomes 'the 
somber registrar of [others'] deaths and exits' (Dickstein, p. 141). This shift of focus 
away from himself starts with the death of the young gunner Snowden on the return 
trip from an abortive mission to Avignon. Hit by flak in the thigh and chest, Snowden 
gradually bleeds to death while Yossarian vainly tries to help him. Treating the 
obvious, but not lethal, thigh wound, Yossarian feels he has gained control of the 
situation but cannot understand why Snowden does not improve and indeed says 
nothing but 'I'm cold'. It is at the moment that he notices the second, more serious 
wound, which on investigation sends Snowden's guts spilling across the floor of the 
plane, that Yossarian realises that he has no control, that death is arbitrarv and 
13 'From Here to Absurdity: Heller's Catch-22', in Seven Contemporary Authors, ed. by Thomas B. 
Whitbread (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1966), pp. 97-118 (p. 107). 
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inescapable, and at this point he loses hope. Trying desperately throughout the novel 
to retain some mockery of hope in the form of abnegation, in effect creating his own, 
self-protective, closed system, Yossarian represses the memory of this incident, 
which is narrated in the form of ever more detailed flashbacks. As Pinsker points out, 
claiming that this forms a struggle that gives the entire novel its structure, 
small wonder that Yossarian 'circles around' this scene, half suppressing its 
grisly import, half attracted to its powerful image. But however much he fills 
in his post-Avignon days by hiding out in the infirmary or by essentially 
futile gestures of protest [ ... ] he cannot avoid its truth. (Pinsker, p. 29) 
The 'truth' that Yossarian tries so hard to avoid, 'the message [he reads] in 
[Snowden's] entrails' that 'the spirit gone, man is garbage' (C-22, p. 450) is so 
powerful that most critics see it as the overriding 'message' of the entire novel. 
Davis, for example, reads this scene as describing Yossarian's failed attempt to attain 
4 some kind of direct encounter with whatever "reality" may or may not he "outside" 
discourse'. Noting the literary allusions and traditional metaphysical content present 
in the scene, he argues that 
the bombardier's seemingly 'existential' confrontation with Snowden's 
innards thus discloses that we can no more dwell within some hypothetical 
order of simple materiality than we can speak in a language free of the self- 
reflexive discontinuities which make possible Catch-22 and all its variations. 
(Davis, pp. 74-75) 
Consequently many critics see the ending as weak, or not of a piece with the 
rest of the novel. Brustein, for example, considers the end to be 'an inspirational 
sequence which is the weakest thing in the book' (Brustein, pp. 3 0-3 1 ). I shall argue, 
however, that Hefler has provided strong structural indicators that lead us to the final 
chapter and illustrate the crucial importance of a laughing relationship that exists 
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between Yossarian and his tent-mate, Orr. Again, Heller himself supports this, saying 
that 
the ending was written long before the middle was written [ ... 
] perhaps four 
years before the book was finished [ ... ]I couldn't see any alternative 
ending. It had a certain amount of integrity. (Krassner, p. 287) 14 
Throughout most of Catch-22 Yossarian has two tent mates, the dead man 
who cannot leave because he never officially arrived and the pilot Orr, 'that dirty 
goddam midget-assed, apple cheeked, goggled-eyed, undersized, buck-toothed, 
grinning, crazy sonofabitchinbastard' (C-22, p. 156). Like the dead man, killed after 
he arrived but before he signed in, whose kit haunts Yossarian but cannot be removed 
(because it is not, officiafly, there), Orr at first seems to be a background character, 
one of a series of running jokes in the novel. Heller provides three threads to this 
joke: Orr's endless odd stories, his constant fiddling with the contents of the tent, and 
the fact that he cannot take a plane up without crashing it in the sea. 
Described most often in terms that emphasise his smaffness, his madness and his 
giggle, Orr can easily be seen as a sort of court dwarf, alienated by his grotesque 
form while being, paradoxically, totally dependent on society. The fact that he is 
almost invariably described in such streams of adjectives as are quoted above 
highlights the essential unclassiflability of the type. Traditionally in European culture, 
such figures were kept to entertain, but also to bring luck to, a court or wealthy 
household. In the context of twentieth-century America, however, Orr cannot fulfil 
such a role, and although this Airforce community on Pianosa. may act as a sort of 
14 Again, see note 1. While it is possible that this is retrospective re-creation on Heller's part, not 
only has he claimed to have used the same process of planning the ending first (or at least, early on) 
in writing Closing Time (see Chapter Three), the evidence from the text here strongly suggests that 
this is, indeed, the case. 
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household (and, as such, he becomes the squadron's Made Fool), Yossarian worries 
about what wifl happen to him after the war. 
Yossarian felt sorry for Orr. Orr was so small and ugly. Who would 
protect him if he lived? Who would protect a warmhearted, simple-minded 
gnome like Orr? 
[... He] was a happy and unsuspecting simpleton an eccentric midget, a 
freakish likeable dwarf with a smutty mind and a thousand valuable skills 
that would keep him in a low income group all his life. (C-22, p. 32 1) 
As John Hunt points out, Orr is 'representative to [Yossarian] of the simple- 
minded good people of this world' (Hunt, p. 243). A series of key scenes in the 
novel, however, which parallel the scenes involving Snowden's death over Avignon 
and the implications of Catch-22 (both of which, as I have argued, only serve to trap 
Yossarian), gradually reveal the importance of Orr as a Transcendent Fool. In chapter 
three, when Yossarian has flown 44 missions and has recently returned from hospital, 
we are told that Orr is building a stove for the tent that they share with the dead man, 
Mudd. This is two chapters before the first overt explanation of Catch-22 quoted 
above, which occurs in chapter five, the same chapter that contains the first reference 
to the disastrous flight over Avignon. 
The building of the stove is returned to in chapter twenty eight, when 
Yossarian has flown 60 missions and has just returned from hospital again, this time 
after a genuine leg injury sustained in the flak after the milk run to Parma. Again, this 
is echoed soon afterwards, in chapter thirty, when we are told about Yossarian 
treating Snowden for the 'wrong wound' - the wound in his thigh. Chapter twenty 
eight starts with an account of Orr crash-landing his plane in the sea after the second 
trip to Avignon. Sergeant Knight tells Yossarian how Orr held the life-raft against the 
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side of the sinking plane so that the other crewmen (one of whom could not swim) 
could get into it safely; 'that little crackpot sure has a knack for things like that' 
(C-22, p. 316). 
He kept slapping his hands on his legs every few seconds as though he had 
the shakes and saying 'All right now, all right, ' and giggling like a crazy little 
freak, then saying 'All right now, all right, ' again and giggling like a crazy 
little freak some more. It was like watching some kind of a moron. Watching 
him was all that kept us from going to pieces altogether during the first few 
minutes. (C-22, pp. 316-17) 
While the others are absorbed in the task of simply keeping on the life-raft, Orr, 
much to the hilarity of his companions, opens all the compartments and systematically 
uses every piece of equipment at his disposal, handing round chocolate bars, 
sprinkling shark repellent into the water and making tea. 
Can't you see him serving us tea as we sat there soaking wet in water up to 
our ass? Now I was falling out of the raft because I was laughing so much 
[ ... I 
The next thing he found was this little blue oar about the size of a Dixie- 
cup spoon, and, sure enough, he began rowing with it, trying to move all 
nine hundred pounds of us with that little stick. Can you imagine? 
(C-22, p. 317) 
Sergeant Knight and the others see Orr only as a Made Fool, identified as 
deviant by society and therefore only useful for entertainment; an important function 
in its own right, as watching Orr's antics is 'afl that [keeps them] from going to 
pieces altogether during the first few minutes'. Like a clown's props, the chocolate, 
shark repeflent, tea, and so on are used to divert attention from the men's situation, 
and their laughter expresses a release of tension similar to the laughter of a circus 
audience who enter the clown's world to escape, for a moment, their own fives. This 
'bag of tricks' motif, however, also identifies Orr with the transcendent aspects of the 
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traditional trickster figure. Although the reader does not discover it until the end of 
the novel, there is more to Orr's behaviour here than meets the eye. This motif is 
repeated when Yossarian returns to his tent to find Orr already there, fiddling with 
the stove he is building. Orr's bag of tricks has transformed into the parts for the 
stove, and, unlike Sergeant Knight, Yossarian becomes aware that there is something 
going on that he does not,, yet, understand. 
'The days are getting shorter, ' Orr observed philosophically. 'I'd like to 
get this all fnished for you while there's still time. You'll have the best stove 
in the squadron when I'm through' [ ... ] 'What do you mean, meT Yossarian wanted to know. 'Where are you 
going to beT 
Orr's stunted torso shook suddenly with a muffled spasm of amusement. 
'I don't know, ' he exclaimed, and a weird, wavering giggle gushed suddenly 
through his chattering buck teeth like an exploding jet of emotion. He was 
still laughing when he continued, and his voice was clogged with saliva. 'If 
they keep on shooting me down this way, I don't know where I'm going to 
be. ' (C-22, p. 320) 
Yossarian stifl sees Orr, at this point, as the others see him; an eccentric - 
sometimes useful, sometimes infuriating, sometimes just odd. No reason for his 
behaviour is apparent, and therefore none exists, and although they are friends, 
Yossarian has a superstitious fear of flying with him, putting in an official request 
never to be put on the same crew. Yossarian, by this stage of the novel in a 
permanent state of anxiety and paranoia, thinks Orr's seemingly endless fiddling with 
a valve for the stove is done just to send him mad. 
[It] was about the size of a thumb and contained thirty-seven separate parts, 
excluding the casing, many of them so minute that Orr was required to pinch 
them tightly between the tips of his fingernails as he placed them carefuRy on 
the floor in orderly, catalogued rows, never quickening his movements or 
slowing them down, never tiring, never pausing in his relentless, methodical, 
monotonous procedure unless it was to leer at Yossarian with maniacal 
mischief Yossarian tried not to watch him. He counted the parts and 
thought he would go clear out of his mind. He turned away, shutting his 
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eyes, but that was even worse, for now he had only the sounds, the tiny, 
maddening, indefatigable, distinct clicks and rustles of hands and weightless 
parts. (C-22, p. 322) 
Pushed to the limit, Yossarian considers murdering Orr, thinking that it would 
solve both their problems, and just as he is imagining plunging a knife into the back 
of the other man's neck, Orr asks "'does it hurt? " [ ... ] as though by protective 
instinct "Does what hurtT "Your leg, " said Orr with a strange, mysterious 
laugh' (C-22, p. 323). This 'strange, mysterious laugh', suggesting as it does the 
possibility that Orr reafly has just read Yossarian's mind, reminds the reader of his 
(weird' laughter when Yossarian asks him where he is going to be after the stove is 
finished, and casts a subtle atmosphere over the ensuing conversation. Although it 
seems to be about various girls that both men have known, Yossarian is wary, 
sensing a trap. Thinking that this wifl have something to do with his embarrassment 
about sleeping with a bald girl, Yossarian falls straight into the real trap, which is to 
force his attention back to the stove-valve and thence to something Orr is trying to 
tefl him. 
'Will you please hand me that small composition gasket that rolled over 
there? It's right near your foot. ' 
'No it isn't. ' 
'Right here, ' said Orr, and took hold of something invisible with the tips 
of his fingernails and held it up for Yossarian to see. 'Now I'll have to start 
all over again. ' 
'I'll kill you if you do. I'll murder you right on the spot. ' 
'Why don't you ever fly with meT Orr asked suddenly, and looked 
straight into Yossarian's face for the first time. 'There, that's the question I 
want you to answer. Why don't you ever fly with meT 
Yossarian turned away with intense shame and embarrassment. 
(C-22, p. 324) 
Orr, having just duped Yossarian into asking about the whore in Naples. ) may 
be only pretending to hold a tiny piece of machinery to ftirther infuriate Yossarian 
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and amuse himself, as well as to give him an opportunity to look straight at Yossarian 
and ask his question. There is also the possibility, however, that the valve part is 
invisible only to Yossari. ýc as is the truth that Off is trying to tell him, the 
significance of his invitation to fly with him. The valve therefore becomes symbolic of 
both Orr's status as Made Fool -a foolish and infuriating fiddler - and his status as 
Transcendent Fool, possessing otherworldly knowledge. By the end of the chapter 
we are told that on his next mission Orr crash-lands again and, although the other 
men from his plane are picked up, he is not found. 
The truth that Orr could not make Yossarian see in chapter twenty eight is not 
revealed until the final chapter, forty two, and again an echo occurs just before it (in 
chapter forty one) when Yossarian, under anaesthetic after having been stabbed in the 
chest, finally remembers the wound in Snowden's chest that he could not treat. In 
hospital once more, this time recovering from a murderous attack by Nately's whore, 
Yossarian agrees with Major Danby that 'there is no hope for us, is there? [ ... ] No 
hope at all' (C-22, p. 458). He has now flown 70 missions, and refuses categorically 
to fly any more. Having been offered an untenable choice between Colonel Kom's 
deal (to return home a hero and lie about the conditions on Pianosa, thus betraying 
his companions) and simply going AWOL (the final example of a Catch-22 situation 
in the novel) the two men decide that there is no other option, no escape from the 
closed system of the Air Corps. At this point the chaplain rushes in with 
the electriffing news about Orr [ ... ] Yossarian leaped right out of 
bed with 
an incredulous yelp when he finally understood. 
'Sweden? ' he cried. 
'Orr! ' cried the chaplain. 
'OrrT cried Yossarian. 
'Sweden! ' cried the chaplain, shaking his head up and down with gleeful 
rapture [ ... ] 'It's a miracle, I tell you! 
A miracle! I believe in God again. I 
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really do. Washed ashore in Sweden after so many weeks at sea! It's a 
miracle. ' 
'Washed ashore, hell! ' Yossarian declared, jumping an about also and 
roaring in laughing exultation at the walls, the ceiling, the chaplain and 
Major Danby. 'He didn't wash ashore in Sweden. He rowed there! He rowed 
there, chaplain, he rowed there. ' (C-22, p. 45 8) 
Orr has left his laugh as a legacy, a symbol of hope. Yossarian and the chaplain 
imagine him in his tiny life-raft, fishing for cod and collecting rainwater, and are 
helpless with laughter that echoes, and yet is unlike, the laughter of Sergeant Knight 
during the teffing of the previous life-raft episode. They are laughing now at the same 
thing that Orr was laughing at, rather than at Orr himself, the recognition that he has 
always had the knowledge of how to escape Catch-22. " This laughter is, therefore, in 
the form of a revelation, something recognised by Heller as he describes Yossarian as 
'holding both fists aloft triumphantly as though hoping to squeeze revelations from 
them. He spun to a stop facing Major Danby. "Danby, you dope! There is hope, after 
all. Can't you see?... (C-22, p. 459). Danby is not yet laughing - he cannot yet see the 
joke - and is therefore as blind to it as Yossarian was to the composition gasket. In 
this sense, there is a direct correlation between the metaphor of 'seeing' a joke and 
the concept of revelation as a revealing or sudden insight. 16 
While the Institution that created Catch-22 teaches Yossarian that the only 
possible actions are meaningless (and often immoral) linguistic games and Snowden's 
" Thomas provides a mythological analysis of Orr that indicates his potential for transcendence in 
equating him with the divine. He points out that 'Or' is not only the French for 'gold', but the 
Hebrew for 'light', and in this sense Orr can be seen to represent Apollo, the sun-god. He is also, 
through his constant association with the stove, Hephaestos, a name which comes from 'hemero- 
phaistos', 'he who shines by day' (pp. 320-2 1). Pinsker also notes that Orr's name denotes an 
alternative, an 'or' (p. 27). 
16 The Christian reading of the novel by Victor J. Milne supports this view, although Milne sees the 
ending in terms of redemption and release from moral paralysis; 'Heller's Bologniad: A Theological 
Perspective on Catch-22', Critique: Studies in Modern Fiction 12: 2 (1970), 50-69 (repr. in Kiley 
and McDonald, pp. 58-73). 
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message is that the only reality that such games conceal is the reality of death, Orr's 
escape transcends both and shows Yossarian that one can live outside the institution, 
even with the knowledge that one must die. Thus Alan Cheuse compares Catch-22 to 
Les Mouches, with Yossarian as Orestes, 'escaping into responsibility' when he 
decides to f6flow Orr to Sweden. " 
[Yossarian] knows that Catch-22 is not invincible, that it can be beaten. 
After all, who would accuse Orr of going AWOL, of planning the whole 
thing? Nobody in their right mind 'rehearses' crash landings, and nobody 
imagines rowing - with an implement as ludicrous as a 'tiny blue oar' - to Sweden. It is all too absurd, too outlandish - even for the world of Catch- 
22. But Orr does, and better yet, he did. (Pinsker, p. 47) 
Davis, as I discuss above, considers that Catch-22s importance as a novel 
derives from its overt portrayal of the discontinuities between reality and discourse. 
As he points out, 'an awareness of the problematic boundaries between nature and 
artifice, events and interpretations, and even texts and commentaries has become an 
inescapable part of our intellectual order' (Davis, p. 68). He therefore concludes that 
the only choices in literature are between 'dangerous, closed discourses' (in other 
words, those texts that do not openly adn-fit that they are discontinuous with reality) 
and 'an open exploration of discourse itself (he cites Borges, Nabokov and Barth as 
examples, p. 77). 18 Davis considers the ending to be problematic because 
Heller himself points [out] that he no more thinks of Sweden as a real 
paradise than he believes that Yossarian will get there. Sweden and 
Yossarian's desertion are only images of a 'goal', an 'objective' for those 
who seek to renounce the world of Peckems, Cathcarts, and Scheisskopfs. 
(Davis, P. 76) 
" 'Laughing On The Outside', in Kiley and McDonald, pp. 86-93 (pp. 93). The reference is also to 
Catch-2.2, p. 461, when Yossarian says 'I'm not running away from my responsibilities. I'm 
running to them'. 
" As I shall discuss in Chapter Two, this assessment, particularly of Nabokov, is not unproblematic. 
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'Sweden', according to Davis, is thus just another example of a discontinuous 
discourse, although it is more open than Catch-22. This reading is based on the 
question of whether or not Yossarian can get to Sweden, and on these terms it does 
indeed seem that Sweden, as a fantasy, is a type of closed system. However, it is not 
Yossarian's escape that is important here, but Orr's. Sweden is not merely a 'goal' or 
g objective' for Orr, it is a reality. Without his example Sweden would have no 
meaning for Yossarian and we are thus faced with a character who provides a third 
alternative to Davis's assessment of the possibilities of fiction. Existing at once within 
the closed world of the Air Corps and outside it, Orr seems to argue for a discourse 
that is more than the 'illusory depth which gives us the temporary spectacle of things 
beyond words'. There is no discontinuity between this newly created meaning of 
'Sweden' and the reality of his having got there (indeed, his act has created the 
meaning). It is this direct relationship between Orr's act and Yossarian's 
interpretation of it, mediated by laughter (which, crucially, is non-linguistic) that 
gives this final chapter, and hence the whole novel, its power as an example of the 
possibilities of transcendence. 
One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest 
Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest (1962) is set in a men's ward in a 
psychiatric hospital. The patients, under the charge of the obsessively orderly Nurse 
Ratched, are divided into Thronics', for whom there is deemed to be no cure, and 
'Acutes", for the most part voluntary admissions who feel that they cannot, 
temporarily, cope with life outside the hospital. The novel is narrated by Bromden, a 
Chronic, through whose eyes we see the effect on the ward of the arrival of a new 
patient, Randle Patnck McMurphy. McMurphy has been diagnosed as psychopathic, 
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and his rebellious behaviour throws the ordered world of the hospital into disarray. 
As the novel progresses, he comes to represent the possibility of a life outside the 
restrictions of the hospital and the other patients begin to look to him, rather than to 
Ratched, for their cure. Finally, although McMurphy himself is killed, it is Bromden, 
the 'incurable' Chronic, who regains his sanity and escapes from the hospital to tell 
his tale. 
Although popular ever since its publication, the novel has also received much 
negative criticism, the main points of which can be summed up by Robert Forrey's 
assessment that the novel is macho (and implies therein a repressed homosexuality), 
misogynous and anti-Christian. '9 In a typical critical move that interprets the novel as 
celebrating irresponsible adolescence, Bruce E. Wallis speaks for many when he says 
T/I - Kesey suggests that by throwing butter at walls, breaking in windows, 
stealing boats, and doing in general whatever comes naturally, the inmates 
will become carefree and vital individuals at last. A Utopia composed of 
such self-centred children can spare itself the trouble of making any long- 
range plans. 20 
19 'Ken Kesey's Psychopathic Saviour: A Rejoinder', Modern Fiction Studies 21 (1975), 222-30. 
Perhaps the best-known negative criticism of the novel can be found in: Leslie Horst, 'Bitches, 
Twitches, and Eunuchs: Sex-role Failure and Caricature', Lex et Scientia 13: 1-2 (1977), 14-17; 
Elizabeth McMahan, 'The Big Nurse as Ratchet: Sexism in Kesey's Cuckoo's Nest', College 
English Association Critic 37: 4 (1975), 25-27 (repr. in A Casebook on Ken Kesey's One Flew Over 
the Cuckoo's Nest, ed. by George Searles (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992), pp. 
145-49); Ruth Sullivan, 'Big Mama, Big Papa, and Little Sons in Ken Kesey's One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo's Nest', Literature and Psychology 25 (1975), 34-44 (repr. in Searles, pp. 49-66); Raymond 
Olderman, 'The Grail Knight Arrives: Ken Kesey, One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest' in Beyond 
the Wasteland. - The American Novel in the Nineteen-Sbcties (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1972), pp. 35-5 1 (repr. in Searles, pp. 67-79); Addison C. Bross, 'Art and Ideology: Kesey's 
Approach to Fiction, Lex et Scientia, 13: 1-2 (1977), 60-64. 
20 'Christ in the Cuckoo's Nest; or, the Gospel According to Ken Kesey', in Searles, pp. 103-10 
(p. 110) (orig. publ. in Cithara 12: 1 (1972), 52-58). 
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Such readings argue that McMurphy, who performs afl the above-mentioned 
acts in the novel, is an anti-hero who encourages, by example, destructive and 
anarchic behaviour. Other critics, however, see McMurphy as heroic, in the mould of 
the self-sufficient heroes of Western and Southwestern tradition. Richard Blessing, 
for example, describes McMurphy as 'an anachronistic paragon of rugged 
individualism', whom he compares to Huckleberry Finn, Paul Bunyan and the Lone 
Ranger. 21 
Fred Madden points out that such reactions to the book rely on the assumption 
that McMurphy is the central character, and as he is seen in either a positive or a 
negative light, so the novel as a whole is seen as positive or negative. " Madden, 
rather than seeing McMurphy as either hero or viHain, argues that it is in fact 
Bromden, the narrator, who is the novel's central character, and that McMurphy is 
merely the equal and opposite force to Nurse Ratched, between whose two extremes 
Bromden attempts to find his way and his sanity. I shaH argue that there is yet a 
fourth possibility, which is that Cuckoo's Nest does not have a straightforward 'hero' 
at all, and that it is the relationship between Bromden and McMurphy, the former as 
Protagonist, the latter as Fool, that fonns the focus of the narrative. 
Stephen Tanner points out the existence of a transitional, pre-Cuckoo's Nest, 
Uý story called 'The Kicking Party', the hero of which is a jazz musician who is 'plotting 
to undermine the whole system with his evil laugh and sinful stories'. 23 Kesey, having 
21 'The Moving Target: Ken Kesey's Evolving Hero', Journal of Popular Culture 4 (1971), 615-27. 
Similar approaches can be found in Gerald Graff, Literature Against Itseýf (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1979), p. 216; Ronald Billingsley, 'The Artistry of Ken Kesey', (unpublished 
doctoral thesis, University of Oregon 197 1). 
22 'Sanity and Responsibility: Big Chief as Narrator and Executioner', Modern Fiction Studies, 32: 
2 (Summer 1986) 203-17. 
23 Kcn Kesey, Twayne's United States Authors Series, ed. by Warren French (Boston, MA: G. K. 
Hall, 1983), p. 24. 
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decided that 'the Beat response to an uncongenial conformist society was withdrawal 
by such means as wine, pot, jazz, and Zen', a response to which he felt unsuited, then 
rewrote this character as the 'active and self-reliant' McMurphy (Tanner, p. 24). 
More importantly, as Tanner points out, in 'The Kicking Party' 'the laugher and the 
mental patient are a single person. The turning point would come when he separated 
them as hero of event [McMurphy] and hero of consciousness [Bromden]' (Tanner, 
p. 24). As John Hunt argues, 
Bromden's telling of McMurphy's story thus functions as a vehicle for his 
reaching a truth about himself, a truth which releases him from sickness and 
promises to make him whole. If we look at each of the stories, Bromden's 
and McMurphy's, in the context of the other, we see an exchange of visions, 
a clash between the originally tragic view of Bromden, to which hope has 
been added, and the hopeful view of McMurphy, which became completely 
qualified by tragedy from the day he signed on for the whole game. Though 
each attenuates the vision of the other, Bromden's vision remains the larger. 
In making Bromden his narrator, Kesey not only provides a voice to tell the 
events of a hero's life and death, but also a point of view from which to 
judge the events narrated. The narrator's own story at once arises from and 
incorporates the story he tells. In doing so, the one transcends the other, 
24 finds its own touchstone, and achieves its own truth . 
Tanner talks of Kesey's 'persistent fascination with the transcendent, his 
impatience with the attitude that dreams are only dreams and imaginative experiences 
arejust fictions' (Tanner, p. 25). Much of Bromden's world is obviously delusional, 
but as he says in a much quoted passage, 'it's the truth even if it didn't happen). 25 In 
a letter to Kirk Douglas about the adaptation of the novel for cinema, Kesey explains 
that Bromden's point of view is necessary 
24 'Flying the Cuckoo's Nest: Kesey's Narrator as Norm', in Searles, pp. 13-23 (pp. 22-23) (orig. 
publ. in Lex ef, ýcienlia, 13: 1-2 (1977), 27-32). 
25 One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 8. Subsequent references appear 
in parentheses within the text. Bromden's statement echoes a long tradition of the idea that fictions 
may be 'less real but more true' than life. See, for example, Sir Philip Sydney, Defense of Poesie; 
Nathaniel Hawthorne, preface to Marble Faun; Pirandello, 'Tragedia d'un personaggio'. 
70 
to make the characters big enough to be equal to their job. McMurphy. as 
viewed from the low-angle point of view of the Chief, is a giant, a god, he's 
every movie show cowboy that ever walked down a mainstreet toward the 
OK corral, he's every patriot that ever died for his countrymen on a scaffold 
in history books. The Big Nurse [Ratched] is seen more clearly by the Indian 
than by anyone else, as that age-old ogre of tyranny and fear simply dressed 
in nice neat white. Of course, McMurphy and the nurse are also people, in a 
human situation,, but in the distorted world inside the Indian's mind these 
people are exalted into a kind of immortality. To do this you need fantasy. 
You need to jar the reader from his comfortable seat inside convention. You 
need to take the reader's mind places where it has never been before to 
convince him that this crazy Indian's world is his as well. 
(Quoted in Tanner, p. 23) 
As Tanner points out, 'the novel is about rescue or salvation, and Bromden's 
inner condition gives us a clear idea of what the patients need rescue from' (Tanner, 
p. 22). Bromden himself describes his predicament in terms of a closed system he 
calls the Combine. This is an Institution, of which the hospital is only a small part, 
that seeks to hornogenise and order all humanity according to a set of easily managed 
stereotypes. Anyone who cannot or will not conform with the role given them is seen 
merely as a fault to be rectified so that the machine can continue to run smoothly. As 
Jack de Bellis puts it, the Combine commits 'ontological violation [ ... ] the 
kind of 
-) 26 prejudice that reduces a person to the level of an object . The effect of this, as Joan 
Bischoff argues, is entropy, with everything 'progressing toward total inertia [ ... ] In 
such circumstances, movement becomes uniform, human individuality is erased, and 
language loses its power to communicate'. 27 
26 'Facing Things Honestly: McMurphy's Conversion', Lex et Scientia, 13: 1-2 (1977), 11-13 
(p. 12). 
27 -Everything Running Down": Ken Kesey's Vision of Imminent Entropy'. Lex et Scientia 13: 1 
(1977), 65-69 (p. 65). This is an important definition of entropy, since, while in this novel the 
influence of the Combine is balanced by the influence of McMurphy, in the texts I analyse in 
Chapter Three of this thesis the conditions that Bischoff describes control the whole text. 
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Early in the novel Doctor Spivey, the nominal head of the department that 
Ratched actually controls, outlines to the Acutes the theory on which the hospital 
runs. 
Our intention, he usually ends by saying, is to make this as much like 
your own democratic, free neighbourhoods as possible -a little world Inside 
that is a made-to-scale prototype of the big world Outside that you will one 
day be taking your place in again. (CN, p. 47) 
From Bromden's point of view, this intention has a very sinister quality; the 
'big world' that the doctor speaks of is not the real world, but the closed system of 
the Combine, and the hospital's function is therefore to remove, by force if necessary, 
any individuality that would prevent the patients from 'taking their place' in this 
system. This manipulation of language, referring to a 'big world Outside' that is 
actually a closed systen-4 is similar to the way Catch-22 fimctions; when an Institution 
has control over language, it also has control over reality. This is illustrated when a 
group of visitors is shown around the ward. Bromden tells us of 
that fool Red Cross Woman [ ... 
] saying how ovedoyed she is that mental 
hospitals have eliminated all the old-fashioned cruelty: 'What a cheery 
atmosphere, don't you agreeT She'll bustle around the school-teachers, who 
are bunched together for safety, clapping her hands together. 'Oh, when I 
think back on the old days, on the filth, the bad food, even, yes, brutality, A 
I realize ladies that we have come a long way in our campaign! ' (CN, p. 9) 
Not only does the action of bunching the visitors 'together for safety' 
contradict the 'cheery atmosphere', this passage comes shortly after descriptions of 
filth., bad food and brutality that expose this speech for the lie that it is. 
Recognising that language is one of the Combine's chief weapons, Bromden 
has for years been feigning deafness and dumbness as a defence against feeling 
unseen and unheard. The son of an Indian Chief and a white woman. Bromden has 
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watched the Combine use his mother to manipulate his father into selling the dam on 
which the tribe depended for its livelihood, an action which Bromden could do 
nothing to prevent. He has become lost in a fog of his own making which keeps him 
hidden from the Combine, but also from everything else. Like Yossarian's evasive 
tactics after Snowden's death, however, Bromden's fog does not always protect him 
from the pain of others. Considering the life of Pete Bancini, another patient, 
Bromden admits: 
I can see all that. ) and be hurt by it, the way I was hurt by seeing things in 
the Army, in the war. The way I was hurt by seeing what happened to Papa 
and the tribe. I thought I'd got over seeing those things and fretting over 
them. There's no sense in it. There's nothing to be done. (CN, p. 130) 
Bromden, despite his best efforts, is My aware of everything that goes on 
around him, but feels powerless to prevent it (rather as Yossarian does in the middle 
stages of Catch-22). An example of this can be seen in the descriptions of the main 
fonn of therapy used in the hospital: group sessions. At these the patients sit in a 
circle with Ratched and Spivey and discuss one another's problems. Through 
Bromden's eyes we are given a clear picture of what the effect of the sessions 
actually is. By turning patient against patient, encouraging them to identify faults in 
one another,, the treatment becomes as much of a problem as the symptoms of mental 
illness that the sessions concentrate on and, again, helpless, Bromden can only watch. 
During one of the sessions, he mentafly addresses Bifly Bibbit: 
I can't fix your stuttering. I can't wipe the razor-blade scars off your wrists 
or the cigarette bums off the back of your hands. I can't give you a new 
mother. And as far as the nurse riding you like this, rubbing your nose in 
your weakness till what little dignity you got left is gone and you shrink up 
to nothing from humiliation, I can't do nothing about that either. 
(CN, p. 13 1) 
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Much of the language used by the Combine to control those it deems mad uses 
images of childhood and emasculation, either refusing to acknowledge the maturity of 
the patients or removing any adult independence they may possess. Before the arrival 
of McMurphy, the men on the ward have internalised these attitudes, recognising 
themselves only as children, eunuchs, or even timid animals. The head nurse is 
referred to as '01' Mother Ratched' in bitter recognition that she has total control 
over the men on her ward (CN, p. 116). The Combine thus presents its members with 
a limited set of stereotypes, and if individuals are unable to conform to its idea of 
adulthood, they must be children, since this is the only alternative the Combine will 
admit. The image of an adult male, which McMurphy represents, is therefore a 
powerful one in the novel. 
The reader's introduction to McMurphy is also the first time any of the other 
characters have seen him - he has come in from the outside. Significantly, as 
Bromden reafises,, 'the Combine hasn't got him in all these years' (CN, p. 153) and he 
is thus free of its influence. 'I hear him coming down the haH [Bromden says], and he 
sounds big in the way he walks, and he sure don't slide; he's got iron on his heels and 
he rings it on the floor like horseshoes' (CN, p. 10). This first description, which is 
repeated throughout the novel, gives McMurphy a mythological status. He is 
perceived by Bromden as a satyr, a force of nature to be set against the mechanised 
world of the Combine. A few pages after McMurphy's initial appearance on the 
ward, the scar across his nose is described as 'wine-coloured', a metaphor that 
reinforces both McMurphy's physical side (reminding us as it does of the red nose of 
the heavy drinker and of the fighting that got him the scar) and, in its bacchanalian 
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associations, of his mythical side. 28 This image is repeated later in a discussion 
between McMurphy and Harding (the unofficial leader of the Acutes) to sum up the 
extent to which the men have lost, or had taken from them, any satyr-like qualities 
they might once have possessed; 'Harding hushes all of a sudden and leans forward 
to take McMurphy's hand in both of his. His face is tilted oddly, edged, jagged purple 
and grey, a busted wine bottle' (CN, p. 62, emphasis added). 
The first thing McMurphy does when he enters the ward and sees the other 
patients is to laugh at them. 
Nobody can tell exactly why he laughs; there's nothing funny going on. But 
it's not the way the Red Cross Woman laughs, it's free and loud and it 
comes out of his wide grinning mouth and spreads in rings bigger and bigger 
till it's lapping against the walls all over the ward [ ... ] This sounds real. I 
realize all of a sudden it's the first laugh I've heard in years. (CN, p. 11) 
Although encouraged and interested by the sound of a genuine laugh, Bromden 
is so far lost in his self-protective fog that he finds it threatening. While he can 
recognise in McMurphy's laughter the sign of a world that exists outside the 
Combine, he has, at this point, no means to exist outside it himself He has created his 
fog according to the only system he knows, the closed system of the Combine. In 
effect, he has negated his own identity to prevent the Combine from doing so. " 
McMurphy, who is in a position to see the Combine for what it is, is, therefore, also 
28 Several critics point out mythological and religious parallels in the novel, for example: Nicolaus 
Mills, 'Ken Kesey and the Politics of Laughter', The Centennial Review 16 (1972), 82-90; 
Olderman; James R. Tunnell, 'Kesey and Vormegut: Preachers of Redemption', The Christian 
Century (I I November 1972), 1180-83 (repr. in Searles, pp. 127-133); Wallis; Margaret Yonce, 
'One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest and the Myth of the Fisher King', in The Power of Myth in 
Literature and Film, ed. by Victor Carrabino (Tallahassee: University Press of Florida, 1980), pp. 
92-102. 
29This is a recognised psychiatric phenomenon. See, for example, R-D. Laing's analysis of 
ontological insecurity; The Divided Seýf- An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness (London: 
Tavistock, 1960), part 1, p. 3 (discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis). 
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in a position to see through Bromden's fog, potentiafly exposing him to a threat from 
which he has no other means to defend himself 
All of a sudden I was scared he was laughing because he knew the way I 
was sitting there with my knees pulled up and my arms wrapped around 
them, staring straight ahead as though I couldn't hear a thing, was all an act. 
(CN, p. 22) 
It soon becomes clear that McMurphy's laughter is what enables him, here in 
the heart of the Combine, to resist its influence. 
A couple of times some stupid rule gets him mad, but he just makes himself 
act more polite and mannerly than ever till he begins to see how ftmny the 
whole thing is - the rules, the disapproving looks they use to enforce the 
rules, the ways of talking to you like you're nothing but a three-year-old - 
and when he sees how fumy it is he goes to laughing, and this aggravates 
them no end. He's safe as long as he can laugh, he thinks, and it works 
pretty fair. (CN, p. 113) 
As Nicolaus Mills points out, 'for McMurphy, laughter is above all functional. 
It does not simply provide a release of tensions but a way of gaining one's balance so 
that he can deal with pain' (Mills, p. 86). Thus we see that McMurphy's laugh is just 
as much a protective strategy as is Bromden's fog, but it is a strategy that is open and 
empowering; where Bromden's fog keeps him safe at the expense of his identity, 
McMurphy's laugh enables him to be flexible, to maintain his balance, his sense of 
self This strategy comes so naturally to McMurphy that he assumes that everybody 
employs it, and he is confused by the reactions of the Acutes. As Mills notes, 'getting 
the men to laugh, thereby 'giving [them] a new and amused perspective of the 
arbitrary way they have been categorized' is no easy task (MiRs, p. 87). 
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Witnessing his first group therapy session, which the patients accept as a valid 
and useful process, McMurphy points out that what it reminds him of most is a 
C pecking party). 
The flock gets sight of a spot of blood on some chicken and they an go to 
peckin' at it, see, till they rip the chicken to shreds, blood and bones and 
feathers. But usually a couple of theflock gets spotted in the fracas, then it's 
their turn. And a few more gets spots and gets pecked to death and more 
and more. Oh, a peckin' party can wipe out the whole flock in a matter of a 
few hours, buddy. I seen it. A mighty awesome sight. (CN, p. 55) 
Although Harding reacts cynically to this observation, patronising McMurphy 
that he has been 'on our ward six hours and [has] already simplified all the work of 
Freud, Jung and Maxwell Jones and sununed it up in one analogy' (CN, p. 56), his 
defence of the Combine's methods is not convincing, and eventuafly he admits this. 
Significantly, his admission comes after he has tried, and failed, to laugh. 
Harding looks around, sees everybody's watching him, and he does his 
best to laugh. A sound comes out of his mouth like a nail being crow-barred 
out of a plank of green pine; Eee-eee-eee. He can't stop it. He wrings his 
hands like a fly and clinches his eyes at the awful sound of that squeaking. 
But he can't stop it. It gets higher and higher until finally, with a suck of 
breath, he lets his face fall into his waiting hands. 
'Oh the bitch, the bitch, the bitch, ' he whispers through his teeth. 
(CN, p. 60) 
Harding's failure to produce a real laugh makes him realise that the system he 
has been defending is based on falsehood, and he suddenly sees Ratched, who 
represents that systern, in a new fight ('the bitch'). 
A small group learns the power of laughter on the fishing trip that McMurphy 
manages to organise, despite Ratched's reservations. Tanner points out that the sea is 
an appropriate place for 'this moment of transfon-nation, this Pentecost' because it is 
away from the influence of the Combine (Tanner, p. 4 1). On the way to the docks, 
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the men are made to feel confident and courageous by associating themselves with 
McMurphy. However, when he is absent, talking to the captain, and the dock-side 
loiterers throw abuse at them, they are powerless to respond. Once at sea, however. 
the only man present with any experience of fishing is George, who is obsessed by 
cleanliness and will not touch anything, and McMurphy has brought along a 
prostitute with whom he immediately disappears below decks. When they have 
actually hooked fish, therefore, the men are forced to act for themselves. The physical 
symptoms of their 'madness', the only things by which they have hitherto been 
defined, become mere encumbrances that they must deal with in order to perform. 
Billy still stutters, but he forgets to get frustrated with himself in his excitement, and 
Harding discovers that his mobile hands, hitherto a source of shame to him, can be 
put to practical use. 
Arriving on deck in time to see the transformation that has occurred - 
symptoms have turned into men - McMurphy begins to laugh. It is a laugh that 
echoes his first that 'laps against the walls all over the ward'; but this time, finally 
understanding the message in the laughter, the men join him. 
McMurphy laughs [ ... ] at the girl, at the guys, at 
George, at me sucking my 
bleeding thumb, at the captain back at the pier [ ... 
] and the Big Nurse and 
all of it. Because he knows you have to laugh at the things that hurt you just 
to keep yourself in balance, just to keep the world from running you plumb 
crazy [ ... ]I notice 
Harding is collapsed beside McMurphy and is laughing 
too. And Scanlon from the bottom of the boat. At their own selves as well 
as at the rest of us [ ... 
] Swinging a laughter that rang out on the water in 
ever-widening circles, farther and farther, until it crashed up on beaches all 
over the coast, on beaches all over all coasts, in wave after wave after wave. 
(CN, p. 237-38) 
On the return to shore, when the patients are able to stand up to the wharf 
loiterers without McMurphy's assistance, the real effect of their new-found ability to 
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laugh at themselves becomes apparent. As Terence Martin observes, 'community 
laughter this, comic, aware, the signature of a deep experience, the expression of 
freedom - earned and shared'. 
30 
It is only on the return trip to the hospital, when Bromden notices that 
McMurphy looks 'dreadfully tired and strained andfrantic' (CN, p. 245), that we 
realise he has sacrificed his laugh in giving it to the others. Back in the ward the men 
lose their courage, and while they now understand that the Combine is something to 
be challenged rather than accepted, they rely on McMurphy to fight their battle. 
Although he successfully challenges Ratched's authority over and over again, only 
Bromden notices that McMurphy's laughter has gone on 'long after his humour had 
been parched dry between two electrodes' (CN, p. 305). Finally, facing his inevitable 
f'- ý 
fate, McMurphy marches towards the nurses' station to chaflenge the Combine for 
the last time. Having attacked Ratched, he is fought to the ground by aides, and 
only then did he show any sign that he might be anything other than a sane, 
wilful, dogged man performing a hard duty that finally just had to be done, 
like it or not. 
He gave a cry 
A sound of cornered-animal fear and hate and surrender and defiance. 
(CN, p. 305) 
McMurphy's laugh, the thing that represented his sanity, has become merely an 
animal cry that denies even humanity. Already in effect dead, he is further 
dehumanised by lobotomy and retumed to the ward with eyes 'like smudged fuses in 
a ftise box' (CN, p. 309). Bromden, partly as an act of compassion, partly to prevent 
Ratched using McMurphy as 'an example of what can happen if you buck the system' 
" -One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest and the High Cost of Living', in Searles 1992, pp. 25-39 
(pp. 32-33) (orig. publ. in Modern Fiction Studies, 19: 1 (1973), 43-55). 
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(CN, p. 308), suffocates him with a piflow and, having done so, breaks a window and 
escapes. 
During the novel McMurphy is characterised as a Made Fool from two 
different perspectives. First the Combine, unable to fit him into its scheme of things, 
labels him as a psychopath and has him sectioned in an attempt to contain his 
deviancy. This act has no power over him as an individual, and at first he behaves in 
hospital exactly as he has behaved all his life. The second fool-making, which 
destroys him, is carried out by the men on the ward who desperately need him to be 
their hero. As he says in conversation with Harding, 
'I've had people bugging me about one thing or another as far back as I can 
remember but that's not what - but it didn't drive me crazy. ' 
'No, you're right [ ... ] 'It is us. ' [Harding] swept his hand about him in a soft white circle and 
repeated, 'Us. ' (CN, pp. 294-95) 
McMurphy discovers that teaching the men how to laugh, although it pushes 
him to his limits, is not enough to save them, and he is sacrificed so that they might 
see that Ratched is human and can therefore be beaten. The satyr, a transcendent 
force of nature, has been transformed into a scapegoat, a Made Fool who acts both 
as a conu-nunity's liberator and as its victim. 
McMurphy's role as Transcendent Fool occurs entirely from Bromden's point 
of view. As Hunt points out, Bromden sees McMurphy initially in terms of how the 
others see him, but is in a position, by already being aware of the threat that the 
Combine poses, to begin to see McMurphy as he reaUy is, outside the defnition 
provided of him by both the Combine and the other patients (Hunt, p. 14). As 
McMurphy weakens, Bromden grows stronger, so that eventually he is able to 
glimpse what it is like for McMurphy to be haunted by the needs of others (see, for 
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example, CN, p. 277). it is Bromden who, at first, sees McMurphy as a satyr, come 
to destroy the mechanised world of the Combine. The idea that he is some sort of 
mythical being is almost immediately contradicted, however, by McMurphy himself 
A 11 
Ainer he witnesses his first group therapy meeting and compares the men to chickens, 
Harding explains to McMurphy that they are all nothing more than maladjusted 
rabbits. When McMurphy chaflenges this, arguing that the description must refer to 
his 'fuckin' tendencies', Harding responds, 
'You remember, it was you that drew our attention to the place where the 
nurse was concentrating her pecking? That was true. There's not a man here 
that isn't afraid he is losing or has already lost his whambam. We comical 
little creatures can't even achieve masculinity in the rabbit world, that's how 
weak and inadequate we are. Hee. We are - the rabbits, one might say, of 
the rabbit world! ' [ ... ] 'Harding! Shut your damned mouth! 
Here; all you guys. What the hell is the matter with you? You ain't as 
crazy as all this, thinking you're some animal. ' (CN, pp. 64-65) 
McMurphy insists throughout the novel that he is a man, and is exasperated by 
the other patients' claim that they are not, and Bromden becomes increasingly 
confused about McMurphy's status. On some occasions he celebrates his simple 
humanity, as when he is sweeping under McMurphy's bed: 
Sweeping the dorm soon's it's empty, I'm after dust mice under his bed 
when I get a smell of something that makes me realize for the first time since 
I been in the hospital that this big dorm full of beds, sleeps forty grown men, 
has always been sticky with a thousand other smells [ ... 
] but never before 
now, before he came in, the man smell of dust and dirt from the open fields, 
and sweat, and work. (CN, pp. 97-98) 
At other times Bromden shows a more complex reaction to McMurphy's 
qualities, showing that a strong and complete man is something so unusual in the 
closed world of the Combine that it is strange and ffightening: 
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He's layin' awful quiet, I told myself, I ought to touch him to see if he's still 
alive ... That's a lie. I know he's still alive. That ain't the reason I want to touch 
him. 
I want to touch him because he's a man. 
That's a he too. There's other men around. I could touch them. 
I want to touch him because I'm one of these queers! 
But that's a he too. That's one fear hiding behind another. If I was one of 
these queers I'd want to do other things with him. I just want to touch him 
because he's who he is. (CN, p. 210) 
Much of Bromden's confusion has to do with the fact that, having realised that 
McMurphy is human rather than divine, he initially applies a stereotyped definition of 
manhood to him, in much the same way that the Combine interprets him merely as a 
'psychopath'. As the novel progresses, however, he learns that an independent man 
may be complex without losing any of his masculinity. 
I was seeing him different than when he first came in; I was seeing more 
to him than just big hands and red sideburns and a broken-nosed grin. I'd 
see him do things that didn't fit with his face or hands, things like painting a 
picture at OT with real paints on blank paper with no lines or numbers 
anywhere on it to tell him where to paint, or like writing letters to somebody 
in a beautiful flowing hand. How could a man who looked like him paint 
pictures or write letters to people, or be upset and worried like I saw him 
once when he got a letter back? (CN, p. 153) 
The pivotal moment of their relationship comes when McMurphy discovers that 
Bromden has been hoarding chewing gurn, stuck to the frame under his bed. He 
laughs and begins to sing 'oh, does the Spearmint lose its flavour on the bedpost 
ovemight? '. Angry at first, Bromden teRs us, 'but the more I thought about it the 
ftmnier it seemed to me. I tried to stop it but I could feel I was about to laugh - not 
at McMurphy's singing, but at my own self (CN, p. 205). The first thing he says, 
after many years of silence, is 'thank you,, ostensibly for the gift of fresh chewing 
gum, but, more importantly, also for the return of his laugh, which brings his voice 
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and signals his return to sanity (see also Mills, p. 89). This is a much more direct and 
personal influence than McMurphy has on any of the other characters, and 
significantly it happens in the hospital, several chapters before the fishing trip. As 
soon as Bromden has recovered his voice, he begins to teR McMurphy about the 
Combine, and about his parents; the painful memory he has been trying to repress 
throughout the novel. Bromden clearly identifies McMurphy with his father, and 
warns him that, just as the Combine destroyed him because he was big and tried to 
fight back, so, now that McMurphy has made a stand, his life is also in danger (CN, 
p. 209). This expresses a personal, rather than an altruistic, fear, since the Combine's 
destruction of his father is what originally sent Bromden mad. If he were to rely 
entirely on McMurphy as a father-saviour, as the other men do, therefore, he would 
risk total annihilation should McMurphy fail. 
As Martin argues, however, although McMurphy does not defeat the Combine, 
his laugh shows Bromden a new way of looking, of seeing other possibilities (Martin, 
p. 37). Hunt points out that, after Bromden's initial identification of McMurphy with 
his father, new memories start to emerge of his childhood that show independence, 
first from his father, then from his mother (who has an equivalent parallel in 
Ratched). In this way, Bromden is gradually able to achieve a sense of his own 
identity (Hunt, pp. 21-22). In the novel's title passage (CN, p. 224), Bromden finally 
remembers his grandmother, a 'person of wisdom, a carrier of culture, a figure of 
both nurture and nature [ ... 
]a woman who is fully a person, not a stereotypical 
victim or victimizer' (Hunt, p. 22. See also de Beffis, p. 73). Although McMurphy 
often reminds Bromden of his father, therefore, the fact that he is also a complete 
person in his own right (neither symbofic force nor father-protector) teaches 
Bromden to outgrow his dependence on these roles, and become complete himself. 
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Given the example of a fully rounded personality (Randle Patrick McMurphy is the 
only character in the novel to have a full name), Bromden is able to transcend the 
label given him by the Combine: that of incurable Chronic. 
McMurphy's rebeflious behaviour, therefore, exists only as a reaction against 
the Combine, which prevents its members from achieving a balanced identity. What in 
other circumstances might show such irresponsibility as irritated many of the novel's 
critics, works in fact as balancing anti-system against an already existing, and life- 
denying, system. Bromden's escape, therefore, does not imply that Kesey is 
suggesting we should behave as McMurphy does throughout much of the novel. 
Instead he presents a situation where McMurphy, as Transcendent Fool, reveals to 
Bromden, as Protagonist, the means by which he can reorientate himself so as to five 
successfully in the real world. This revelation is achieved through Bromden's 
understanding of McMurphy's laughter, which, as Mills says, 'was not intended to 
eliminate death and failure but to show that death and failure need not prevent [one] 
from acting' (MiRs, p. 90). 
On The Road 
As Howard W. Webb Jr. has pointed out, Jack Kerouac lived in two worlds; the 
Lowel-I of his childhood and the subterranean territory of the beats. 'He celebrates 
Lowell because it remains for him a place of unsullied beauty; he celebrates the beat 
generation because he finds in it what he [ ... ] had once thought was 
forever lost. ' 31 
This nostalgia for a lost world creates an ambivalence in Kerouac that is reflected in 
31 'The Singular Worlds of Jack Kerouac', in Contemporary American Novelists, ed. by Harry T. 
Moore, Crosscurrents: Modem Critiques series (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
1964), pp. 120-33 (p. 12 1). 
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his novels. While some aspects of his work show a wish to return to an idealised past, 
others seem to argue that the beat way of life indicates a way forward. 
This confusion between the past and the future is evident even in the word 
'beat' itself Although usually seen as a phenomenon of the big cities, an expression 
of a new urban generation's dissatisfaction with its country's traditional values, 
Kerouac claims to have first come upon the meaning of beat as Beatific in a church in 
Lowell, his childhood home. Indeed, Kerouac has said that the beat generation 
goes back to the wild and raving childhood of playing the Shadow under 
windswept trees of New England's gleeful autumn, and the howl of the 
Moon Man on the sandback until we caught him in a tree (he was an 'older' 
boy of 15), the maniacal laugh of certain neighbourhood madboys, the 
furious humor of whole gangs playing basketball till long after dark in the 
park, it goes back to those crazy days before World War II when teenagers 
drank beer on Friday nights at Lake ballroom [ ... ] It goes 
back to the 
completely senseless babble of the Three Stooges, the ravings of the Marx 
Brothers (the tenderness of Angel Harpo at harp, too). 
(Quoted in Webb, p. 128) 
On The Road (1957) relates, in five parts, four round trips across America 
made by Sal Paradise, and the development of his friendship with a 'neighbourhood 
madboy ". Dean Moriarty, whose 'maniacal laugh' and 'senseless babble' ring through 
the novel. It starts with a marriage break-up and illness that force Sal to reassess his 
life and begin a search for a more meaningful and fulfilling existence, a search in 
which, as Webb points out, Dean becomes crucial (Webb, p. 123). 
R. J. Ellis sees the novel as symbolic of America in the post-war years. 
The pattern of ejection from domestic stability into a period of illness and a 
subsequent setting-forth -a pattern of stability/distress/new 
departure - 
matches the way the USA had, after a long period of endeavouring to isolate 
itself within domestic concerns, engaged in reluctant global combat during 
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World War Two, and then entered upon a period of post-war development 
possessing undefined characteristics. 32 
In this way, Ellis continues, the novel 'reassesses America's national myths in 
this post-war climate, now devoid of the sense of euphoria generated by VJ Day. At 
the start of On The Road Sal, influenced by these national myths, seeks 'the West' 
(which he sees as 'an arena for self-discovery'), and attempts to cast Dean in the role 
of rugged frontiersman. However, not only does Sal discover that the West no longer 
exists as he had imagined it, but Dean steadfastly refuses to fit into the desired 
stereotype, although Sal 'desperately attempts to re-integrate [him] into a 
conventional heroic representation - the good bad (cow)boy who "only stole cars for 
joy rides"' (Ellis, p. 67). " Dean's resistance to categorisation teaches Sal, over the 
course of the novel, that a more open existence, one which is essentially undefinable 
by conventional means, may be possible. As George Dardess argues, the relationship 
between the two men is of paramount importance to this process; 'On The Road is a 
-) 34 love story, not a travelog (and certainly not a call to Revolution) . 
Gradually [Sal] realizes that Dean is as he is because he has left behind all 
'bitterness, recrimination, advice, morality' and has always ahead of him 'the 
ragged and ecstatic joy of pure being. ' In his experiences with this 'new kind 
of American saint. ' [ ... 
] Jack recaptures joyfulness. (Webb, p. 124)" 
32 'Liar! Liar! ': Jack Kerouac - Novelist (London: Greenwich Exchange, 1999), p. 66. 
33 See also Jim Burns, 'Kerouac and Jazz', The Review of Contemporary Fiction 3: 2 (1983), 33-41 
(p. 39). 
" 'The Delicate Dynamics of Friendship: A Reconsideration of Kerouac's On The Road, American 
Literature: .4 Journal of 
Literary History, Criticism and Bibliography, 46 (1974), 200-06. 
35 Webb uses the names 'Jack' and 'Dean' to distinguish the recurrent Kerouac 'protagonist' (in the 
general sense) and Kerouac 'hero' respectively across several of the novels. The implication of this 
technique is that Kerouac played this formative relationship over and over to himself in his fiction. 
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As is suggested by the novel's title, the Road is where Sal, as Protagonist, is 
taught to see with new eyes. Gerald Nicosia says that 'travel to [Sal and Dean] is a 
conscious philosophical method by which they test the store of hand-me-down 
truisms. Moreover,, as a potent imaginative symbol, travel is a philosopher's stone 
that turns every experience into a spiritual lesson'. 36 Comparing the novel to Jack 
London's The Road, Nicosia says that 'while the tramp may have no legal or social 
authority, he has, according to London, the power of witnessing injustice and telling 
about it,, and thus he may serve as one of the most powerful forces for change' 
(Nicosia, p. 344). Dean, bom on the road and brought up in the streets by a hobo 
father, is thus clearly identified with the Fool, whose traditional position and function 
in society is just as London describes. 
Although the idea of an Institution is not so clearly defined in On The Road as 
it is in Catch-22 or One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, there are clear indications 
throughout the text of a closed system of convention that Sal is trying to escape. 
Regina Weinreich argues that the first sentence of the novel, linking Sal's split with 
his wife to his first meeting with Dean, 'immediately associates [him] with 
disappointment about social restriction at large', 37 or, as Sal puts it himself, 'my 
feeling that everything was dead'. " 
This disappointment is evident on two levels. Society as a whole has become, in 
Sal's eyes, either dominated by a controlling ideology that restricts any expression of 
36 Memory Babe: A Critical Biography ofJack Kerouac (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1994), p. 343. 
37 1 Synaesthesia, Synchronicity, and Syncopation', The Review of Contemporary Fiction 3: 2 
(1983), 64-68 (p. 65). 
38 On The Road (London: Andr& Deutsch, 1958), p. 3. Subsequent references appear in parentheses 
within the text. 
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freedom (represented by the pofice and the government), or homogenised to a 
meaningless parody of its own past. '9 The first of these can be seen in Sal's 
description of the police as being 
involved in psychological warfare against those Americans who don't 
frighten them with imposing papers and threats. It's a Victorian police force; 
it peers out of musty windows and wants to inquire about everything, and 
can maýe crimes if the crimes don't exist to its satisfaction. (OR, p. 136) 
It is also evident in Bull Lee's complaint that 'they can make clothes that last 
forever. They prefer making cheap goods so's everybody'U have to go on working 
and punching timeclocks and organizing themselves in sullen unions and floundering 
around while the big grab goes on in Washington and Moscow' (OR, p. 149). The 
second is apparent in Sal's disillusionment when he finds that everywhere he goes is 
covered with identical prefabricated houses and is 'chock full of chichi tourists' (OR, 
p. 5 1). Modem society, for Sal, can be summed up by his much-quoted remark; 'This 
is the story of America. Everybody's doing what they think they're supposed to do" 
(OR, p. 68). 
The second level on which Sal's disappointment with restriction appears is in 
his relationships with intellectual friends who consider themselves to be a counter- 
culture to broader society. As he says, 'all my New York friends were in the 
negative, nightmare Position of putting down society and giving their tired bookish or 
political or psychoanalytical reasons' (OR, p. 10). The fact that this position 
is 
(negative' and 'tired' shows that it has become just as stagnant as the society it 
I- - claims to be a reaction against. Consequently, when Sal meets the uneducated and 
39 It should be noted that, during the course of his travels, Sal, ironically, 
both becomes a policeman 
and embraces the myth of America that leads to such parodies. 
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anarchic (though intelligent), Dean, he wants to get to know him 'because my life 
hanging around the campus had reached the completion of its cycle and was 
stultified' (OR, pp. 9-10). In Dean, by contrast, Sal can 'hear a new call and see a 
new horizon' (OR, p. 10). 
40 
This raises the question of who, exactly, is being identified with 'beatness' in 
the novel. Although this entire group, both biographically and as they are fictionalised 
within the text, are commonly identified by critics as the beat generation, in On The 
Road it is Dean (whom the group opposes), who is described by Sal as beat. 
Revealing in this context is Webb's analysis of the driving force behind the feelings of 
the original beat group in the mid-forties. It is a description that has clear parallels 
with the prevailing pathologies of post-war America: 
they were haunted by their inability to believe in anything, convinced that 
this faithlessness was unbearable, and driven by the tension arising from their 
conflicting views to a craving for excess. (Webb, p. 121 )41 
A result of this tension, as John Clellon Hohnes wrote in his seminal article in 
1952, is that 'beatness' meant 'being undramatically pushed up against the wall of 
42 
oneself . This 
is an image of restriction, at odds with the 'new horizon' that Sal 
seeks. The very use of the word beat to describe Dean, therefore, is another sign of 
Kerouac's ambivalence about the possibilities of transcendence. 
" Dean's position in this group is illuminated by Gerald Nicosia's discussion of Kerouac's choice of 
his name. Nicosia notes that 'if Professor Moriarty was Holmes' most nefarious opponent, 
Moriarty's great intelligence and energy also stimulated Holmes to his most brilliant feats of crime 
detection'. There is, therefore, 'a pun on the fact that Neal was the greatest "opponent" of John 
Clellon Holmes, who like Sherlock would have been insufferably bored without "Moriarty's" 
challenge to his stiff morality' (Nicosia, p. 347). 
41 See, for example, Christopher Lasch, The Culture ofNarcissism. - American Life in an Age of 
Diminishing Expectations, 2nd edition (London: Norton, 199 1). 
42 'This Is The Beat Generation', New York Times, 16 November 1952. 
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As Barry Miles points out, the episode early in the novel (several days into 
Sal's first, solo, trip across America) when he wakes after a long sleep in a cheap 
43 hotel and cannot remember who he is, is a form of epiphany. Significantly, it is an 
epiphany that occurs alone and takes the form of wiping clean the slate of his identity; 
until Sal travels with Dean, and shares a laughing relationship with him, he has 
nothing with which to refiff himself 
Sal first gets the impression that Dean has knowledge of things outside the 
norms of society when listening to his frenetic descriptions of everything he 
experiences. In discussing Dean's attempts to describe his intuitions, especially about 
time, ERis says 
imposing narrative order threatens to undermine Dean's attempt to recast it 
as mystical experience. His transcendence cannot be fixed in time as a linear 
story any more than the original myth [of the West] can fit post-war 
America. Dean's endless talking necessarily ruptures syntactical rules. 
(Effis, p. 73) 
Dean, wanting to be a writer like Sal, echoes this, saying, 'there's so many 
things to do, so many things to write! How to even begin to get it afl down and 
without modified restraints and all hung-up on like literary inhibitions and 
grammatical fears ... 
' (OR, p. 7). Analysing the way that Kerouac modulates between 
different styles in On The Road, and noticing that the most free-flowing, 
4 spontaneous prose' language is used to describe Dean's behaviour, Effis argues that 
'this sort of stylistic alternation in [the novel] complements its exploration of the 
increasing separation between the dominant values of a post-war American middle- 
class seeking to re-estabfish some consensual stability and an increasingly alienated,, 
4 3, Jack Kerouac. - King of the Beals (London: Virgln, 1998), p. 135. 
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sexually polymorphous minority' (Ellis, p. 83). Dean's position, then, is firmly 
established as expressing the paradoxical possibility of communicating the ineffable 
truths that exist outside everyday life. 
He appears to have the ability to apprehend everything he encounters as it 
exists in itself, which he calls 'digging'. His constant laughter is an expression of this 
apprehension, as, for example, when he, his girlfiiend Marylou, and Sal are on a ferry 
crossing over to Algiers to visit Bull Lee. 
Negroes were working in the hot afternoon, stoking the ferry furnaces that 
burned red and made our tires smell. Dean dug thern, hopping up and down 
in the heat. He rushed around the deck and upstairs with his baggy pants 
hanging halfway down his belly. Suddenly I saw him eagering on the flying 
bridge. I expected him to take off on wings. I heard his mad laugh all over 
the boat - 'Hee-hee-hee-hee-hee! ' (OR, p. 14 1) 
Dean's laughter is described as 'mad' here and elsewhere, which has a twofold 
meaning for Sal. First, it shows Dean's status as a Made Fool; as with Orr, because it 
is unclear what this laughter means, it is assumed to mean nothing. Second, as is 
indicated here by Sal's impression that Dean is about to 'set off on wings', 'mad' 
takes on the alternative associations discussed in the Introduction that involve 
supernatural knowledge or ability and thus indicates Dean's status as Transcendent 
Fool. 44 Ellis describes Sal's 
convention-ridden yet unstable depiction of Dean as 'mad' [ ... 
] For Sal 
there is a measure of virtue in 'madness' (as the resonances with Melville's 
Ishmael., Emily Dickinson, Blake and the Shakespearean fool make clear) to 
offset his sense that Dean is merely 'foolish. Though Sal's position 
oscillates between these attitudes, he also constantly strives to integrate his 
experiences into manageable, culturally-familiar patterns. (Effis, p. 77) 
44 On this interpretation of Dean's madness see, for example, Lee Bartlett, 'The Dionysian Vision of 
Jack Kerouac', in The Beats. - Essays in Criticism, ed. by Lee Bartlett (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 
198 1 ), pp. 1] 5-26. 
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Dean's position in society as Fool is clear in the way he parodies the 
establishment, as, for example, when Sal says that he 'loved to smoke cigars. He 
smoked one over the paper and talked. "Ah, our holy American slopjaws in 
Washington are planning fur-ther inconveniences - ah-hem! - aw - hup! hup! "' (OR, 
p. 115). He is fascinated by people whose 'souls really won't be at peace unless they 
can latch on to an established and proven worry and having once found it they 
assume facial expressions to fit and go with it, which is, you see, unhappiness, and all 
the time it all flies by them and they know it and that too worries them no end' (OR, 
pp. 208-09). 
Increasingly, however, it is clear that Dean's dual role creates tension within 
the group. His frenetic behaviour disrupts the lives of those around him. No longer 
merely an interesting and entertaining 'madman', he regularly hurts those closest to 
him. From his transcendent perspective, however, he is unable, or unwilling, to limit 
himself to the closed system of 'normal' behaviour, and sees the establishment simply 
as another aspect of the universe to be 'dug'. Marylou, for example, says to Sal, 
'Gee, I'm sad. ' 
'What are you sad about, kidT 
'I'm sad about everything. Oh damn, I wish Dean wasn't so crazy now. ' 
Dean came twinkling back, giggling, and jumped in the car. 
'What a crazy cat that was, whoo! Did I dig him! I used to know 
thousands of guys like that, they're all the same, their minds work in uniform 
clockwork, oh, the infinite ramifications, no time, no time ... ' (OR, p. 163) 
Although aware of the effect Dean is having on his friends, Sal begins to 
understand what the world must look like from his point of view, and, in a moment of 
epiphany, perceives a backstreet softball game not as a closed system of rules, 
but as 
the totality of human possibilities, with Dean at its centre. 
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A great eager crowd roared at every play. The strange young heroes of all 
kinds, white, colored, Mexican, pure Indian, were on the field, performing 
with heart-breaking seriousness. Just sandlot kids in uniform. Never in my 
life as an athlete had I ever permitted myself to perform like this in front of 
families and girl friends and kids of the neighbourhood, at night, under 
lights; always it had been college, big-time, sober-faced; no boyish, human 
joy like this. Now it was too late. Near me sat an old Negro who apparently 
watched the games every night. Next to him was an old white bum; then a 
Mexican family, then some girls, some boys - all humanity, the lot. Oh, the 
sadness of the fights that night! The young pitcher looked just like Dean. 
(OR, pp. 180-81) 
At this point Sal considers that it is 'too late' for him to exist within this 
'human joy'. Although he has become aware of the restrictions of blindly following 
convention, this awareness has made him an outsider, a misfit, and he has not, as yet, 
found an alternative mode of existence. Consequently, Sal vacillates between 
defending Dean's status as Transcendent Fool and feeling pain and embarrassment at 
his behaviour,, which becomes more and more detached from everyday 
responsibilities. In the following passage, which occurs when Sal is staying with Dean 
and his wife, Camille, Dean's 'maniacal giggle' is thrown into sharp relief by the 
'wails of his baby' and the loneliness of the women: 
[Camille and Dean] were yelling at each other as I slipped through with a 
feeble smile and locked myself in the bathroom. A few moments later 
Camille was throwing Dean's things on the living-room floor and telling him 
to pack. To my amazement I saw a full-length oil painting of Galatea Dunkel 
over the sofa. I suddenly realized that all these women were spending 
months of loneliness and womanliness together, chatting about the madness 
of the men. I heard Dean's maniacal giggle across the house, together with 
the wails of his baby. (OR, p. 187) 
Here, Sal identifies closely with the women, but soon afterwards he maintains 
his attitude that Dean is a transcendent being, and sees the group as being at 
fault for 
not accommodating him, for not knowing what to say to him. 
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'I think Marylou was very, very wise leaving you, Dean, ' said Galatea. 
'For years now you haven't had any sense of responsibility for anyone. 
You've done so many awful things I don't know what to say to you. ' 
And in fact that was the point, and they all sat around looking at Dean 
with lowered and hating eyes, and he stood on the carpet in the middle of 
them and giggled - he just giggled. He made a little dance [ ... 
]I suddenly 
realized that Dean, by virtue of his enormous series of sins, was becoming 
the Idiot, the Imbecile, the Saint of the lot. (OR, p. 193) 
The climax of this scene comes when Sal makes the decision to side 
wholeheartedly with Dean, and defend him against the attack of the group. The 
language Sal uses no longer concerns the implications of Dean's behaviour, a crying 
baby or lonely woman, but the full metaphysical import of what Dean has been trying 
to communicate. Dean stands 
in front of everybody, ragged and broken and idiotic, right under the 
lightbulbs, his bony mad face covered with sweat and throbbing veins, 
saying, 'Yes, yes, yes, ' as though tremendous revelations were pouring into 
him all the time now, and I am convinced they were, and the others 
suspected as much and were frightened. He was BEAT - the root, the soul 
of Beatific. What was he knowing? He tried all in his power to ten me what 
he was knowing [ ... 
] He was alone in the doorway, digging the street. 
Bitterness, recriminations, advice, morality, sadness - everything was behind 
him, and ahead of him was the ragged and ecstatic joy of pure being [ ... ] 
'The sooner he's dead the better, ' said Galatea, and she spoke officially 
for almost everyone in the room. 
'Very well, then, ' I said, 'but now he's alive and I'll bet you want to 
know what he does next and that's because he's got the secret that we're all 
busting to find. ' (OR, p. 195) 
It is important to notice that the group that attacks Dean in these exchanges 
represents a counter-culture, rather than society at large. Leading a bohernian 
existence themselves, they target Dean (at least in part) to divorce him from, and 
therefore validate, their own lifestyle. As Ellis argues, 'Dean the ex-reform school 
car-thief is scapegoated for the excesses of the group' (EHis, p. 79). 
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Significantly, in the passage quoted above, Dean does not giggle; his effort to 
be understood has fallen on deaf ears. Although Sal defends him to the others, it is 
important to notice that Dean stands 'alone in the doorway' looking outwards, while 
Sal stands inside with the others. At this point, Dean is unreachable, and Sal must 
also cross the threshold, leave the Institution, if he is to learn Dean's secret. Back on 
the road with Dean (in other words, in Dean's transcendent territory), however, Sal 
finds that he cannot cope with the pitch at which Dean experiences life. 
All that old road of the past unreeling dizzily as if the cup of life had been 
overturned and everything gone mad. My eyes ached in nightmare day. 
'Ah, hell, Dean, I'm going in the back seat, I can't stand it any more, I 
can't look. ' 
'Hee-hee-hee! ' tittered Dean and he passed a car on a narrow bridge and 
swerved in dust and roared on [ ... ]I could feel the road some twenty inches beneath me, unfurling and flying and hissing at incredible speeds across the 
groaning continent with that mad Ahab at the wheel. (OR, p. 234) 
When Dean and Sal part after this latest trip it is evident that there is still some 
distance between the two men, but Sal has at least realised the significance of Dean's 
attraction to the Road; that revelation is a process, a journey. We are given, however, 
the first indication that their roads inight fbHow separate paths in the distinction Sal 
makes between Dean's 'life' and his own 'way': 
'Good-by, good-by. ' Dean walked off in the long red dusk [ ... ] All the 
firne 
he came closer to the concrete comer of the railroad overpass. He made one 
last signal. I waved back. Suddenly he bent to his life and walked quickly out 
of sight. I gaped into the bleakness of my own days. I had an awful long way 
to go too. (OR, p. 254) 
The next time the friends meet, Dean's transcendence is complete and the 
group has accepted him as a Fool, no longer expecting any social responsibility 
from 
him. To illustrate this, Sal describes him in terms of natural objects (a boulder and a 
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flower) and as an Angel (a supernatural creature), rather than as a ragged idiot or 
'mad Ahab'. 
If you touched him he would sway like a boulder suspended on a pebble on 
the precipice of a cliff. He might come crashing down or just sway rocklike. 
Then the boulder exploded into a flower and his face lit up with a lovely 
smile and he looked around like a man waking up and said, 'Ah, look at all 
the nice people that are sitting here with me. ' [ ... ] People were now beginning to look at Dean with maternal and paternal affection glowing in 
their faces. He was finally an Angel, as I always knew he would become. 
(OR, p. 263) 
This acceptance of Dean as My transcendent, without any more confusion 
with his status as a Made Fool, finally enables Sal to understand Dean's laughter. 
Significantly, this occurs only after Sal has given up his search for a stereotyped 
American West with Dean as its hero and 'realized I was beginning to cross and re- 
cross towns in America as though I were a travelling salesman - raggedy travellings, 
bad stock,, rotten beans in the bottom of my bag of tricks, nobody buying' (OR, 
p. 245). Sal's dreams of the past have been revealed to be too well-trodden, his bag 
of tricks - empty but for rotten beans that have turned out not to be magical - 
parodying the stock in trade of the genuine trickster. 
Sal's final road trip, taken with Dean and another friend, Stan, breaks this 
meaningless repetition of crossing and re-crossing America and takes them South, to 
Mexico and a new land (see also Ellis, p. 72). They spend the afternoon in a whore 
house, getting high and listening to mambo music, then drive on, at night, through 
deep jungle. The headlights fail and, insisting that they can 'make it', Dean drives on 
through utter darkness. Suddenly the friends realise they have crossed over into the 
Tropic of Cancer - Dean has taken them over a dark threshold into a world none of 
them have experienced before. 
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'We're in a new tropic! No wonder the smell! Smell it! ' I stuck my head out 
the window; bugs smashed at my face; a great screech rose the moment I 
cocked my ear to the wind. Suddenly our lights were working again and 
they poked ahead, iffurninating the lonely road that ran between solid walls 
of drooping, snaky trees as high as a hundred feet. 
'Son-of-a-bitch! ' yelled Stan in the back. 'Hot damn! ' He was still so 
high. We suddenly realized he was still high and the jungle and troubles 
made no difference to his happy soul. We began laughing, all of us. 
(OR, p. 293) 
Dean's message is revealed to Sal, through laughter, to be the essence of man 
without civilisation; 'no towns, nothing, lost jungle, n-ffles and miles, and down-going, 
getting hotter, the insects screaming louder, the vegetation growing higher, the smell 
ranker and hotter until we began to get used to it and Eke it' (OR, p. 293). 
Paradoxicaffy this is at once an image of becoming one with the earth and a vision of 
hell, and it is the memory of whores and drugs and mambo music that initially makes 
Stan laugh and protects his 'happy soul' from 'the jungle and troubles'. Crucially, 
however, as we have seen in the analyses thus far in this thesis, laughter expresses 
just this acknowledgement of the real world as having a positive and a negative 
aspect which are inextricable from one another. Moreover, Kerouac seems to be 
arguing that such a confrontation is impossible within the closed system of American 
society as he describes it. The fact that Mexico is a different, and more open, world, 
is indicated by Sal's response to a policeman who stops in the n-ýiddle of the night 
simply to ask if Dean is sleeping; 'such lovely policemen God hath never wrought in 
America. No suspicions, no fuss, no bother: he was the guardian of the sleeping 
town, period' (OR, p. 295). 
Having finally communicated his revelation, Dean leaves Sal, with dysentery, in 
Mexico City. When they next meet, Sal is living in New York with a new girlfriend 
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and Dean has traveHed cross-country again to visit him, but has nothing coherent to 
say. 
He hopped and laughed, he stuttered and fluttered his hands and said, 'Ah-- 
ah-you must listen to hear. ' We listened, all ears. But he forgot what he 
wanted to say. 'Really listen-ahent Look, dear Sal-sweet Laura-I've 
come-I'm gone-but wait-ah yes. ' And he stared with rocky sorrow into his 
hands. 'Can't talk no more-do you understand that it is-or might be-But 
listen! ' (OR, pp. 306-07) 
Due to go out in a foursome with Remi Boncccur and his girlfriend to a Duke 
Effington concert, they refuse to give Dean a lift, and abandon him to return cross- 
country alone. Sal has returned to a life of convention, and now sides with Remi, 
who. ) 
he notes 'was fat and sad now but still the eager and formal gentleman, and he 
wanted to do things the right way, as he emphasized. So he got his bookie to drive us 
to the concert in a CadiRac' (OR, p. 308). 
VVhile the ending is ambivalent, it is open. Analysing the first and last 
paragraphs of the novel, Dardess says that 
the book begins with the narrator's construction of distinctions and 
boundaries; it ends with his discarding them -a discarding which indicates 
his desire to suspend opposites in a perhaps continuous state of flux. The 
book moves from hierarchy to openness, from the limitations of possibilities 
to their expansion. (Dardess, p. 201) 
Ellis, however, argues that Sal's 'fear of trespassing beyond the consensual 
bounds of class and sexual propriety' always make him unable to understand Dean 
fully (Ellis, p. 82). He says of the novel that 
in this ending, On The Roads structure decisively bifurcates. Sal's story 
ends up as a Bildungsroman: swept up by commodity capitalism's luxury 
limousine, he is carried back into society - the Bildungsrornan's classic 
pattern [ ... 
] Sal's final acceptance of self-imposed limitation is marked by 
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the way his final thoughts of Dean are nostalgically sentimentalized [ ... 
] 
Dean's story, in contrast, is still picaresque in form: he is left on the road, 
rounding the comer, stidl seeking to resolve his inward conflicts. 
(Ellis, p. 75) 
He continues; 
How Sal shapes his story will mean he always ends up doing what he is 
'supposed to do'. The unanswered questions concern the means of release 
from the consumerist subject-position he embraces. They remain 
unanswered precisely because the narrative position Sal adopts excludes 
penetrative understanding of Dean's continuing rejection of limitations. 
Dean is ultimately commodified in Sal's syntactical account -just another 
American tale told in the back of a Cadillac. Sal seeks to produce Dean's 
idealism as a Bildungsroman like his own, but Dean's idealistic adherence to 
pure activity is incompatible with Sal's insistence on arrival. 
(Ellis, pp. 76-77) 
Nicosia, on the other hand, sees the novel as echoing natural processes, thereby 
putting Sal's eventual self-limitation in the context of his recognition of a broader, 
more open, system. Noting the constant repetition of such words as star, beat, vision, 
dream and so on, Nicosia argues that 
the thrust of all these symbolisms is to establish the cyclical nature of what 
men designate 'truth' or 'the absolute, ' etc. To this end Kerouac also uses 
many time collapses and images of light springing from darkness, and pays 
close attention to the passage of the seasons. The story begins and ends in 
winter. The book completes one cycle in the Be of the narrator, since at the 
opening he has just lost one wife, and at the close he has finally found 
another. (Nicosia, p. 348) 
Webb argues that the problems with the ending of On The Road stem from the 
ambivalence in Kerouac himself that is suggested at the beginning of this section. 
Because he was never able to reconcile his feelings about the two worlds of Lowell 
and the beats, he is not able to provide a convincing representation of a transcendent 
character. 
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Has he exaggerated the possibilities of self-realization in the beat world; has 
he sentimentalized the hoodlum, the dope addict, and the poet? After aIL if 
Jack himself remains always separate from the beat generation, what chance 
is there for anyone else? [ ... ] He must either re-evaluate his worlds and his 
relation to them as man and artist, or he must find fresh experiential and 
literary means for reaffirming the virtues of Lowel-1. (Webb, pp. 132-33) 
This observation gets at the heart of transcendence in literature. If one takes the 
position presented in the Introduction, laughter and art have in common the ability to 
stand outside the normal conventions, finding 'fresh experiential and literary means' 
by which we can develop. While Kerouac has shown the possibility for revelation in 
the laughing relationship that develops between Dean and Sal, he himself seems to 
remain unconvinced. This is, perhaps, because of his insistence that transcendent 
experiences can be communicated by changing the language used to describe them. 
As we see in Dean's decline into incoherence, however, such an attempt is bound to 
fail because of the ineffability of such experiences. Where Kerouac does succeed 
(although his other utterances seem not to reflect this) is in presenting Sal's 
revelation in the Mexican jungle in terms of (non-linguistic) shared laughter. 
Conclusion 
While each of the novels analysed in this chapter explores the relationship between an 
Institution, a Protagonist, and a Fool - laughter fornling an essential part of this 
dynamic - Heller, Kesey, and Kerouac use different techniques to illustrate the 
phenomenon that I have called Laughter of Revelation. 
The Institution of the Air Corps in Heller's novel uses Catch-22 to control 
language, which, Gary Davis argues, is discontinuous with reality. Because its 
members are trapped within its closed system, the effect of this is that whoever 
controls language controls the only reality that those within the system have access 
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to. In a similar way, the Combine in One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest reifies 
humanity so that people are seen, not as independent identities, but as cogs whose 
only purpose is to keep the machine running smoothly. By control-ling the definition 
of what this ideal person is, the Combine is able to designate those who don't fit 
merely as faults to be rectified. In both cases, individual people are secondary to the 
Institution, which is a self-perpetuating and self-serving system. Furthermore, the 
Institution is shown to be actively destructive (as we see, for example, when 
increasing numbers of Yossarian's friends are killed during pointless bomb runs, or in 
the lobotomies conducted on disruptive patients, including McMurphy himself). Less 
overtly, in On The Road the police and the government exist on the one hand, to 
stamp out any signs of deviancy, and, on the other hand, to trap the population into 
an endless cycle of commodification. 
In each of these novels there appears a character (the Fool) who exists 
independently of the Institution, thereby having access to a reality that exists outside 
the closed system. While Orr seems trapped at the beginning of Catch-22, serving as 
the example used by Yossarian and Doc Daneeka in the first overt defirlition of 
Catch-22, it is revealed that he has, while living within the system, long been planning 
and practising for his escape. McMurphy and Dean, however, are slightly different. 
McMurphy has always lived independently of the Combine, and his engagement with 
it is due entirely to the need he recognises in his feflow patients, while Dean is also an 
outsider, who watches conventions with as much interest as he does everything else, 
but is fundamentally unaffected by them. He is only accepted into the community 
when his intrinsic difference is recognised and he is given license to 
behave 
irresponsibly. 
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Orr overcomes the language paradox of Catch-22 simply by acting. 
McMurphy's dilenuna is how to five independently once the pain of others has been 
recognised. He cannot stand as the others' representative in a battle against the 
Combine and maintain the separation that keeps hirn safe, and he dies. In his 
independence, unqualified throughout On The Road, Dean becomes more and more 
distant from others, and he ends in incoherence. 
Yossarian, the only Protagonist in these texts who is not a first-person narrator, 
is initially as much a ftmctioning part of Catch-22's system as anyone else, although 
he develops his own Catch-22-like strategies for his own individual purposes. After 
Snowden's death, however, he realises that the war has implications for others beside 
himself, and he begins to confront the system directly (although he has no means to 
attack it coherently). Until he learns the significance of the private joke that causes 
Orr to giggle throughout Catch-22, Yossarian tries to repress his awareness of 
mortality; the apparent pointlessness of existence which Snowden's message 
communicates to him. Bromden (partly, perhaps because his story is told 
retrospectively) is already fully aware of the threat of the Combine at the start of One 
Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest. Like Yossarian, however, he does not consider that 
anything can be done, as his own experience with his father has taught him that any 
attempt to fight back leads only to destruction. He underestimates his own (and by 
extension, everyone's) potential for inner strength until McMurphy - not only a hero 
for his community, but revealed to be nothing more than a man in his gradual 
weakening and eventual death - teaches him that a true laugh, by acknowledging 
both pleasure and pain, can keep one sane and enable one to act despite the threat of 
the Combine. In effect, the laughter of McMurphy and Orr teaches Bromden and 
Yossarian that it is possible not only to become independent enough to see the limits 
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of the Institution, but also to move outside it and five without the (limiting) 
protection that it does provide. Sal on the other hand, while recognising in Dean's 
laughter an important symbol of fi7eedom, returns quite happily to the Institution once 
his adventure is over, satisfied simply to have learned that there is more to life than 
conventions and norms. Never able to embrace wholeheartedly what Dean represents, 
Sal merely tells us of his existence. This is therefore a different kind of first-person 
account from Bromden's, whose 'exchange of visions' essentially means that he has 
become a version of McMurphy that, nevertheless, leaves his own personality intact 
and strong. 
AN three of these novels, therefore, question in different ways the possibility of 
the transcendence of everyday reality, and especially of the restrictive systems that 
society creates. Heller circumvents the problems of language by making an epiphany 
of an action, conununicated by laughter. It is important to notice that the reader is 
never actually given a description of either Orr's or Yossarian's escape. Instead, the 
first is presented as accomplished fact and the second as the existential statement that 
Yossarian, in running, has taken responsibility for his own life. Kesey confronts the 
idea that fantasy is essential to communicate things that 'mere truth' cannot. In so 
doing, he creates a series of interrelating metaphors or visions that describe 
Bromden's world in a way that naturalistic language could not. Kerouac, as his style 
in On The Road shows, vaciflates between the necessity for mutuaffy agreed modes 
of language - syntax and grammar that communicate but are limited - and 
experimentation with a much freer mode of expression, which ultimately achieves 
little more than incoherence. The different tellings of these tales, each of which 
contains a powerful image of transcendence, therefore invite questions regarding the 
possibility of communicating anything truly new in novelistic form. These three 
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novels, then, show the beginnings of a metafictional tendency to problernatise the 
way the story is told and, in Kerouac's case in particular, the possibility is intimated 
that language may not prove able to overcome its own limitations to communicate 
objective 'truth' coherently. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LAUGHTER OF APOCALYPSE 
Introduction 
Laughter of Apocalypse takes the fonn of a relationship that involves revelation, as in 
Chapter One, but here the revelation is either of evil, or comes too late to prevent 
catastrophe. The relationship between Institution, Protagonist and Fool (and indeed, 
the designation of these roles) is also more complicated in these examples than in 
those discussed in Chapter One, although, as before, it is clearly identifiable through 
the dynamics of shared laughter. 
Typically, the Fools in these examples are perceived to be demons or monsters. 
While they function as Made Fools, in that by breaking taboos they serve mainly to 
reinforce the norm, in these examples the taboos broken are of an extreme kind, so 
that the Apocalyptic Fool may seem to be different from the more benign (and often 
victimised) figures who cannot be expected to cope with social convention. Of 
course, the question of degree that influences the perception of the Fool exists on a 
continuum, rather than falling conveniently into the categories of demons and victims. 
Randle McMurphy and Dean Moriarty, for example, both display demonic 
characteristics, but the crucial difference is that their influence on the Protagonist is 
positive and creative. 
Here, on the other hand, the Fool directly threatens both the Institution and the 
Protagonist; his or her laugh expresses a desire to destroy both individual sanity and 
social relationships. The revelation that the Fool betokens through his or her mockery 
typically concerns the guilt or fear of those he or she attacks, those truths that one 
would rather not face. The demonic Fool, therefore, can only be defeated once a 
Protagonist has accepted responsibility for these truths and assimilated them into his 
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or her personality, thereby negating the Fool's destructive intent. Also, in 
personifying, and thus externalising, the sins or fears of a society, this type of Fool 
often acts as a scapegoat, in that, in destroying the Fool, society IS cleansed. 
The Protagonists, because they have the potential to understand and assimilate 
transcendent experiences, are able to confront and overcome the threat that the Fool 
poses in a way that Institutional or closed thinking, because of its lack of flexibility, is 
unable to. Thus while the sense of Protagonist as advocate for the Fool's message to 
the reader still holds, there is also a sense in which the Protagonist acts as champion 
for his or her community, defending it against the Fool as demon. The relationship 
that is expressed by the Laughter of Apocalypse, therefore, occurs in the form of a 
struggle between the forces of system and anti-system, and describes transcendence 
in terms of the destruction of a corrupt or static system in order, ultimately, to create 
a better world. 
The Fool as Demon 
Leslie Fiedler points out that horror writing has existed for a long time, its current 
incarnation beginning in the eighteenth century as a reaction against Samuel 
Richardson's 'mimetic mode' and signalling a return to a style more like Medieval 
and Renaissance romance with its elements of the 'marvellous' and the 'wonderful'. 
Such fiction was, Fiedler says, reborn 'as terrifying nightmare' after upheavals such 
as the French Revolution, 'when the failed dream of Reason was breeding monsters 
in the dark undermind of Europe' (Fiedler, p. 46). Despite periods since then when 
horror stories have been largely dismissed as 'disreputable schlock', 'they have 
' 'Fantasy as Commodity and Myth', in The World of Stephen King, ed. by Tim Underwood and 
Chuck Miller (New York: Plume, 1986), pp. 45-50 (p. 45). 
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refused to die from our imagination, in which all of us remain children, for 
therapeutic reasons we do not understand' (Fiedler, p. 47, p. 48). This response to 
the failure of Reason adequately to address experienced reality seems different from 
the entropic response outlined in the Overview (and discussed in Chapter Three) that 
concludes that life is chaotic and therefore meaningless (in effect, seeing it as entirely 
nightmare). Instead, horror fiction uses fantasy to draw the monsters out of the 'dark 
undennind' and personify them in order that they may be confronted. By 
acknowledging the power of the irrational in this way, a balance can be maintained 
between the demands of Reason - the ordered systems that we need in order to 
function - and those of Unreason; the potential for chaos and destruction that exists 
in every individual and every society. 
A crucial element of horror fiction is its use of laughter; as Stephen King has 
pointed out, 'humor and horror are close together'. ' In traditional gothic tales 
laughter typicaRy acts as a mark of madness brought on by despair on the part of a 
victim, or of mockery or triumph on the part of a demon. In H. P. Lovecraft's 1922 
tale 'The Hound', for example, the narrator, confronted by the animated skeleton of a 
gigantic dog, 'scream[s] and [runs] away idiotically, [his] screams soon dissolving 
into peals of hysterical laughter'. ' The mocking demon appears in Mary Shelley's 
novel of 1818. Victor Frankenstein, finding his new bride murdered, looks up to see 
the creature he created at the window: 'a grin was on the face of the monster; he 
seemed to jeer, as with his fiendish finger he pointed towards the corpse of my wife'. ' 
Quoted by Clive Barker, 'Surviving the Ride', in Underwood and Miller, pp. 51-62 (title page). 
Omnibus 2: Dagon and Other Macabre Tales, intro. by August Derleth, (London: Grafton, 1985), 
pp. 196-205 (p. 204). 
4 Frankenstein; or, The Modern Prometheus, in Three Gothic Novels, ed. by Peter Fairclough, intro. 
by Mario Praz, Penguin English Library series (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), pp. 257-497 
(p. 468). 
107 
In both these examples, guilt and responsibility play an important part. In the first, the 
narrator has robbed the Hound's grave of a valuable artefact and is being punished, 
either by a supernatural force or by his own delusional conscience. In the second, 
Frankenstein had abandoned his creation as soon as it awoke, denying his 
responsibilities as 'father', and refuses to help the creature make a new Eden with a 
mate of itsown kind. Consequently, Frankenstein's creation punishes him by killing 
all those he loves. Both of these are examples of destructive, mad laughter, 
unmitigated by any positive sense of forgiveness or redemption. In more recent 
horror fiction, however, a sane, human laughter is often also present, which opposes 
and balances the demonic. 
A contemporary American example of demonic mockery can be found in 
Wiffiam Peter Blatty's The Exorcist (197 1). The demon Pazuzu, having possessed 
twelve-year-old Regan MacNeil, speaks through her, its laughter contrasting with her 
fear, as, for example, when 'Regan's piercing cry of terror turn[s] to a guttural, 
5 
yelping laugh of malevolent spite and rage triumphant'. Repeatedly described in 
terms of bestial, bellowing laughter, Pazuzu most often shows its presence by 
stretching Regan's mouth 'into a feral grin, into bow-mouthed mockery) 
(Ex, p. 204). Merrin, the exorcist, describes to his assistant, Damien Karras, the 
purpose of this constant mockery: 
I think the demon's target is not the possessed; it is us ... the observers ... 
every person in this house. And I think -I think the point is to make us 
despair; to reject our own humanity, Damien: to see ourselves as ultimately 
bestial; as ultimately vile and putrescent; without dignity; ugly; unworthy. 
(Ex, p. 311) 
5 The Exorcist (London: Blond & Briggs, 197 1 ), p. 190. Subsequent references appear in 
parentheses within the text. 
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As the destruction of McMurphy in One Flew Over the Cuckoos Nest shows, 
however, Pazuzu's victims will only despair (and thereby lose their humanity) if they 
lose their own ability to laugh. Natural, human laughter, therefore, acts as a powerful 
balancing force in The Exorcist. One of the principle agents of this force is Father 
Dyer, a young priest who comes to a party at the MacNeil household early in the 
novel. 'At the door, he apologized for his lateness. "Couldn't find the right necktie, " 
he told Chris [Regan's mother] expressionlessly. For a moment, she stared at him 
blankly, then burstinto laughter. Her day-long depression began to lift. ' (Ex, p. 61) 
The other is detective Kinderman, who is investigating the death of Chris's 
colleague, Burke Dennings. During his first interview with Chris (who is almost at 
breaking point) he starts to teR her a story about his mother keeping carp in the 
4 9(ah bathtub, finishing ,, that's enough now; enough. " He sighed wearily, motioning 
his hand in a gesture of dismissal. "But now and then a laugh just to keep us from 
crying"' (Ex, p. 175). When Kinderman, after much hesitation, asks Chris for an 
autograph (she is an actress), she 'almost laugh[s] with relief, at herself, at despair 
and the human condition' (Ex, p. 18 1). 
The fact that Chris almost laughs shows how close the demon is to winning, 
and it does, in fact, succeed in destroying Karras's humour. Towards the end of the 
novel he can no longer laugh, so that when he returns to his room to find a note from 
Dyer - 'A key to the Playboy Club has been found on the chapel kneeler in front of 
the votive fights. Is it yours? You can claim it at Reception' - he puts it down 
'without expression' (Ex, p. 321). Again, some pages later, Kinderman tells another 
of his fimny stories, and Karras can only respond by 'smiling bleakly' (Ex, p. 323). 
The power of shared, human laughter is shown only to balance the demon's, it cannot 
defeat it outright. Instead Karras finally destroys Pazuzu by being moved to ftiry 
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(action) rather than shame (retreat) by its mockery. Denouncing the demon as a 
'loser', he forces Pazuzu to possess him instead of the child and then kills himself 
(Ex, pp. 329-30). 
The function of the Made Fool, it has been argued, is to unite a community in 
its recognition and rejection of the Fool's deviancy. As Enid Welsford says, 
The Fool is an unabashed glutton and coward and knave [ ... ] he winks at us and we are delighted at the discovery that we also are gluttons and cowards 
and knaves. The rogue has freed us from shame. ' 
As Transcendent Fool, however, the demon has special knowledge, in this case 
of the hearts and minds of its victims, and it uses this knowledge to divide and isolate 
people, destroying any sense of community. The demon reveals those hidden things 
131, about ourselves that we are too ashamed to share with others and laugh about, 
playing on our guilt and fear until our sense of our own unworthiness destroys us. 
Karras, consumed by guilt about his mother's lonely death in a sordid apartment, is 
weakened by the demon's taunts about his filial duties. It is only when he is able to 
see Pazuzu not simply as his own cruel conscience but as a threat to everybody in the 
house that Karras can reassert a sense of community by sacrificing himself for the 
others. Significantly, this occurs only when both he and the demon have stopped 
laughing. The moment of recognition and confrontation happens beyond laughter, 
which is presented simply as an expression on the one hand of the threat to humanity, 
and on the other of the defensive response. 
Thus apocalyptic laughter entails two types of revelation. First the demon. as 
Transcendent Fool, reveals those things that characters would rather remained 
' The Fool: His Social & Literary History (London: Faber and Faber, 1935), p. 318. 
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hidden, in an attempt to use their shame or fear to destroy them. Second. a 
Protagonist, realising that this attempt can only be successful if one refuses to 
acknowledge one's own culpability, takes on the role of scapegoat. In this example, 
Karras literally accepts the sins of the world by taking the demon into himself In 
committing suicide, therefore, he not only punishes himself for what he perceives to 
be his crime (abandoning his mother), he also releases the others from gufft. 
Perhaps the best contemporary example of an overt battle between demonic 
and human laughter is to be found in Stephen King's novel, It (1986). As in The 
Exorcist,, the demonic is expressed through the aggressive and destructive laughter of 
the monster, 'It'), which uses the fears of its individual victims against them. 
However, as Jeanne CampbeH Reesman points out, this mockery is ultimately 
defeated by 'happiness expressed through simple laughter - shared laughter'. 
' In 
order to understand how this defeat is possible, it is important to address the 
dynamics King sets up between the Fool (as demon), It, the town of Derry which it is 
trying to destroy, and a group (the 'Losers' Club') who act communally as 
Protagonist in order to defeat it. 
Several critics have pointed out that King's effectiveness as a writer stems from 
his placing of the horrors of Gothic fiction in everyday, small town settings, with 
recognisably ordinary characters! Furthermore, as Ben Indick points out, he 
combines the fear of the supernatural with 'the self-conscious real and imagined fears 
7 'Riddle Game: Stephen King's Metafictive Dialogue', in The Dark Descent: Essays Defining 
Stephen King's Horrorscape, ed. by Tony Magistrale (New York: Greenwood, 1992), pp. 157-70 
(p. 165). 
' For example, Ben P. Indick, 'What Makes Him So Scary? % in Discovering Stephen King, ed. by 
Darrell Schweitzer (Mercer Island, WA: Starmont, 1985), pp. 9-14; Michael A. Morrison, 'After the 
Danse; Horror at the End of the Century', in A Dark Night's Dreaming: Contemporary American 
Horror Fiction, ed. by Tony Magistrale and Michael A. Morrison (Columbia: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 9-26. 
of the young (which do not vanish even in adulthood) of inadequacy, physical 
changes, need for love and attention'(Indick, p. 10). In so doing, King amplifies and 
deepens the ordinary, everyday fears of his readers. As Tony Magistrale puts it, 
At the heart of King's fictional microcosm is an acute awareness of the most 
emotional and deep-seated American anxieties. Under the supernatural 
veneer of vampires and telekinetic powers, which remains acknowledged as 
one of the great popular attractions of his writing, King's world is a mirror 
to our own. Echoing a dominant concern of Christopher Lasch and many 
other contemporary social scientists, King's work highlights the ways in 
which American society undermines the morality necessary for love - of self 
and for others. ' 
Thisis a common aim of modem horror novelists. As Michael Morrison points 
out, 'while the modem horror short story typically focuses on the psychology of a 
single character, the modem horror novel takes on society' (Morrison, p. 14). 
King's method, as Edwin Casebeer shows, is to use an external antagonist (in 
this case, It) to lead members of a community into conflict with their neighbours. 
'This conflict results in a community held together by conformity rather than 
cooperation, with narcissism and the closed door, fealty to no code but self- 
-) 10 
gratification, and apocalypse simmering beneath the surface . King 
has said in 
interview that 
my work underlines again and again that I am not merely dealing with the 
surreal and the fantastic but, more important, using the surreal and the 
fantastic to examine the motivations of people and the society and the 
institutions they create. (Quoted by Casebeer, p. 45) 
9 'Defining Stephen King's Horrorscape: An Introduction', in Magistrale 1992, pp. 14 (p. 3). 
Bernard J. Gallagher also argues that Lasch's analysis of the 'Culture of Narcissism' is crucial to an 
understanding of King's work; 'Breaking Up Isn't Hard to Do: Stephen King, Christopher Lasch, 
and Psychic Fragmentation', Journal ofAmerican Culture 10: 4 (winter 1987), 59-67. 
'0 'Stephen King's Canon: The Art of Balance', in Magistrale and Morrison , pp. 42-54 (p. 48). See 
also King's Needful Things (199 1), in which an external antagonist destroys a community by giving 
each member of it what he or she most desires, at the expense of their relationships with one 
another. 
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The town of Derry has a long and bloody history, marked by cyclically 
recurring acts of cruelty and murder. The demonic It, which most frequently appears 
in the guise of a clown called Pennywise, is always present, killing and encouraging 
others to kill, while simultaneously acting as a depraved conscience to those it has 
thus encouraged. The clown's presence is felt both in the inhabitants' fear of one 
another and in their attempts to hide their own part in the town's guilt. Rather than 
homogenising a community and refusing to accept difference, as the Institution has 
been shown to do in the last chapter, Pennywise's influence denies community, turns 
neighbour against neighbour, and destroys social structures. 
To overcome this influence King uses children, presenting an image of 
childhood that is both free of the taint of sin and imaginative enough to understand 
the threat posed by It. As Casebeer points out, 
King adheres to the romantic belief that the child is the father of the man. It 
may be that children are superior in wisdom and psychological talents to 
adults simply because the latter are corrupted by psyches shrunken by 
materialism and rationalism - but they are superior. (Casebeer, p. 49) 
King addresses this potential - the ability to see the world as it really is, 
unmediated by adult constraints - overtly in It. While, for a child, 'a sudden upheaval 
of beauty or terror at ten did not preclude an extra cheese-dog or two for lunch at 
noon9, 
when you grew up, all that changed. You no longer lay awake in your bed. 
sure something was crouching in the closet or scratching at the window ... 
but when something did happen, something beyond rational explanation, the 
circuits overloaded. [ ... 
] It didn't digest. Your mind kept coming back to it, 
pawing it lightly Re a kitten with a ball of string ... until eventually, of 
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course, you either went crazy or got to a place where it was impossible for 
you to function. 11 
The child, then, is in an ambivalent position, at once prey to the terrors of the 
irrational and flexible enough to assimilate those terrors, to continue to function when 
confronted by them. The Losers' Club works as an extended version of this image. 
Not only are its members (at the start of the narrative) children, they are also 
outsiders, ostracised because of their difference: Bill has a stutter, Ben is fat, Beverly 
has an abusive father, Richie wears glasses, Eddie is a hypochondriac, Stan is Jewish 
and Mike is black. Facing daily confrontation in their ordinary lives, therefore, these 
children are ideally placed to meet the challenge of the irrational when it arises. 
Laughter plays an important part in this schema because, being child outsiders, 
all the central characters are laughed at by others, and it is not until they form their 
club that they are able to laugh amongst themselves. An example of this occurs when 
Ben first meets the others in the Barrens, a green wilderness that surrounds the 
sewage system in the heart of the town. 
Stuttering Bill burst out laughing. Ben looked at him sharply, decided he 
wasn't being laughed at, exactly (it was hard to say how he knew it, but he 
did), and grinned. [ ... 
] 
Both Bill and Eddie burst out laughing this time, and Ben joined them 
] He liked the way his laughter sounded with theirs. It was a sound he 
had never heard before; not mingled laughter - he had heard that lots of 
times - but mingled laughter of which his own was a part. (It, pp. 196-97) 
Significantly, this happens after Ben has triumphed in an encounter with the 
children's chief schoolyard enemies, the buffies Henry, Butch and Vic. Initially drawn 
together by their attempts to avoid these boys, the Losers' Club is formed by a 
It (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1986), p. 433. Subsequent references appear in parentheses 
within the text. 
114 
mutual agreement that Ben and his new friends will fight back. The laughter in this 
scene, then, is an expression of solidarity against an enemy,, an attitude that becomes 
crucial once they are involved with It. 
This involvement is provoked by the start of a new cycle of violence in Derry,, 
this time the murders of local children. Bill's younger brother, George, is the first 
victim, and BiH's fury at this act draws the others into an investigation of crimes that 
the adults of the town seem unable to cope with. Illustrated by the monster's fi7equent 
appearance as Pennywise the giggling clown, It uses demonic laughter to undermine 
the sanity of its victims, as when the father of another of the murdered children hears 
what he thinks is his daughter's voice coming from the kitchen sink; 
I heard Betty somewhere down in those friggin pipes. Laughin. She was 
somewheres down there in the dark, laughin. Only it sounded more like she 
was screamin, once you listened a bit. Or both. Screarnin and laughin down 
there in the pipes. (It, p. 132) 
Not only does this experience make the man question his own sanity, the adults 
of Derry are simply unable to believe such things to be possible, and his tale is 
ignored. 
The Losers, by contrast, do believe, and pursue It, ultimately to its lair in the 
sewers. It fights back by disguising itself as the thing each child is most afraid of and 
then mocking their fear. They find out by accident, however, that It is also afraid of 
their laughter. In a haunted house which Pennywise has both created and led them to, 
Richie tries to encouragge the terrified Stan; 
'Come on, Stan-kid. ' he said. 'Is you a man or is you a mouse? " 
'I must be a man, ' Stan said shakily, and wiped tears from his face with 
the heel of his left hand. 'So far as I know, mice don't shit their pants. ' 
They laughed and Ben could have sworn he felt the house pulling away 
from them, from that sound. (11, pp. 692-93) 
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The contrast between laughter and screams or tears in these examples is telling. 
In the first, the ambivalent connection between laughter and horror is expressed by It, 
and the response of the listening adult is fear and disbelief In the second, however, 
Stan's ability to turn his tears into laughter (but only, it should be noticed, with the 
full support of the others) indicates that the children are just as able to use the power 
inherent in this ambivalence as It is. This leads Bill to the discovery of an ancient 
ritual, the Ritual of Chad. This is a form of wit contest, in which a holy man and a 
demon bite -one another's tongues so that neither can escape and then teR jokes, the 
first to laugh being destroyed. The children use this idea to turn Its illusions against 
itself shooting It with a silver bullet when it appears as a werewolf and using Eddie's 31 
inhaler to squirt 'acid' at It when it appears as a giant crawling eye. By turning their 
fears around in this way the children are able to overcome them, to see a werewolf or 
a crawling eye as ridiculous rather than frightening. This gives them power over it, 
and, in a significant reversal of the Ritual, their laughter causes it to retreat. 
When the Losers, now adult, are called back to Derry by another cycle of 
murders, they return to the ambivalent world of their childhoods, where laughter and 
terror are two sides of the same coin, and must therefore abandon their dependence 
on adult rationality if they are to survive. With two important exceptions, each Loser 
has become successful in a career in which creativity has a vital role. Rather than lose 
their childhood selves completely, each has retained a flexibility of imagination that 
makes this return possible. Stan, however, who even as a child regarded the irrational 
as an 'offensejft, p. 349) and could therefore never assimilate it in the way the 
others could, kills himself when he is called home. Eddie, who has become a 
limousine driver, has the strength to return, but no longer has the imagination to 
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engage with It, and he is killed in the final battle. Both men have chosen careers 
which are merely on the fringes of creativity; Stan managing a large video company 
and Eddie driving famous actors too and from their film sets. This indicates that, 
while still attracted to the power of a fantasy world, neither, as an adult, is truly 
creative himself 
The two most important characters in this respect are Bill, who has become a 
novelist, and Mike, who is now the town librarian. Bill, always the leader of the 
group, becomes its main imaginative focus, and it is his revelation, as I shall discuss 
in a moment, that finally leads to Its death. While the others must abandon their adult 
selves in order to confront It on its own terms, Mike fives at once in both worlds. As 
he says, 'on one level of my mind I was and am living with the most grotesque, 
capering, horrors; on another I have continued to live the mundane fife of a smafl-city 
librarian' (It, p. 126). Mike, whose journal entries form much of the narrative and 
whose research reveals many of the details of Derry's bloody past, becomes the 
group's advisor as wefl as the reader's guide. This liminal position is unique in the 
novel and, significantly, Mike does not engage in the final apocalyptic battle with It. 
His liminal status is reinforced by his visit to Albert Carson, who was librarian before 
him and is now dying of throat cancer. Carson, having spent a lifetime studying the 
history of Derry, teUs Mike that it is now his tum to find and tell the truth. He 
emphasises that this telling should rely more onfeeling (the imaginative power of the 
child) than on fact (adult rationality), and when Mike laughs at this 
Carson grin[s] with his leathery lips - an expression of good humor that was 
actually a little frightening. In that instant he looked like a vulture happily 
guarding a freshly killed animal, waiting for it to reach exactly the right stage 
of tasty decomposition before beginning to dine. (It, p. 129) 
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What seems to be an evil smile, evoking Pennywise's habit of partially eating 
his victims, is in this case that of someone who is helping Mike to defeat It. Meeting 
again as adults, the Losers gradually realise the significance of this blurring between Cý 
themselves and It. Finding that Stan is dead and they are only six, Bill feels 
that It was the seventh; that It and time were somehow interchangeable, that 
It wore all their faces as well as the thousand others with which It had 
terrified and killed ... and the idea that It might be them was somehow the 
most frightening idea of all. How much of us was left behind here? He 
thought with sudden rising terror. How much of us never left the drains and 
the sewers where It lived ... and where Itfed? Is that why we forgot? Because part of each of us never had anyfuture, never grew, never left 
Derry? Is that why? (It, p. 395) 
In this realisation that their lives are inextricably linked to the evil that It 
represents, the Losers recognise that they are at once Derry's champion and its 
scapegoat. The part of them that never grew up, the innocence of childhood, is to be 
sacrificed in a final confrontation that will cleanse the town. As adults, however, 
Pennywise mocks them, playing on their fear that they have lost the childish ability to 
use the ambivalence of laughter as a weapon; 'You'll never think of the right riddles 
and jokes. You'll never make me laugh, Mikey. You've all forgotten how to turn 
your screams upside-down' (It, p. 565). This image returns twice in the novel. 
Shortly after the episode just described, Pennywise is described as having a 'bloody 
grin too red and too wide, a scream turned upside-down' (It, p. 570). And again, in a 
picture from an old copy of the Derry News, 'off to the left was a clown - their 
clown - turning a handspring for a group of children. 
The artist had caught him 
upside down, turning his smile into a scream' (It, p. 583). As Reesman argues in her 
Bakhtinian analysis of the novel, 
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Such grotesque laughter, the ambivalent laughter of the carnival, 
acknowledges horror even as it rises above it. It knows of this possibility, 
and fears it. Disguised as Vic, It visits Henry in the insane asylum and says, 
"They can't hurt Me if they only half-believe ... But there have been some distressing signs". The Losers must "believe" enough in evil to confront it, 
but they must also "unbelieve" in its monological control over them. If the 
Losers were to laugh at It instead of succumbing to Its terrors, It would not 
only be threatened but destroyed. (Reesman, p. 166) 
This is finally achieved by the adult Losers at the moment that Bill sees Its 
laughter for what it really is: an attempt to destroy all communication rather than to 
create intimacy. In an enactment of the Ritual of Chfid, Bill's mind and the creature's 
have become enmeshed, and It draws him inexorably towards its own world, the 
Deadlights. 
It screamed noxious laughter, and Bill became aware that Its voice was 
beginning both to fade and to swell, as if he was simultaneously drawing out 
of Its range ... and hurtling 
into it [... ] He would shortly be beyond sane 
communication with It ... and some part of 
him understood that, for all Its 
laughter, for all Its alien glee, that was what It wanted. Not just to send him 
out to whatever It really was, but to break their mental communication [ ... ] 
To pass beyond communication was to pass beyond salvation. (It, p. 846) 
This realisation releases Bill from Its power, and he recognises that to believe in 
It is to understand it, and therefore to believe in and understand the things that It is 
trying to destroy. 
chia, this is Chiid, stand, be brave, be true, standfor you brother, your 
ftiends; believe, believe in all the things you have believed in, believe that 
ifyou tell the policeman you're lost he'll see that you get home safely, that 
there is a Tooth Fairy who lives in a huge enamel castle that courage 
is possible and words will come smoothly every time [ ... 
He suddenly began to laugh in the darkness, not in hysteria but in utter 
delighted arnazernent. 
'OH SHIT, I BELIEVE IN ALL OF THOSE THINGS! ' he shouted, and 
it was true: even at eleven he had observed that things turned out right a 
ridiculous amount of the time. (It, p. 847-48) 
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Its power over them eliminated, the Losers are finally able to kill It. However. 
because of its corrupting influence which pervades Derry, as Its world falls apart the 
sewers, both symbolically and literally the heart of the town, collapse, and Derry is 
also destroyed. 
As Reesman observes, the function of It as enabling, by confrontation, Bill's 
moment of revelation, has implications for It as a novel, and for its relationship with 
the reader. 
As It serves as the town's soul, a historical collective self of the sins of the 
town fathers, It also represents the dark personal unconscious the young 
developing psyches of the novel must confront in order to live, while on a 
meta-level It points to the jarring psychological function of the novel itself 
Pennywise could be called a grotesque image of the artist, particularly in Its 
insistence on upsetting usual ways of 'seeing" of 'knowing'. 
(Reesman, p. 16 1) 
The idea of It as Fool, as Artist is consistent with the analysis in the 
Introduction to this thesis of the Transcendent Fool as creative force. As Reesman 
points out, however, it is significant that the two strongest voices in the novel are 
those of writers, Mike and Bill, for 'the characters' narratives are attempts to explain, 
to tell about, the darkness of It in order to survive' (Reesman, p. 163). Comparing 
Stan's reactions to It and Bill's, Reesman argues that where Stan only 'sees', and 
then re ects, Bill 'addresses', he assimilates situations and uses them later in his work i 
(Reesman, p. 167). Casebeer also Points out that in It, the persona of 'author' is 
given an optimistic potential; 'where the child's imagination is the only weapon of the 
adult against the death and meaninglessness of the eponymous evil, the novelist Bill 
Denbrough [ ... 
] regains this state most easily and thus is a vital element of the 
protagonistic band' (Casebeer, p. 5 1). 
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Two images of the artist are, therefore, presented in the novel. The new ways 
of 'seeing' and 'knowing' that It represents lead only to the revelation that its 
ultimate purpose is to destroy both communication and community, and it is only the 
ability of the Protagonists to assimilate and 'tell about' this threat that proves to be 
genuinely creative, in that it takes this knowledge and conununicates it to the reader. 
King's fiction, Casebeer argues, does more than simply produce catharsis, (it 
urges readers to confront squarely and disturbingly the horror in their own lives 1) 
(Casebeer, p. 43). King's skiH, he continues, is in 'his ability to balance opposing 
realities' so that, while the resolutions of his novels may seem unsatisfactory, King is, 
in fact, placing the onus on the reader; 'we will behold in the artistic experience an 
affirming and illuminating mirror of our problems and our solutions' (Casebeer, 
p. 45). He argues that the authorial voice in King's work is a conservative persona 
who 'agrees with the norms of the community', while 
the antagonist (as monster) is that shadow aspect of us which finds its reality 
in the individual, the bizarre, and the grotesque. This antagonist seeks to 
tyrannically control or to destroy rather than to belong, which is dynamic 
rather than centred and driven rather than ordered. We contain both and we 
come to the novel to experience both. Their conflict will never be settled, for 
it is the essence of what they are: opposites that define one another. 
(Casebeer, p. 47) 
Barker similarly argues that King's aims are basicaffy conservative, but that 
they are also subversive in that fantastic literature shows us the complexity of our 
minds in its totality, including our own propensity for morbidity or perversion which 
is usually suppressed (Barker, p. 57). King, Casebeer argues, thus balances the 
traditional horror novel, in which the antagonist is destroyed, and the postmodem, in 
which the antagonist is transformed into the protagonist, with the result that King 
acts as a shaman, 'employing magic (the fantasy image. childhood imagination) to 
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lead his culture into self-discovery' (Casebeer, p. 47). This assessment of King as an 
author seems to support the idea of artist as Fool, employing magical truths to show 
society a new way forward. As we have seen in the analyses both of his own novel, 
It, and of Blatty's The Exorcist, however, not only can the Fool's knowledge be used 
destructively rather than creatively, but the Protagonist, in such circumstances, 
frequently takes on both the role of scapegoat and the role of artist. 
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Sula (1973) is, like It, set in a small town, in this case, Medallion, a 'little river town 
in Ohio'. " The plot covers the years 1919 to 1965, tracing the decline of the black 
community of Medaffion. CaUed the Bottom as 'a nigger joke' (Su, p. 4) by its 
inhabitants, the neighbourhood began when a slave was offered freedom and a piece 
of the most fertile 'bottom land' as a reward for a difficult task. On completion of this 
task the farmer tricked the slave by arguing that the infertile land in the hills around 
Medallion was, in fact, the 'bottom of heaven - best land there is' (Su, p. 5), so the 
slave begged for, and was given, land in the hills rather than the valley. Calling their 
neighbourhood the Bottom keeps this trick - and their ancestor's having faflen for it 
- constantly in the inhabitants' minds, and the acknowledgement of white evil and 
their own My therefore underpins and defines the community. " Morrison shows, 
however, that the 'joke' is more complex than this dichotomy between white 
oppressors and black victims when she defines it as 
12 Sula (London: Chatto & Windus, 1980), p. 5. Subsequent references appear in parentheses within 
the text. 
" Joanne Gabbin also makes this point; 'A Laying on of Hands: Black Women Writers Exploring 
the Roots of Their Folk and Cultural Tradition', in Wild Women in the Whirlwind- Afra-American 
Culture and the Contemporary Literary Renaissance, ed. by Joanne M. Braxton and Andr&e Nicola 
McLaughlin (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), pp. 246-63 (p. 255). 
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The kind white folks tell when the mill closes down and they're looking for a 
little comfort somewhere. The kind colored folks tell on themselves when 
the rain doesn't come, or comes for weeks, and they're looking for a little 
comfort somehow. (Su, pp. 4-5) 
While this clearly indicates that whites too respond to misfortune with laughter, 
important word changes between these two sentences show the difference in the 
dynamics of this response. Where the 'white folks' look for comfort 'somewhere', 
outside themselves, the 'colored folks' tell the joke 'on themselves' to find comfort 
'somehow'. in other words, they internalise it, and the evil that provoked it. By 
associating a white trick with drought or flood in this way, Morrison also seems to 
argue, as Victoria Middleton points out, that jthe community's] confusion of natural 
and social wrongs implies that they renounce responsibility for contributing to their 
own suffering'. 14 Consequently, the community's laughter is a means of defence, a 
way of surviving the evils that seem to surround it rather than an attempt to defeat 
them. Morrison describes a white visitor to the Bottom misunderstanding the laughter 
that he hears; 
U_ It would be easy for the valley man to near the laughter and not notice the 
adult pain that rested somewhere under the eyelids [ ... ] He'd 
have to stand 
in the back of Greater Saint Matthew's and let the tenor's voice dress him in 
silk, or touch the hands of the spoon carvers (who had not worked in eight 
years) and let the fingers that danced on wood kiss his skin. Otherwise the 
pain would escape him even though the laughter was part of the pain. 
A shucking, knee-slapping, wet-eyed laughter that could even describe 
and explain how they came to be where they were. (Su, p. 4) 
This laughter, therefore, is static rather than dynamic. It describes 'how they 
came to be where they were' rather than showing a way forward. As Madhu Dubey 
" 'Sula: An Experimental Life', College Language Association Journal, 28: 4 (June 1985), 367-81 
(p. 370). 
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argues, 'the folk culture of the Bottom is geared toward survival rather than change', 
hence 'the community's perception of evil as an uncontrollable natural phenomenon 
that must be allowed to run its course'. " One of these evils, which is bitterly resented 
but still accepted, is the black community's constant exclusion from the economic 
development of Medallion as a whole. When a road is started in 1927 to improve 
business links with other towns, rumours circulate that local black labour will be used 
to build it, which come to nothing when itinerant white workers are brought in 
instead. The same thing happens in 1937, when a plan is formed to build a tunnel 
under the river. Again the black men try to get work, and again they are bitter, but 
not rebellious, when they are turned down. Like the Losers' Club in King's novel, the 
inhabitants of the Bottom feel marginalised and victimised, but unlike the Losers they 
respond by forming the closed system of an Institution rather than acting as 
Protagonists. 16 
Cynthia Davis argues that, as we see when the vaHey man misunderstands the 
laughter he hears in the Bottom, white brutality involves 'the systematic denial of the 
reality of black fives'. 17 An important aspect of this denial is illustrated by the way the 
white people of Medallion refuse to see their black neighbours as part of the same 
15 "'No Bottom and No Top": Oppositions in Sula', in Toni Morrison: Contemporary Critical 
Essays, ed. by Linden Peach, New Casebook series (London: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 70-88 (p. 8 1). 
16 Many critics note the importance of marginalisation in Sula, although most see it as a political 
issue. Barbara Rigney, for example, argues that black women are doubly marginalised, taking the 
reductive view that while men are dualistic, women are multiple, which enables Morrison to 
'[subvert] traditional Western notions of identity and wholeness'. While she does identify this stance 
as postmodem, she claims that it first appears in literature that concerns marginalised characters, 
seeing this as entirely a race and gender issue and therefore ignoring the way madness has 
influenced Western literature over the centuries, as well as the cultural theories of such 
commentators as R-D. Laing and Christopher Lasch; 'Hagar's Mirror: Self and Identity in 
Morrison's Fiction' in Peach 1998, pp. 52-69 (p. 53). Joseph H. Wessling, on the other hand, 
interprets the novel in terms of Freud's theory of narcissism; 'Narcissism in Toni Morrison's Sula', 
College Language Association Journal, 31: 3 (March 1988) 281-98. 
17 'Self, Society and Myth in Toni Morrison's Fiction', in Peach 1998, pp. 27-42 (p. 27). 
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community. Even when there is plenty of well-paid work available (as when the road 
is built), black families are allowed to starve rather than be given jobs. Davis 
interprets the novel in terms of Sartre's 'Look', where 'being "seen" by another both 
confwms one's reality and threatens one's sense of freedom' (Davis, p. 28). This 
leads to 'a cycle of conflicting and shifting subject-object relationships in which both 
sides try simultaneously to remain in control of the relationship and to use the Other's 
look to confirm identity' (Davis, p. 29). This can lead to Bad Faith, 'a vacillation 
between transcendence and facticity which refuses to recognise either one for what it 
reafly is or to synthesise them' (Davis, p. 29, quoting from Being and Nothingness). 
Thus, characters are in Bad Faith who 'use others to escape their own responsibility 
to define themselves' (Davis, p. 29). This can, of course, also happen in 'internalising 
the "Look" of the majority culture', an action which is 'life-denying, eliminating [] 
one who reafly accepts the external definition of the self gives up spontaneous feeling 
and choice' (Davis, p. 29,30). This is a compeffing interpretation of the position of 
the black community of the Bottom. As Davis points out, although reciprocation is 
possible between two individuals, social divisions of power unbalance the process and 
lead inevitably to Bad Faith from the social perspective; 'the adoption of a rigid role, 
the withdrawal from life, is for Morrison as for Sartre a failure' (Davis, p. 30). 
An existential hero would therefore, in this context, be the character who 
overcomes not only the dominant, white 'Look', but, more importantly, the 
introjected version of it that leads to the Institutionalisation of the black 
neighbourhood. Moreover, for this self-definition to have context, and therefore a 
wider meaning, such a character must attain a reciprocal relationship with an 'othef, 
since 'freedom defined as total transcendence lacks the intention and significance that 
can come from commitment' (Davis, p. 34). This freedom, and the reciprocation that 
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contextualises it, is expressed in the relationship between two girls, Nel Wright and 
Sula Peace, who grow up in the Bottom. Both are, to a large extent, the product of 
their upbringings; Nel in a traditional nuclear family, the daughter of a conformist 
mother who strictly adheres to society's rules, Sula. in an anarchic household of 
relations and boarders, the daughter of a wild and promiscuous mother. The isolation 
that both girls feel, caused on the one hand by restriction and on the other by chaos, 
brings them together, and they become close friends. 
Playing together by the river one day, the girls are approached by Chicken 
Little, a child younger than they, whom they introduce into their games. Sula takes 
the boy's hands and swings him around in a circle until, losing her grip, and watched 
by a horrified Nel, he flies into the river and sinks without trace. Again, this incident 
is filled with laughter, from the boys 'swimming and clowning in the water, shrouding 
their words with laughter' that Nel and Sula pass on their way to the river (Su, p. 57), 
to Chicken Little himself, whose 'bubbly laughter' the girls could still hear as he 
' sailed away out over the water' (Su, p. 60-6 1). The laughter here is extemal to the 
girls themselves, and therefore different to the protective laughter discussed above. 
This expresses experience outside the Institution, a transcendent laughter that does 
not contain pain or tragedy, showing that, despite the attempts of the community of 
the Bottorn, such things are not controBable. 
Joseph Wessling notes that 'as the two girls grow into womanhood, Sula 
continues the impulsive life, the life without priorities, while Nel settles into a 
conventional pattern of middle-class respectability'. 18 This leads to Sula's 
18 Wessling describes Nel's upbringing in terms of the superego, while Sula's is of the id; 
'Narcissism in Toni Morrison's Sula', College Language Association Journal, 31: 3 (March 1988) 
281-98 (p. 285, pp. 290-94). Houston A. Baker Jr. also interprets the novel in psychoanalytic terms; 
'Knowing Our Place: Psychoanalysis and Sula', in Peach 1998, pp. 103-09. 
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identification as evil (because 'different') by the Institution (of which Nel has, by 
now, become a part). Many critics have noticed that Sula defies stereotypical 
interpretation, making her not only a threat to her community, but a puzzle for the 
reader. '9 As Dubey argues, 'that most readers are baffled by Sula's inconsistency is 
apparent from the strenuous critical attempts to translate her character into a familiar 
ideological format' (Dubey, p. 75). Morrison, she argues, deliberately undermines the 
reader's ability to arrive at a straightforward interpretation both of Sula as a character 
and of Sula as a novel. In particular, says Dubey, by playing black nationalist and 
feminist issues against one another, Morrison makes any political reading of the novel 
20 difficult, although critics often make this attempt . 
Significantly, Linden Peach describes Sula as a trickster figure, defined by Paul 
Radin as 'the undffYerentiated present within every individual [ ... ] he who was before 
good and evil, denier, affirmer, destroyer and creator', rather than in terms of a 
21 binary opposition of good and evil . Middleton argues, 
in a similar vein, that Sula 'is 
a Promethean artist, defiant of the gods and superior to other mortals' (Middleton, 
p. 368). In this role of artist creator Sula. is revealed as a Fool, one who 'possesses no 
'9 For example, Jacqueline de Weever, 'The Inverted World of Toni Morrison's The Bluest Eye and 
Sula', College Language Association Journal, 22 (1979) 402-14; de Weever, Mythmaking and 
Metaphor in Black Women's Fiction (New York: St. Martin's Press, 199 1); Joanne Gabbin, 'A 
Laying on of Hands: Black Women Writers Exploring the Roots of Their Folk and Cultural 
Tradition', in Braxton and McLaughlin, pp. 246-63 (p. 248); Middleton, pp. 367-81. 
'0 Feminist readings of the novel include: de Weever, 'Inverted World'; Hortense Spillers, 'A 
Hateful Passion, a Lost Love', in Feminist Issues in Literary Scholarship, ed. by Shari Benstock 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), pp. 293-323; Barbara Jean Varga-Coley, 'The 
Novels of Black American Women', (unpublished doctoral thesis, State University of New York, 
198 1). Nationalist readings include: Rosearm Bell, Review of Sula, Obsidian 2: 3 (1976), 93-95 
(repr. in Critical Essays on Toni Morrison, ed. by Nellie Y. McKay (Boston, MA: G. K. Hall, 1988), 
pp. 24-27); Richard Barksdale, 'Castration Symbolism in Recent Black American Fiction', College 
Language Association Journal 29: 4 (1986), 400-13; Odette Martin, 'Sula', First World, 1: 4 
(1977), 42. 
21 Toni Morrison, Macmillan Modem Novelists series, general ed., Norman Page (London: 
Macmillan, 1995), p. 45. Peach is quoting from Radin; The Trickster (London: Routledge, 1956), 
pp. 168-69. Notice again Morrison's subversion of stereotypes in making her trickster figure female 
instead of the more traditional male. 
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values, moral or social, is at the mercy of his passions and appetites, yet through his 
actions all values come into being' (Peach, p. 5 1, quoting Radin, p. ix). Since, as was 
shown in the previous paragraph, Morrison deliberately obstructs easy interpretation 
of both this central character and the text as a whole, it is unsurprising that 'one of 
the salient features of the trickster figure is the way the onus of interpretation is 
placed upon the observer' (Peach, p. 50). Typically, such interpretation is fraught 
with difficulty even when the narrative shows Sula's own thoughts, as in the 
following, when she interprets herself, by implication, as 'wicked', an assessment 
undercut by the wording of the passage, 
She thought she liked the sootiness of sex and its comedy; she laughed a 
great deal during the raucous beginnings, and rejected those lovers who 
regarded sex as healthy or beautiful. Sexual aesthetics bored her. Although 
she did not regard sex as ugly (ugliness was boring also), she liked to think 
of it as wicked. (Su, p. 122, emphasis added) 
The question of interpretation is, however, easy for the inhabitants of the 
Bottom; Sula. is simply another evil to be survived. Feeling that Sula. is wicked, her 
neighbours finally decide that she is guilty of the ultimate transgression, that of 
sleeping with white men. This is clearly symbolic, since not only is the truth of the 
accusation immaterial ('it may not have been true, but it certainly could have been. 
She was obviously capable of it' (Su, p. 112)), this sin is later described as being 
impossible, since 'all unions between white men and black women were rape; for a 
black woman to be willing was literally unthinkable' (Su, p. 113). This accusation is 
therefore merely a way of saying that Sula's evil makes her at home with 
transgression and thus capable of anything. 
She came to their church suppers without underwear, bought their 
steaming platters of food and merely picked at it - relishing nothing, 
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exclaiming over no one's ribs or cobbler. They believed that she was laughing at their God. (Su, pp. 114-5) 
Thus, Sula's adult laughter has a similar status to the laughter during the 
episode in which Chicken Little is killed; it expresses the uncontrollable, the vast 
possibilities of 'outside' that the Bottom seeks to protect itself from. As Joanne 
Gabbin points out, however, '[Sula's] difference makes her at once the pariah of the 
Bottom and its most precious and needed symbol of evil. Sula is the center' (Gabbin, 
256). This is illustrated in the actual effect Sula has on the conununity, which is, 
ironicafly, positive: 
Their conviction of Sula's evil changed them in accountable yet mysterious 
ways. Once the source of their personal misfortune was identified, they had 
leave to protect and love one another. They began to cherish their husbands 
and wives, protect their children, repair their homes and in general band 
together against the devil in their midst. (Su, p. 117) 
Thus Sula's role in her community is as a Made Fool. Identified as the cause of 
the inhabitants' problems, she can be scapegoated to absolve them of responsibility 
for their sins. In doing this, however, the people of the Bottom respond to Sula in 
exactly the same way that they respond to white oppression; she is something to be 
suffered rather than confronted. By using her to embody its problems, the community 
can avoid acknowledging any culpability they may have for their own situation. 
Acting as an Institution, the people of the Bottom cannot use Sula's example to 
develop and grow because they have separated themselves too effectively from what 
she represents. As Dubey notes, 'Sula's newness so sharply departs from the past that 
it cannot revitalise her community's old ways; the encounter between the new (Sula) 
and the old (the community), far from producing a dynamic exchange, remains locked 
in a state of absolute contradiction' (Dubey, p. 79). The one person with whom such 
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an exchange might have been possible, Nel, becomes, as an adult, so fkmly 
entrenched in the rules of the Institution that when Sula carelessly sleeps with Nel's 
husband, Jude, Nel is so horrified by the transgression that she abandons both 
marriage and friendship. Later, when Sula is dying alone of a wasting disease, Nel 
goes to see her and is appalled when Sula, apparently recognising that the visit has 
more to do with social etiquette than with friendship, laughs at her. Nel no longer 
understands Sula's claim that 'I can do it all, why can't I have it allT, responding 
with the voice of the Institution, with all its prejudices and stereotypes, 'You can't do 
it all. You a woman and a colored woman at that. You can't act like a man' (Su, 
p. 142). 
In contrast to this deadlock between the Institution of the Bottom and the 
chaos of the Fool Sula, Morrison introduces another Fool-figure, Shadrack, a local 
man who has been traurnatised by his experience of war. Having 'turned his head a 
little to the right' one day 'and [seen] the face of a soldier near him fly off (Su, p. 8), 
Shadrack becomes afraid that his own body wiH fly into pieces or grow unnaturafly. 
After a spell in a psychiatric hospital he is released, and returns to his grandfather's 
shack on the riverbank. Terrified of the unexpectedness of death, 'he hit on the 
notion that if one day a year were devoted to it, everybody could get it out of the 
way and the rest of the year would be safe and free' (Su, p. 14). He therefore 
institutes January the third as National Suicide Day, and 'walk[s] through the Bottom 
down Carpenter's Road with a cowbell and a hangman's rope calling the people 
together. Telling them that this was their only chance to kill themselves or each 
other" (Su. p. 14). At first terrified by National Suicide Day, by its second year the 
inhabitants of the Bottom have grown used to it, and him; 'once the people 
understood the boundaries and nature of his madness, they could fit him, so to speak, 
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into the scheme of things' (Su, p. 15). They understand Shadrack's madness because 
it is similar to their own; where they attempt to shut out all pain, forming a closed 
system of defensiveness and denial, he attempts to shut it in, to enclose death and 
make it conform to the rule of appearing on only one day of the year. Both attempts 
are doomed to failure, because they insist on a structure that does not reflect the 
world as it really is. 
Shadrack, therefore, functions as another kind of Made Foot, one who 
accurately mirrors the feelings of his community. That he is bound to this community 
in a way that Sula, is not is crucial to his ability to fulfil this role. He performs the 
ritual of National Suicide Day out of love for the others and a genuine desire to help 
them. Ironically, however, it is again Sula's influence that has made him feel this love, 
a feeling which is based on a misunderstanding. After Chicken Little's death, Sula 
runs to Shadrack's hut to make sure he was not a witness to the accident, but 
Shadrack,, lonely and ostracised, interprets this simply as a visit from a neighbour, a 
sign that he is accepted and loved. Sula, so unbounded that her neighbours see her as 
evil, is thus instrumental not only in binding the community together, but also in 
binding Shadrack, the Bottom's genuine representative, to them. 
Because the social systems of the Bottom are not self-reliant, Sula's absence, 
particularly the absence of her mockery, makes the whole structure fall apart. Shortly 
after her death, which is more celebrated than mourned by the people of the Bottom, 
a hard winter makes everybody ifl and hungry. 
Still it was not those illnesses or even the ice that marked the beginning of 
the trouble, that self-fulfilled prophecy that Shadrack carried on his tongue. 
As soon as the silvering began, long before the cider cracked in the jugs, 
there was something wrong. A falling away, a dislocation was taking place. 
Hard on the heels of the general relief that Sula's death brought, a restless 
irritability took hold [ ... ] mothers who had defended their children 
from 
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Sula's malevolence (or who had defended their positions as mothers from 
Sula's scorn for the role) now had nothing to rub up against. The tension 
was gone and so was the reason for the effort they had made. Without her 
mockery, affection for others sank into flaccid disrepair (Su, p. 153). 
Shadrack's 'self-fuffilled prophecy' is of the only possible outcome for the 
Bottom's life-denying systems; self-destruction. Echoing the laughter 'that could 
even describe and explain how they came to be where they were', the people of the 
Bottom finaffy accept their fate and fbHow Shadrack. 
Like the 5carlet fever that had touched everybody and worn them down to 
gristle, their laughter infected Carpenter's Road. Soon children were 
jumping about giggling and men came to the porches to chuckle [ ... ] It was Mrs Jackson!, who ate ice, who tripped down off her porch and marched - 
actually marched - along behind him. The scene was so comic the people 
walked into the road to make sure they saw it all. In that way the parade 
started. (Su, p. 159) 
This laughter is more than just a static expression of the acceptance of 
suffering. Described in terms of an infection, Morrison emphasises that the Bottom's 
laughter here is unhealthy and destructive. Without Sula, there is nothing to prevent 
the people of the Bottom from giving in to the despair that their 'prophet' Shadrack 
represents. Once Sula is dead, Shadrack is entirely alone, no longer having any fink to 
his community, and with the love that might have saved them exposed as a 
meaningless misunderstanding, there is nothing to stop Shadrack leading them to 
their deaths. Nearly everybody that lives in the Bottom follows Shadrack through the 
town of Medallion and into the unfinished workings of the river tunnel (the symbol of 
their feelings of victimisation), which, due to a sudden thaw, collapses on top of 
them. 
Dubey argues that a combination of passive hope for a saviour and a single act 
of rebellion (attacking the river tunnel) lead to Suicide Day 1941 because both 
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involve looking outward for a solution to one's problems (Dubey, p. 79). Their 
attempt to break out of the circle of history that keeps them oppressed (the road in 
1927, the river in 1937) fails, and things are no better (indeed, they are worse) by 
1965 (Dubey, p. 80). As Maxine Lavon Montgomery points out, 'Shadrack's 
tragicon-fic holiday fails to end the community's constant disorder'. 22 This is because 
it forms another closed system, embodying not a containment of death, but 'the 
latent, almost suicidal despair of this community' (Middleton, p. 372). Montgomery 
does point out, however, that this ritual fits the pattern of 'the annual celebration of 
the end of the world among many non-Western cultures whose conception of time 
is circular, not finear'(Montgomery, p. 130). 'In the community's collective 
unconscious, then, the apocalypse, an event prefigured by the many deaths and 
disasters, endings and beginnings, is indeed a hopeful affair signalling the recovery of 
a romantic past [ ... ] characterized 
by freedom, vitality, and psychological wholeness' 
(Montgomery, p. 132). As we shall see, however, this wholeness is achieved not by 
the community, but by a single individual; Sula's friend, Nel. 
A sense of completeness can never be achieved by Sula herself, since, as Dubey 
argues, 
with no grounding roots in the past, Sula's radical difference proves to be 
meaningless and is ultimately reduced to the very sameness she tries to 
challenge: 'If I live a hundred years my urine will flow the same way, my 
armpits and breath will smell the same. My hair will grow from the same 
holes. I didn't mean anything. I never meant anything'. (Dubey, p. 79) 
Sula's independence from afl norms of behaviour becomes ultimately 
meaningless because, as Davis argues, 'freedom defined as total transcendence lacks 
22 'A Pilgrimage to the Origins: The Apocalypse as Structure and Theme in Toni Morrison's Sula', 
Black American Literature Forum, 23: 1 (spring 1989), 127-37 (p. 130). 
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the intention and significance that can come from commitment'. Without the context 
that Nel provided when they were children, Sula's very lin-ýitlessness isolates and 
traps her, and her only solution, after a fife of experimentation, is to embrace the one 
experience she has not yet encountered, death. As Montgomery points out, 
For Sula, the apocalypse is a solitary event: Her death is the rite of passage 
by which she escapes linear time altogether - an oppressive cycle that has inhibited her free self-expression. Alone, alienated from the community, 
having explored herself freely, she assumes a fetal position and symbolically 
descends through water and darkness. Hers is a successful ritualistic return 
to the past. (Montgomery, pp. 134-5) 
Carolyn Jones argues that Sula embodies an 'immense and unchecked power 
[which] is destructive both for the self, as we see when Sula dies alone, and for the 
community, as we see when the people of Medallion refuse to recognize Sula's 
-) 23 importance and are destroyed by the angry spirit of the dead Sula . It is important 
to notice that Jones sees the destruction of the town as caused by the community's 
refusal to recognise Sula's power, rather than by that power itself It is their inability 
to acknowledge their own contribution to the evil she represents that destroys them. 
Nel's individual revelation of Sula's importance, therefore, can only be 
achieved once she has faced, in a way the rest of the town is never able to, her own 
sins (in her case, the guilt she bears for her part in Chicken Little's death). Middleton 
points out that some critics have seen Sula as merely irresponsible or traumatised by 
23 'Sula and Beloved. Images of Cain in the Novels of Toni Morrison', African American Review, 
27: 4,615-26 (p. 625). Other critics have pointed out Sula's otherworldly qualities, for example; 
Michele Pessoni, "'She Was Laughing at Their God": Discovering the Goddess within in Sula', 
African American Review, 29: 3 (autumn 1995), 439-5 1; Vashti Crutcher Lewis, 'African Tradition 
in Toni Morrison's Sula', Phylon: A Review of Race and Culture 48: 1 (March 1987), 91-97 (repr. 
in Braxton and McLaughlin, pp. 316-25). 
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childhood, 24 while others (including Morrison herselD have argued that Sula and Nel 
complement one another and, taken together, make one healthy personality. " 
Middleton, however, argues that 'despite what Morrison tells us, her novel shows 
that the two women do not merely complement and correct each other's limitations. 
Nel's final understanding of Sula symbolizes the awareness of otherness that is 
essential to self-realization' (Middleton, p. 368). As with Hunt's argument about the 
relationship between Bromden and McMurphy in One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest, 
Middleton thus sees Nel's vision as being, ultimately, the larger, as her eventual 
understanding of Sula enables her to learn and grow. Sula's message to Nel is of the 
means by which one can transcend 'the norms of an oppressive and unheroic society 
[]a self-destructive, closed world that functions at the expense of the self-esteem 
of its individual members' (Middleton, p. 369). 
Sula, as is typical of the Transcendent Fool, communicates this message 
through laughter, but, since Nel's realisation of Sula's importance comes after Sula is 
dead and the town is largely destroyed, it occurs in a changed form. Two key scenes 
identify this change, the first appearing half way through the novel, when Sula has 
just reappeared after a ten-year absence, the second occurring at the very end. In the 
first scene Nel, now married with children, sits in her kitchen considering Sula's 
retum. 
2' For example, Jerry H. Bryant, 'Something Ominous Here', Nation 219 (July 6 1974), 24 (Sula as 
irresponsible); Joan Bischoff, 'The Novels of Toni Morrison: Studies in Thwarted Sensitivity', 
Studies in Black Literature, 6: 3 (1975), 21-23 (Sula as traumatised). 
2' For example, Robert B. Stepto, "'Intimate Things in Place": A Conversation with Toni Morrison', 
Massachusetts Revievi, 18 (1977), 473-89 (repr. in A Chant of Saints: A Gathering ofAfro-American 
Literature, Art, and Scholarship, ed. by Michael S. Harper and Robert B. Stepto (Urbana: University 
of Illinois Press, 1979), pp. 216-17). 
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Her old friend had come home. Sula. Who made her laugh, who made her 
see old things with new eyes, in whose presence she felt clever, gentle and a 
little raunchy. (Su, p. 95) 
It is clear that Sula's laughter is different from the kind that protects the 
inhabitants, of the Bottom from their pain. Rather than enabling survival and 
endurance, Sula's laughter makes Nel 'see old things with new eyes', the creative 
possibilities that indicate that Sula is a Transcendent Fool. Later, the two women sit 
together, remembering the absurdity of their sexual experimentation as children, and 
their laughter makes a 'duet' that is contrasted with the everyday, defensive laughter 
of the Bottom. 
Nel lowered her head onto crossed arms while tears of laughter dripped 
into the wann diapers. Laughter that weakened her knees and pressed her 
bladder into action. Her rapid soprano and Sula's dark sleepy chuckle made 
a duet that frightened the cat and made the children run in from the back 
yard, puzzled at first by the wild free sounds, then delighted to see their 
mother stumbling merrily toward the bathroom, holding on to her stomach, 
fairly singing through the laughter: "Aw. Aw. Lord. Sula. Stop. " [ ... ] 
Damp-faced, Nel stepped back into the kitchen. She felt new, soft and 
new. It had been the longest time since she had had a rib-scraping laugh. She 
had forgotten how deep and down it could be. So different from the 
miscellaneous giggles and smiles she had learned to be content with these 
past few years. (Su, pp. 97-98) 
In this passage Nel can appreciate the creative value of Sula's laugh, and is thus 
in a position to act as Protagonist. She is not, however, ready to understand Sula's 
laughter fully at this point. Taking the judgmental stance that typifies the Institution's 
reaction to the Fool, Nel becomes angry at Sula's decision to put her grandmother 
into a nursing home rather than look after her herself As t eir conversation 
continues, 'the closed place in the water spread[s] before them' (Su, p. 101). Chicken 
Little's drowning, which brought them together as children, is used as an image of 
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separation, a 'closed place' that exists between the two women as adults. It is shortly 
after this scene that Nel finds Sula with Jude and cuts them both out of her life. 
At the end of the novel Nel visits Eva Peace, Sula's grandmother, in her 
retirement home, and the old lady not only confuses her visitor with her 
granddaughter, she lays the blame for Chicken Little's death equally between them, 
'I didn't throw no little boy in the river. That was Sula. ' 
'You. Sula. What's the difference? You was there. You watched, didn't 
you. Me, I never would've watched. ' (Su, p. 168) 
This makes Nel reconsider her whole relationship with her friend since this 
pivotal moment of their lives, and, remembering Sula's solitary funeral, she suddenly 
feels the other's presence in a moment of epiphany. 26 
'All that time, all that time, I thought I was missing Jude. ' And the loss 
pressed down on her chest and came up into her throat. 'We was girls 
together, ' she said as though explaining something. '0 Lord, Sula, ' she 
cried, 'girl, girl, girlgirlgirl. ' 
It was a fine cry - loud and long - but it had no bottom and it had no 
top, just circles and circles of sorrow. (Su, p. 174) 
Memories, specifically memories of the childhood the two women spent 
together, instigate the reaction in both passages. However, where in the first Nel's 
memories are of innocent experimentation, in the second, Eva has made her aware 
that she is just as guilty of killing Chicken Little as Sula. This makes Nel realise that 
in judging Sula, as the rest of the community do, she has avoided accepting the 
responsibility they share for this event,, and for the break-up of Nel's marriage, and 
26 Several critics see the end of the novel in terms of epiphany, for example; Gabbin , p. 259; 
Middleton, p. 380; de Weever, 'Inverted World', p. 408, p. 423. 
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that it was therefore her denial, not Sula's transgression, which had driven the two 
apart. 
The similarity of language between the two scenes is significant. Only the word 
4 sorrow' in the second passage indicates that Nel may be crying, while tears appear, 
'dripped into the wann diapers' in the first. The laughter 'pressed [Nel's] bladder into 
action' in the first passage, while the loss 'pressed down on her chest' in the second. 
She cries 'Aw. Aw. Lord. Sula. Stop. ' in the first passage, a cry which is repeated as 
'0 Lord, Sula', then extended, rather than 'stopped' in both the repetition of 
'girlgirlgirl' and in the 'circles and circles of sorrow' that follow. The 'deep and 
down' laugh has become a cry with no bottom and no top as Nel, finally released 
from restriction, realises, too late, the value of the friend she has lost. Now truly 'soft 
and new' Nel must face life alone, without the duet' that made this newness possible. 
Micheffe Pessoni points out that while some critics see the ending as idealistic 
(for example, Dorothea Drummond Mbalia), 'others, like Barbara Christian, read the 
ending as a type of eulogy for the Bottom, a recognition come too late that a belief in 
Sula might have saved Nel and the entire community'. 27 Middleton agrees with this 
view, pointing out that 'at the novel's end, only Nel is changed by her epiphany. 
Racial integration has left Medallion not really "so much better in 1965". The 
townspeople all seem like the Deweys, the trio of innocuous but unindividuated boys 
adopted by Eva' (Middleton, p. 380). 
17 Pessoni, "'She was laughing at their God": Discovering the Goddess Within in Sula', African 
American Review, 29: 3 (1995), 439-51 (p. 450); Dorothea Drummond Mbalia, Toni Morrison's 
Developing Class Consciousness (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 199 1); Barbara 
Christian, Black Women Novelists: The Development ofA Tradition 1892-1976 (Westport, CT: 
Greenwood, 1980). 
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Montgomery argues that 'to be Black in America, the novel implies, is to 
experience calamity as an ever-present reality, to five on the brink of apocalypse' 
(Montgomery, p. 127). This perception of apocalypse, that 'the Black American 
world has always been chaotic', is at odds, Montgomery argues, with the 'Western 
apocalyptic vision [that] includes a gradual decline in social, economic, and moral 
conditions, a major catastrophe, then a new beginning' (Montgomery, pp. 127-28). 
Acting as an Institution, the people of the Bottom are unable to learn from their 
apocalypse and become, instead, like members of Bromden's Combine; 'innocuous 
but unindividuated'. Their Bad Faith, the 'vaciHation between transcendence and 
facticity [Sula and Institution]' leads ultimately to destructive denial rather than to 
rebirth. 
Montgomery continues, however, by arguing that on an individual basis such 
cyclical development is possible; 'the novel's circular narrative structure - beginning 
with the creation of the Bottom, ending with Nel's symbolic rebirth - indicates the 
possibility of recovering one's lost selfhood' (Montgomery, p. 128). In assimilating 
Sula's laughter, but re-expressing it as tears, Nel simultaneously shows her 
understanding of Sula as 'other' and her recognition of herself as a complete person, 
containing the potential for both creation and destruction. 
Lolita 
Vladimir Nabokov's novel about an affair between a middle-aged man, Humbert 
Humbert, and an eleven-year-old girl, Dolores Haze, has caused controversy ever 
since its subject matter was considered unsuitable for an American readership, leading 
to the initial publication of Lolita in Paris by a company notorious for its works of 
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pornography. 28 Contemporary reviewers, not, apparently, wishing to seem prudish, 
often combine criticism of Lolita's morality with criticism of its aesthetic qualities. 
Kingsley Amis, for example, regards Humbert's remorse at the end of the book to be 
unconvincing and the portrait of Lolita (Humbert's name for Dolores) to be just that, 
an image 'devotedly watched and listened to but never conversed with, the object of 
desire but never of curiosity', which he sees as a major fault in the novel. '9 F. W. 
Dupee in an early review (and before Lolita's publication in America) considers that 
both Humbert's 'world of total evil' and his final repentance are inconsistent with his 
'idiom' as presented elsewhere in the novel, and argues that 'it is the author 
intervening on Humbert's behalf and playing the role straight in order to make a vital 
point', which he regards as a weakness. 'O 
Gladys Clifton, on the other hand, argues that those critics who have found the 
novel objectionable morally, 'must have seen only the stereotypes they brought to 
their reading, not the unique creations that Humbert and Lolita are in their fictional 
world'. " Stereotypes, or the images people create in their relationships with one 
another, are an important theme in the novel. Consequently, I shall argue not only 
that Humbert does create a portrait which he caffs Lolita and Nabokov does break 
into his own narrative, reminding us that Humbert too is just an image, a fiction, but 
that these are just the qualities that give Lolita its power. 
28 Although Lolita was published in Paris in 1955, it was not published in America until 1958. All 
references are to the first English edition (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959) and appear in 
parentheses within the text. 
29Review of Lolita in Nabokov: The Critical Heritage, ed. by Norman Page, The Critical Heritage 
series, general editor B. C. Southam (London: Routledge, 1982), pp. 102-07 (p. 106) (orig. publ. in 
The Spectator, 6 November 1959,635-66). 
30 Review of Lolita in Page, pp. 84-91 (p. 91) (orig. publ. in Anchor Review, 1-3 (1957), 5-13). 
'Humbert Humbert and the Limits of Artistic License', in Nabokov's Fifth Arc: Nabokov and 
Others on His Life's Work, ed. by Julius Edwin Rivers and Charles Nicol (Austin: University of 
Texas Press, 1982), pp. 153-69 (p. 156). 
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Dupee argues that 'Lolita applies its heat to the entire sensibility [not just to 
erotica or pornography], including the sense of humour. Instead of putting the desires 
in an agreeable simmer, it acts on them almost like a cautery, sterilizing them with 
horrid laughter' (Dupee, p. 84). This is an important observation, since not only is the 
book itself full of laughter, Dupee also suggests that Nabokov is using this laughter, 
as well as his controversial subject matter, to act as Fool, mocking his readers. 
The supreme laugh may be on the reviewers for failing to see how much of 
everyone's reality lurks in its fantastic shadow play [ ... ] the 
book's general 
effect is profoundly mischievous, like that of some diabolical distorting 
mirror in some particularly obscene amusement park. (Dupee, p. 85) 
As we shall see, both these points are crucial to an understanding of Lolita. 
Nabokov has written the novel on several levels, each identifiable in terms of the 
dynamics of a laughing relationship. This relationship is apocalyptic not only because, 
as the spurious foreword tells us, all the main characters are already dead by the time 
we read the novel, but also because, as I shall go on to discuss, Lolita involves the 
double revelation that is typical of the demonic Fool. As our awareness of these 
levels shifts, we come to recognise the inability of nonns, of the stereotypical 
'American girl', 'American family' or 'pervert', to explain the experience of real life. 
At the same time, Nabokov also makes us question the ability of even the text that 
teaches us this to describe reality adequately. 
Haunted by memories of Annabel, the first, and unrequited, love of his own 
childhood, the adult Humbert struggles against the temptations, 'the fey grace, the 
elusive, shifty, soul-shattering, insidious charm' of a certain kind of girl-child (Lo, 
p. 19), which he describes in the foRowing terms: 
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Between the age limits of nine and fourteen there occur maidens who, to 
certain bewitched travelers, twice or many times older than they, reveal their 
true nature which is not human, but nymphic (that is, demoniac); and these 
chosen creatures I propose to designate as 'nympbets'. (Lo, p. 18) 
The nymphet inhabits a magical world, an 'intangible island of entranced time,, 
completely separate from her human sisters, whom Humbert describes as 
'incomparably more dependent on the spatial world of synchronous phenomena' (Lo, 
p. 19). In both his defnition of such children as 'demoniac' and his suggestion that 
they exist outside time, Humbert describes the nymphet in terms of the Transcendent 
Fool whose airns are destructive rather than creative. As G. D. Josipovici says, 'she is 
no other than that amoral, ever-desirable female who leads those who pursue her to 
destruction 9.32 
Looking for lodgings, Humbert visits the house of Charlotte Haze, but is 
unimpressed until he is introduced to her daughter. At their first meeting Humbert 
recognises Dolores as a nymphet, recasting her in his mind as Tolita', and he 
immediately falls under her spell and decides to stay. Her demonic world is 
characterised by a happy, yet mocking, laughter that Humbert longs to share, as we 
see in his failed attempt at a practical joke early in the novel. Noticing the child 
leaning out of an upstairs window, 'wisecracking streetward' to a friend outside, 
Humbert creeps up behind her and grabs her, but is told roughly to 'cut it out! ' and 
retreats with a 'ghastly grin'. He continues: 
32 'Lolita: Parody and the Pursuit of Beauty', Critical Quarterly, 6 (1964), 35-48 (p. 39). Several 
critics argue that Humbert is Lolita's victim, for example: Robertson Davies, 'Mania for Green 
Fruit', Victoria Daily Times, 17 January 1959; John Hollander, 'Lolita' Partisan Review, Autumn 
1956,557-60 (repr. in Page, pp. 81-83); Page Stegner, Escape into Aesthetics: The Art of Vladimir 
Nabokov (New York: Dial, 1966), pp. 108-09; Lionel Trilling, review of Lolita, Encounter October 
1958,98 (repr. in Page pp. 92-102). 
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But now listen to what happened next. After lunch I was reclining in a 
low chair trying to read. Suddenly two deft little hands were over my eyes: 
she had crept up from behind as if re-enacting, in a ballet sequence, my 
morning manoeuvre. Her fingers were a luminous crimson as they tried to 
blot out the sun, and she uttered hiccups of laughter and jerked this way and 
that as I stretched my arm sideways and backwards without otherwise 
changing my recumbent position. My hand swept over her agile giggling 
legs. (Lo, p. 55) 
Here we see Lolita in a characteristicaRy liminal position; inside the house 
talking and laughing with some unseen other outside. Her 'wisecracking' contrasts 
strongly with Humbert's 'ghastly grin' as he withdraws; he has not been allowed into 
her world. She, however, enters his soon afterwards by coming into his study 
(symbolically his world both because he is a scholar and because the rest of the house 
is Haze territory) and she does so laughing. 
Later, Humbert describes his feelings ofjealousy and inadequacy while 
watching Lolita play tennis, ride on horseback, 
or else, at a ski lodge, I would see her floating away from me, celestial and 
solitary, in an ethereal chairlift, up and up, to a glittering summit where 
laughing athletes stripped to the waist were waiting for her, for her. 
(Lo, p. 158) 
In this passage, we see Lolita rising up towards another, celestial world where 
beautiful people (of Lolita's own demoniac kind) await her, laughing, while 
earthbound Humbert can only watch. 
Aa 
Auer much plotting, Humbert finally gains access to the nymphet's world in a 
hotel room significantly full of mirrors. While he tries to explain that it may prove 
necessary for them frequently to share such rooms, Lolita unexpectedly takes charge 
of the situation. 
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'The word is incest, ' said Lo - and walked into the closet, walked out 
again with a young golden giggle, opened the adjoining door, and after 
carefully peering inside with her strange smoky eyes test she make another 
mistake, retired to the bathroom. (Lo, p. 119) 
The casual way in which she orientates herself among all the reflections in the 
room echoes her facility at entering different worlds and reinforces Humbert's idea 
that she is a demon, as does the fact that it is she that seduces him the next morning, 
suggesting 'with a burst of rough glee' that they play a game 'she and Charlie' had 
played at summer camp (Lo, pp. 131-32). Too late, and without being able to help 
himself anyway, Humbert Humbert realises that he has been trapped, and that his 
destruction is now inevitable: 
I should have understood that Lolita had already proved to be something 
quite different from innocent Annabel, and that the nymphean evil breathing 
through every pore of the fey child that I had prepared for my secret 
delectation, would make the secrecy impossible, and the delectation lethal. I 
should have known (by the signs made to me by something in Lolita - the 
real child Lolita or some haggard angel behind her back) that nothing but 
pain and horror would result from the expected rapture. (Lo, pp. 123-24) 
This, then, is one layer of the novel, but the reader sees throughout a possibility 
that Humbert himself comes to acknowledge - the possibility that Lolita is just an 
ordinary American eleven-year-old; that she has been Dolores and not Lolita all 
along. During their travels together across America (after Charlotte's death) Humbert 
becomes aware, despite himself, that he has taken on the role of surrogate parent, a 
role for which he is totaHy unprepared: 
A combination of naYvety and deception, of charm and vulgarity, of blue 
sulks and rosy mirth, Lolita, when she chose, could be a most exasperating 
brat. I was not really quite prepared for her fits of disorganized boredon-ý 
intense and vehement griping, her sprawling, droopy, dopey-eyed style, and 
what is called goofing off -a kind of diffused clowning which she thought 
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was tough in a boyish hoodlum way. Mentally I found her to be a 
disgustingly conventional little girl. (Lo, pp. 145-46) 
Dupee argues that in undergoing this role reversal with respect to Lolita - from 
her lover to her father - Humbert 'registers more and more sharply the real horror 
and the real significance of his partnership with Lo'. As she sees life, Dupee points 
out, as 'just one gag after another", this distorting mirror therefore reflects our own 
familial relationships; children feel 'misunderstood, abused, betrayed' by their parents 
until they grow up to 'accept them as part of the gag that life is'. He argues, 
therefore, that the novel deals with 'the bitter commonplaces of life's indestructible 
surface' (Dupee, p. 90). 
Some part of Humbert, throughout, seems to realise that if Dolores is simply a 
conventional American girl, then the magical world of the nymphet is just a fantasy of 
his. If this is true, then what he is doing is tragic and monstrous, and in a rare 
moment of clarity, Humbert sees America as 
the lovely, trustful, dreamy, enormous country that by then, in retrospect, 
was no more to us than a collection of dog-eared maps, ruined tour books, 
old tyres, and her sobs in the night - every night, every night - the moment I 
feigned sleep. (Lo, p. 172) 
As Cfifton points out 'whenever Humbert begins to describe the actual detail of 
his life under the influence of "the perilous magic of nymphets", a grotesque gap 
appears between his fantasy of "bliss" and his life with a flesh-and-blood American 
teen angel. It is a gap filled with comedy and irony at his own expense' (Clifton, 
p. 153). She cites several passages that serve as 'an emphatic reminder that while we 
may be invited to smile at Humbert's situation and find it comical, this is not true for 
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Lolita, even though she is part of the same situation. It is an important paradox' 
(Clifton, p. 155). 
Matthew Winston points out that Humbert is essentially trapped in a closed 
world of his own making. His obsession is with holding time at one magical instant, 
the 'immortal day' of his childhood when he almost possessed Annabel Leigh. In this 
sense, Winston argues, it is important that Humbert is writing his memoirs; as 
Nabokov himself says, 'both memory and imagination are a negation of time ,. 33 
Winston argues that Humbert is equally 'trapped by his own predilection for seeing 
his life through a veil of literature [ ... ] Since Humbert needs to 
impose upon his life 
the fixity of a literary work, he later attempts to force Lolita into the invariable 
pattern of a literary character, and therein fies his criýrne and his sin' (Winston, 
pp. 423-24). 
For the most part, however, Humbert shows himself to be an expert at self- 
delusion, reinterpreting Lolita's laughter in the following passage, as he watches her 
being escorted home by a boyfriend: 
She had developed more than one conventional mannerism, such as the 
polite adolescent way of showing one is literally 'doubled up' with laughter 
by inclining one's head, and so (as she sensed my call), still feigning helpless 
merriment, she walked backwards a couple of steps, and then faced about, 
and walked toward me with a fading smile. (Lo, p. 183) 
Humbert's interpretation sees himself and Lolita in a private world of their 
own, which involves the necessity of her learning various polite tricks so that she may 
seem normal when she is forced by circumstances to go out into the conventional 
33 'Lolita and the Dangers of Fiction' Twentieth-Century Literature, 21 (1975), 421-27 (p. 422), 
quoting from Alfred Appel Jr., 'An Interview with Vladimir Nabokov', Wisconsin Studies in 
Contemporatýi, Literature, 8 (spring 1967), 127-52 (p. 140). 
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one. Another interpretation, however, is that, far from 'feigning helpless merriment'9 
Lolita is in fact enjoying a joke with a contemporary, for a moment being an ordinary 
little girl, and the sight of Humbert, forcing her to rejoin his mad world, is what 
makes hersmile fade. The use of the word 'feigning' (particularly when associated 
i with being 'helpless') recalls its previous use - 'the moment I feigned sleep" - and 
therefore also recalls her 'sobs in the night - every night, every night'. In a sinfflar 
episode later in the novel Humbert considers Lolita's reactions as she watches the 
signs of genuine affection between Avis, a school friend, and her father. 
Lolita always had an absolutely enchanting smile for strangers [ ... ] which did not mean a thing of course, but was so beautiful, so endearing that one 
found it hard to reduce such sweetness to but a magic gene automatically 
lighting up her face in atavistic token of some ancient rite of welcome - 
hospitable prostitution, the coarse reader may say [ ... ] While 
fat Avis sidled 
up to her papa, Lolita gently beamed at a fruit knife that she fingered on the 
edge of the table, whereon she leaned, many miles away from me. Suddenly, 
as Avis clung to her father's neck and ear while, with a casual arm, the man 
enveloped his lumpy and large offspring, I saw Lolita's smile lose all its light 
and become a frozen little shadow of itself, and the fruit knife slipped off the 
table and struck her with its silver handle. (Lo, pp. 278-79) 
The tone is, of course, ironic and self-condemning. Writing in retrospect from 
his prison cefl, Humbert now realises the M import of what he has done, and 
narrates such scenes in order to torture himself with his crime. As he says several 
pages before the passage quoted above, 
Unless it can be proven to me - to me as I am now, today, with my heart 
and my beard, and my putrefaction - that in the infinite run it does not 
matter a jot that a North American girl-child named Dolores Haze had been 
deprived of her childhood by a maniac, unless this can be proven (and if it 
can, then life is a joke), I see nothing for the treatment of my misery but the 
melancholy and very local palliative of articulate art. (Lo, pp. 275-76) 
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Later, in possibly the most famous passage in the book, Humbert reflects on his 
relationship with this North American girl-child, and, in a tragic revelation, realises 
too late that in an effort to regain his own childhood he has deprived Lolita of hers. 
He listens to a strange sound in the distance; 
]Reader! What I heard was but the melody of children at play, nothing but 
that, and so limpid was the air that within this vapor of blended voices, 
majestic and minute, remote and magically near, frank and divinely enigmatic 
- one could hear now and then, as if released, an almost articulate spurt of 
vivid laughter, or the crack of a bat, or the clatter of a toy wagon, but it was 
all really too far for the eye to distinguish any movement in the lightly etched 
streets. I stood listening to that musical vibration from my lofty slope, to 
those flashes of separate cries with a kind of demure murmur for 
background, and then I knew that the hopelessly poignant thing was not 
Lolita's absence from my side, but the absence of her voice from that 
concord. (Lo, p. 299) 
The tone of this, the 'limpid air', the 'magical', 'divinely enigmatic' sound of 
innocent laughter echoes, of course, previous descriptions of the world of the 
nymphet. It is Humbert, as he has eventuaRy realised, not Lolita, who inhabits the 
alien world. The 'intangible island of entranced time' that he cannot reach is the 
world of his own lost childhood with Annabel. Crucially, it is a revelation that puts 
Lofita's laughter in its proper context - in innocent play with other children - and it is 
Humbert's sudden ability to hear it as such that leads to his remorse. 
If the alien world we explore in Lolita is, as is suggested by this revelation, 
Humbert's rather than Lolita's, it could then be argued that it is Humbert that enacts 
the role of Fool in the novel. Humbert does, in fact acknowledge that he inhabits his 
own private world into which he invites Dolores, an ordinary American eleven-year- 
old. 
148 
She had entered my world, umber and black Humberland, with rash 
curiosity; she surveyed it with a shrug of amused distaste; and it seemed to 
me now that she was ready to turn away from it with something akin to plain 
repulsion. Never did she vibrate under my touch, and a strident 'what d'you 
think you are doing? ' was all I got for my pains. To the wonderland I had to 
offer, my fool preferred the corniest movies, the most cloying fudge. To 
think that between a Hamburger and a Hurnburger, she would - invariably, 
with icy precision - plump for the former. (Lo, p. 163) 
His is a corrupt and evil world, inhabited by a monster he describes as a master 
of contradiction and deceit: 'Humbert Humbert, with thick black eyebrows and a 
queer accent, and a cesspoolful of rotting monsters behind his slow boyish smile' 
(Lo, p. 45). His habit of renaming everybody he describes illustrates the way Humbert 
recasts experience to fit this world that he inhabits. Even his own name, he reveals, is 
a species ofjoke to which we are never given the key, and he often refers to himself 
in the third person, as though Humbert Humbert, who 'tried hard to be good. Reafly 
and truly he did', is simply another facet of this fantasy (Lo, p. 2 1). The 'queer 
accent' is important, as it reminds us that Humbert comes literally from another 
world; Europe. Dupee argues that '[Humbeirt's] fate hangs on the godlike motion of 
the motorcar and the wayward oracle of the telephone', in other words, he does not 
fit into the twentieth-century American world, which he perceives as divine, whereas 
to the Hazes he is 'the prince of a lost reahn' and 'the sinister outsider' (Dupee, p. 
86, p. 87). Comparing the two worlds, Humbert echoes his description of himself as 
he walks through a small American town at night: 
The rain had been cancelled miles before. It was a black warm night, 
somewhere in Appalachia. Now and then cars passed me, red tail-fights 
receding, white headlights advancing, but the town was dead. Nobody 
strolled and laughed on the sidewalks as relaxing burghers would in sweet, 
mellow, rotting Europe. I was alone to enjoy the innocent night and my 
terrible thoughts. (Lo, p. 274) 
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In contrasting the old, rotting, world, with the new - America - Humbert is 
Placing himself in the role of Made Fool. Humbert's depravity, in other words, when 
combined with his foreignness, makes him ideally placed to act as a jester, mocking 
the society of nineteen-fifties America simultaneously from within and without. The 
spurious foreword to the novel, warns us (with irony) of this role: 
No doubt, he is horrible, he is abject, he is a shining example of moral 
leprosy, a mixture offerocity andjocularity that betrays supreme misery 
perhaps, but is not conducive to attractiveness. He is ponderously 
capricious. Many of his casual opinions on the people and scenery of this 
country are ludicrous. (Lo, p. 6) 
In keeping with his position as Fool, Humbert often addresses his reader 
directly, and, significantly, invites his or her laughter overtly on many occasions. 
Organising the hotel room for his and Lolita's first night together, for example, he 
says, 
What a comic, clumsy, wavering Prince Charming I was! How some of my 
readers will laugh at me when I tell them the trouble I had with the wording 
of my telegram! (Lo, p. 108) 
And again, 
At this point I have a curious confession to make. You will laugh - but 
really and truly I somehow never managed to find out quite exactly what the 
legal situation was. (Lo, p. 168) 
The laughter that Humbert encourages here is typical of the ambivalent laughter 
of the Fool. As Clifton points out, Humbert's situation may be ludicrous, but we are 
aware that Dolores's is not, and we are also aware that Humbert knows this. 
Having encouraged us to laugh at him, however, Humbert next turns his 
attention to American society. inviting us to laugh with him. The many generic motels 
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that come to sum up American popular culture for Humbert are described in scathing 
terms: 
Nous connfimes (this is royal fun) the would-be enticements of their 
repetitious names - all those Sunset Motels, U-Beam Cottages, Hillcrest 
Courts, Pine View Courts, Green Acres [ ... ] Some motels had instructions 
pasted above the toflet (on whose tank the towels were unhygienically 
heaped) asking guests not to throw into its bowl garbage, beer cans, cartons, 
stillborn babies; others had special notices under glass, such as Things to 
Do. (Lo, pp. 143-44) 
The impossibility of distinguishing between one motel and another describes a 
homogenisation of American society as a whole, while the lack of hygiene and the 
image of babies being thrown away so regularly as to necessitate a specific instruction 
reveals the underlying horrors that this uniformity fails to control. Humbert's own 
'cesspoolful of rotting monsters', therefore, acts as a mirror to the world he sees 
around him. 
When he first meets the headmistress of Beardsley School for girls, it is clear 
from her disquisition on the school's philosophy that she represents everything that 
he finds vacuous and vulgar about American culture. To reinforce his opinion that 
she is talking misguided nonsense (in an ironic reversal of his own habit of doing so) 
she persistently gets his name wrong. 
I mean, you could have a child learn by heart a good encyclopedia and he or 
she would know as much as or more than a school could offer. Dr. Hummer, 
do you realize that for the modem pre-adolescent child, medieval dates are 
of less vital value than weekend ones [twinkle]? - to repeat a pun that I 
heard the Beardsley college psychoanalyst permit herself the other day. We 
five not only in a world of thoughts, but also in a world of things. Words 
without experience are meaningless. What on earth can Dorothy 
Hummerson care for Greece and the Orient with their harems and slaves? 
(Lo, p. 174) 
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The irony of the last sentence - that Lolita knows considerably more about 
harem fife than the headmistress would be able to cope with if she knew - is both 
mockery of her and further self-indictment by Humbert, and again we detect the 
ambivalence in his laughter. To understand how Humbert's (invariably elitist and 
highbrow) mockery of American life works, we must turn again to the foreword by 
the fictional John Ray Jr., Phl). 
In this poignant personal study there lurks a general lesson; the wayward 
child, the egotistic mother, the panting maniac - these are not only vivid 
characters in a unique story: they warn us of dangerous trends; they point 
out potent evils. "Lolita " should make all of us -parents, social workers, 
educators - apply ourselves with still greater vigilance and vision to the 
task of bringing up a better generation in a safer world. (Lo, p. 7) 
This wonderfully pompous attitude, as Humbert teaches us over the course of 
the novel, misses the point completely. As Peter Levine argues, 'Ray and his 
colleagues seek to simpW and classify human behaviour, viewing everything in the 
monochrome statistics of a Kinsey report'. 34 If Dolores's only options are between a 
4 panting maniac' on the one hand, and the cloying fudge and vacuous psychobabble 
of those very parents, social workers and educators whose task it is to bring up the 
next generation on the other, then, to return to an earlier quotation 'it does not 
matter a jot that a North American girl-child named Dolores Haze had been deprived 
of her childhood by a maniac' because the childhood she missed was equally 
unworthy of her. In this sense, Nabokov does indeed seem to argue, through 
Humbert, that 'fife is a joke'. Nabokov thus provides the novel with a third layer of 
meaning; that Humbert, as Fool, provides the reader, as Protagonist, with a 
revelation of the true state of society. 
34 , Lolita and Aristotle's Ethics', Philosophy and Literature, 19: 1 (April 1995), 32-47 (p. 37). 
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Moreover, by parodying the inadequate stereotypes that John Ray uses, again 
mirrored by Humbert's attempts to make Lolita conform to an image he has created, 
Nabokov forces the reader to confront the idea that words can never explain reality, 
with the paradoxical result that Humbert's revelation should not be possible. Many 
critics have engaged with this apparent paradox. Trevor McNeely, for example, 
concludes that 'the Nabokov intellectual position [ ... ] is that Lolita is justified on 
aesthetic grounds alone', seeing this as 'nihilistic - that is to say, utterly meaningless, 
and known to be such by Nabokov - though masquerading as a reasonable and 
logical proposition'. 
35 
This idea that Nabokov is tricking his readers, encouraging them to look for 
meaning where there is none, is a popular critical response. There is, however, 
another interpretation of Lolita as a text that insists that it is possible to transcend the 
words on the page and access 'truths'. Walter Allen, for example, says that 
Humbert's language is 'a form of exhibitionism, a manic showing-off' through which 
he, and the reader, occasionally glimpses a 'truth", as, for example, in his last meeting 
with Dolores. 
36 
Lionel Trilling argues that Lolita is a modem version of what he calls 'passion- 
love'; a type of relationship in literature (for example in Arthurian romance) that 
breaks taboos and subverts the idea of a happy marriage. Passion-love must be 
'suffered' as though it were an illness, and 'typically led to disaster for the lovers, to 
death'. " Originally marital infidelity was sufficiently taboo to be at the root of 
35 "'Lo" and Behold: Solving the Lolita Riddle', Studies in the Novel, 2 (summer 1989), 182-99 (p. 
188). 
36 Review of Lolita in Page, pp. 107-08 (p. 107) (orig. publ. in The New Statesman, 7 November 
1959, p. 632). 
37 Review of Lolita, in Page 1982, pp. 92-102 (p. 97, p. 98) (orig. publ. in Encounter, October 1958, 
p. 98). 
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'passion-love', but in order to set this type of relationship in the twentieth-century, 
Nabokov has had to turn to paedophilia to create the appropriate level of scandal; 'it 
puts the lovers, as lovers in literature must be put, beyond the pale of society 1) 
(Trilling, p. 99). Significantly, as Trilling points out, in the nineteenth-century 'the 
creative genius took over some of the characteristics of the lover: his obsessiveness, 
his masochism, his noble subservience to an ideal, and his antagonism to the social 
conventions, his propensity for making a scandal' (Trilling, p. 97). Consequently, 'in 
this respect lovers were conceived of much as we conceive of the artist - that is, as 
captivated by a reality and a good that are not of the ordinary world' (Trilling, p. 98). 
Thus it can be argued, as John Hollander does, that Lolita is about Nabokov's love 
affair with the romantic novel (rather than with America, as other critics suppose) 
(Hoflander, pp. 81-82). 
Thomas Frosch also sees Lolita as a romance, in which Lolita's 'appeal consists 
partly in her transiency - she will only be a nymphet for a brief time - and partly in 
her status as a dairnonic visitor to the common world' (leading to an impossible quest 
for Humbert). 18 Frosch points out that 'even John Ray, the fool who introduces 
Lolita, asserts a prime Nabokov theme when he says that every great work of art is 
original and "should come as a more or less shocking surprise"' (Fro sch, p. 174). 
Arguing that Humbert's confession is at the same time a defence of his actions, 
Frosch considers that 
as a whole, the book defends itself against a utilitarian concept of art 
Nabokov's obvious satire [in the foreword] is intended to remove the 
allegation of his having a conventional moral purpose. Other accusations are 
handled within the text itself In addition to conventional moralists, Nabokov 
detests psychiatrists and literary critics, and it is against these [closed] types 
38 'Parody and Authenticity in Lolita', in Rivers and Nicol, pp. 171-87 (p. 171). 
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of readers - or these metaphors for the Reader - that Humbert wages 
constant war [ ... ]What is on trial, then, is Humbert's uniqueness and 
originality, his success in an imaginative enterprise. (Frosch, pp. 175,179) 
Although he considers that Humbert's attempt fails, Frosch compares him to 
Hermann, the irredeemable artist criminal in Nabokov's Despair (193 7), claiming that 
Humbert's final acknowledgement of guilt and responsibility enables him, unlike 
Hermann, to 'be paroled from Hell'. As he points out, 'Humbert is finally able to see 
beyond the prison of his solipsism' (Frosch, p. 181). 
Frosch argues that Nabokov uses parody 'to evade the accusation of triteness 
and to elude the literary past in the hope of achieving singularity' (Frosch, p. 182). In 
this way, he claims, 'parody is Nabokov's way of getting as close to the romantic 
novel as possible and, more, that he actually does succeed in re-creating it in a new 
form, one that is contemporary and original, not anachronistic and imitative' (Frosch, 
p. 182). He points out that Nabokov has himself 'spoken of the artist as an illusionist 
trying to "transcend the heritage" with his bag of tricks [ ... ] But we are really 
dealing 
in works such as Lolita with the magic of the shaman, and, in this case, parody - 
together with the other features of a proleptic comic style - is perhaps his most 
powerful spell' (Frosch, p. 186). 
Robert Uphaus writes of Humbert's artistic ideal to be 'the ideal of the soaring 
imagination disciplined by craft, but unenctunbered by the commonplace'. 
39 He 
continues, 'the novel thus becomes both a contest between artist and society and 
between the Dionysian and Apollonian, the two aspects of Humbert's increasingly 
haggard self (Uphaus, p. 106). 
" 'Nabokov's Kunstlerroman: Portrait of the Artist as a Dying Man', Twentieth-Century Literature. 
13 (1967), 104- 10 (p. 104). 
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What these approaches have in common is the conviction that the imagination 
has the power to transcend the ordinary. Nabokov, such critics argue, shows us that 
the reader who, like John Ray, insists on explaining, on engaging simply with the 
meanings of and relationships between words, is missing the point of art. The power 
of the imagination, which the artist as shaman reveals to us, is to enable a 
Kierkegaardian leap of faith . 
40 The artist's bag of tricks thus relies on the reader's 
capacity to understand the magic that is performed, rather than concentrating on the 
props themselves. Where, for example, Orr's antics with shark repellent and tea in 
Catch-22 are shown to have a hidden meaning, and Sal's rotten beans in On The 
Road are shown not to, it is not the image of tea or beans that is important, but what 
they represent. In Lolita, Nabokov uses his own narrative as a bag of tricks, fooling 
some readers into seeing only the props - the words - and concluding that the whole 
is meaningless, while others see through the layers of fiction and image to apprehend 
truths that are at once independent of and contextualised by the actual narrative. 
Thus Humbert's revelation that he has deprived Lolita of her childhood, of her own 
identity, paradoxically told within the context of his memoirs - his image of her - 
stands for the equally paradoxical double revelation with which Nabokov provides 
the reader. Like the demon Pazuzu, Nabokov encourages us to despair of finding 
meaning, or moral worth, in his novel. However he also reveals to us, through 
Humbert, that we can overcome the closed system of language by engaging with 
Lolita at an imaginative level, in effect taking responsibility for own interpretation of 
the text and apprehending our own truths. 
40 McNeely, conversely, argues that this leap is not of faith, but of despair, a sign that one has 
accepted the meaninglessness in Nabokov's work (McNeely, p. 136). 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter Laughter of Apocalypse has emerged as entailing two revelations. The 
revelation of the Fool as Demon, as we see in Blatty's The Exorcist and King's It, is 
of human weakness, and the mockery of the Fool is designed to bring the victim to 
despair. In the case of the demons Pazuzu and it this revelation leads, for the 
Protagonists, not to despair, but to the second revelation that it is possible to 
overcome fear and the hatred of the demonic and reclaim a sense of human worth. In 
this case, then, the Fool acts as a negative example in order for the Protagonist to 
retain the sense of balance that, I have suggested, is necessary for sanity. Where 
Laughter of Revelation involves a Protagonist overcoming the madness of system, 
Laughter of Apocalypse occurs in such texts as The Exorcist and It when a 
Protagonist resists the madness of anti-system. In Blatty's novel, the demon's 
mockery is balanced, but not defeated, by communal, human laughter, but this 
balancing in itself enables Karras to find the strength to attack the demon and reassert 
the sense of conununity that the sharing ofjokes expresses. In It, the laughter of the 
Losers is shown to have the power not merely to resist, but to destroy the demon. 
Having isolated and corrupted the adults of Derry, It is defeated by child Protagonists 
who possess both innocence and imagination. This gives them an ambivalent 
perspective similar to the demon's own, which enables them to turn Its laughter 
against itself, transforming the terrifying irrational into the merely ridiculous. 
The Fool's initial revelation can, however, be misinterpreted as the sign of an 
evil that he or she bears alone; the task of the victims then apparently being to 
ostracise and contain this evil in order to defend the community from it. Such an 
attempt, as I have shown in the analysis of Sula, will always fail since it involves the 
refusal to recognise that such characters embody not an abstract idea of evil, but the 
157 
gu . and fears of the community itself Since balance can only be achieved by 
confronting the chaos that the Apocalyptic Fool represents, this response to 
perceived evil betrays unbalanced, Institutional thinking. Thus when the inhabitants of 
the Bottom lose Sula, the community is immediately exposed as being too inflexible 
to accommodate adverse experiences, which leads to the apocalypse of National 
Suicide Day 1941. In Morrison's novel the second revelation, achieved by the 
Protagonist Nel, again involves the acceptance of responsibility, but in this example it 
is accompanied by a sense of loss, since Sula is, by this time, dead. Realising that it is 
she, not Sula, who is to blame for her problems, Nel re-expresses Sula's limitless 
laughter in the form of equally boundless tears, crying out a eulogy that 
acknowledges Sula's importance both in her own life and in the community. 
Nabokov's novel Lolita involves a more complex example of the Laughter of 
Apocalypse, as the narrative occurs on several levels, causing the dynamics of the 
laughing relationship to shift. In the first of these, Humbert as Protagonist falls victim 
to the seductive yet mocking laughter of Lolita, whose status as Apocalyptic Fool is 
assumed through Humbert's designation of her as a nymphet. It becomes clear, 
however, that the demonic Lolita is a creation of Humbert's, projected onto an 
ordinary eleven-year-old girl in much the same way that, for example, Kesey's 
Combine applies limited stereotypes of mental illness to the men in the hospital. At 
this level of the narrative, Humbert as Apocalyptic Fool seeks to control those 
around him according to the rules of a fantasy he has created, with Dolores Haze as 
his chief Victim. 
Like King's monster It, Humbert therefore illustrates an interesting aspect of 
Laughter of Apocalypse, which is that the demonic Fool often acts in ways almost 
indistinguishable from the Institution, in that both Humbert and It seek to manipulate 
158 
and control reality, at the expense of the identity of other characters. Humberts 
mockery of American popular culture, which the reader is invited to join, therefore 
evokes an ambivalent response. It is impossible to deny that the narrow-minded and 
superficial world at which Humbert laughs deserves this scorn, but it also difficult to 
feel anything but revulsion for Humbert himself, even while one laughs with him. 
It is at this point that the third level of the narrative becomes crucial. By 
introducing a character who fictionalises those around him, Nabokov reminds the 
reader that Humbert, too, is fictional. By encouraging us to laugh at limited and 
stereotypical thinking, Nabokov is thus, in effect, inviting us to laugh at our own folly 
in taking his images seriously. Humbert becomes the character who is trapped by 
Nabokov's image of him, which ironically results in a partial return to the first level 
of the narrative, in which Humbert is a Protagonist, although here the Fool is 
Nabokov himself As do the other Protagonists in examples of Laughter of 
Apocalypse, Humbert thus experiences a double revelation, but in this example the 
second revelation is metafictional. When, in a moment of epiphany, Humbert accepts 
his guilt for the sin of having deprived Dolores of her childhood, he also embodies the 
paradoxical revelation to the reader that, even though he is fictional, his 
transcendence of a solipsistic fantasy world has real meaning beyond the confines of 
the text. 
The analysis of Laughter of Apocalypse in this chapter illustrates possible ways 
of dealing with the problem of writing about ineffability. As Cynthia Davis argues in 
her analysis of Sula, transcendence without a reciprocal relationship with an other 
leads to meaninglessness. Both Blatty and King personify the irrational as demons, 
whose relationship with other characters is mediated by the ambivalent nature of 
laughter. The Protagonists' real fear of it is transformed into a sense of the 
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ridiculous, their laughter therefore simultaneously putting them into a relationship 
with and keeping them separate from it. In a similar way, Morrison employs 
ambivalence by showing how the unbounded laughter of the Fool, which cannot be 
directly echoed by a non-transcendent character, is instead transposed into tears that 
recognise the importance of anti-system while at the same time remaining rooted in 
system. Nabokov, moreover, shows that this sense of ambivalence can be used to 
overcome the difficulties of the reader's relationship with the text. Again using 
laughter, he parodies apparently exhausted modes of discourse in order, 
paradoxically, that they may be encountered as something new and revealing. 
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CHAPTER THREE: LAUGHTER OF ENTROPY 
Introductign 
So far in this thesis I have traced the recurrence in several novels of a relationship 
between two or more characters, the dynamics of which are expressed through 
laughter. Within the context of an Institution, a society or community that I have 
defined as mad in that its rules are so strict as to form an apparently inescapable 
closed system, there appears in each case a Fool. Seen initially in terms that the rules 
of the Institution can encompass, in other words, as a Made Fool, these characters 
are revealed to be transcendent, in that they have the ability to see and function 
beyond the Institution's conventions. Thus the Transcendent Fool, according to a 
definition of madness as loss of balance, is also mad, in that he or she is an expression 
of limitlessness or anti-system. The Transcendent Fool's influence may be either 
creative or destructive, and this potential is mediated and realised through a 
relationship with one or more Protagonists, who act as advocate or champion, either 
for the Fool's creative message, or in defence of society against the Fool's desire to 
destroy. Thus, while the Fool facilitates orientation by opposing the Institution's 
system, it is the Protagonist who ultimately achieves balance, and is in a position to 
communicate this achievement to the reader. While the revelatory process may be 
either creative or destructive, it occurs in every case accompanied by shared laughter, 
which I have called a laughing relationship. 
Such models rely on the idea of a coherent reality outside the closed system of 
the Institution, access to and communication of which is crucial to the healthy 
development both of the individual and of society. While, for example, in Lolita 
Nabokov resists the idea that reality is something that can be reached and expressed, 
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and in On The Road Kerouac's communication of Dean's revelation can appear 
incoherent to the reader, in both these novels the creative possibilities of the world 
outside the Institution are still fundamental to the text as a whole. 
In this chapter, on the other hand, I shall look at three novels that, while 
, apparently presenting the reader with the familiar pattern of Institution, Protagonist 
and Fool, o-ffer the view that escape from our own Institutions (including the view of 
language as a closed system) is impossible, either because there is no real world 
outside the -systems we create, or because we can only ever understand things as 
mediated by such systems, and could never, therefore, gain meaningful access to 
anything beyond them. As we shall see, in these novels the crucial laughing 
relationship does not occur, either because laughter itself is largely absent from the 
text, or, even when there is much laughter, it occurs either in a closed, solipsistic way 
or as an expression of unassimilated chaos. 
Although this thesis has concentrated on laughter as it appears in the text, 
rather than on theories of humour in literature, some general observations here will 
illuminate the change in world views between the novels analysed in Chapters One 
and Two and those that will be looked at in this chapter. Many critics in the past have 
considered that comedy should serve a corrective function by highlighting the follies 
of mankind. Ben Jonson, for example, considers that both comedy and tragedy are 
cathartic, but deal with different subject matters, the former with folly, the latter with 
crime. ' Increasingly, this distinction has become blurred, so that, by the twentieth 
century, there is little that is not considered a proper subject for laughter. Dugald 
Stewart considers that there is an essential moral element to laughter, as it involves 
See Gregory Smith, Ben Jonson, The English Men of Letters series (London: Macmillan, 1919), 
chap. 4. 
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not only the ability to reason (to distinguish one idea from another), but also the 
n 1-. 2 ability to distinguish right from wrong. George Meredith goes finiher, saying that 
6 comedy is the fountain of sound sense'. Quoting Meredith, Ralph Piddington says 
that "'participation in the comic spirit gives high feHowship, " but in order to attain it 
one must believe that our society is founded upon common sense, otherwise one will 
not appreciate the contradiction which the comic spirit perceives'. 3 Thus it seems 
possible, even when dealing with extremes of transgressive behaviour, to use comedy 
rather than tragedy, but only providing the reader can be assumed to make accurate 
moral judgements about the events that occur. 
Jean Jacques Rousseau's analysis of this view is interesting. He argues that 
since comedy must be designed to please the civilisation in which it occurs, it only 
confirms or condemns things already approved or disapproved of, leading merely to 
exaggeration of these dominant views (see Piddington, p. 165, who cites Rousseau's 
Complete Works, volume 2). If these dominant views are the product of an 
Institution, in other words, a sick society,, comedy cannot, then, be said to serve a 
genuinely corrective function. Thus, the views expressed above rely on confidence in 
an innate and universal moral sense that exists independently of the systems of any 
given society, and it is this moral sense that, when shared in laughter, improves a 
community. Should this confidence in absolute moral values fail, therefore, 
community (shared laughter) is undermined and the individual is isolated from others 
2 Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man, 2 vols (Edinburgh [printed] London: 
[n. pub. ], 1$28), Vol. 1, book 2, chap. 7, sec. 3. 
3 Piddington, The Psychology of Laughter: A Study in Social Adaptation (New York: Gamut Press, 
1963), p. 18 1, p. 182. See Meredith, An Essay on Comedy and the Uses of the Comic Spirit 
(Westminster: [n. pub], 1897). 
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and at the mercy of both dominant ideology and intrusive chaos. The novels to be 
analysed in this chapter reflect such a failure, and the laughter present in them 
expresses isolation, chaos or entrapment rather than interaction, community and 
progress. 
What one might caH the anti-realist world view can be distinguished not only in 
a different treatment of laughter, but also in a different conception of madness. 
Where the definition I propose in the Introduction involves the retaining or regaining 
of balance,, and thus assumes a strong sense of a 'self that desires this balance, in the 
twentieth century an alternative view of madness develops that concerns doubt about 
that very self s existence. The first model can be illustrated by the theoretical 
superstructure proposed by Freud that divides the personality into id, ego and 
superego, where the id describes the indiscriminate instincts and natural urges, the 
superego the conscience, or controlling rule-set, and the ego the central core of an 
individual that attempts to balance the former against the latter. 4 Clearly, this 
structure parallels the ideas of Fool (anti-system), Protagonist (self) and Institution 
(system) that I have suggested. The second model is illustrated by the idea of the 
personality described by R. D. Laing as 'ontological instability', where the core (self 
I- is felt by tlw- subject to be absent, or so fragmentary as to appear so. Laing describes 
the ontol9gically stable person as having 
a sense of his presence in the world as a real, alive, whole, and, in a temporal 
sense, a continuous person. As such, he can live out into the world and meet 
others: a world and others experienced as equally real, alive, whole, and 
continuous. ' 
4 See, for example, Two Short Accounts of Psycho-Analysis, trans. and ed. by James Strachey, 2nd 
edition of Strachey's translation (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), 'The Question of Lay Analysis', 
sec. 2, pp. 104-09. 
' The Divided Self, 2nd edition (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), p. 39. 
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The ontologically unstable person, on the other hand, 'may feel more unreal 
than real; in a literal sense, more dead than alive; precariously differentiated from the 
rest of the world, so that his identity and autonomy are always in question' (Laing, 
P. 42). Such an individual, Laing explains, feels that the everyday circumstances of 
life, rather than being enriching and productive, pose a constant threat to his or her 
very existence. The anxiety that this produces can occur in three forms: engulfment, 
implosion and petrifieation. Engulfinent expresses the fear that 'in being understood 
(thus grasped, comprehended), in being loved, or even simply in being seen' one's 
own identity wiH be overwhelmed and destroyed by the other. Thus any fonn of 
'dialectical relationship' is dangerous, and self-imposed isolation is the only safe 
position to take (Laing, pp. 43-45). Implosion, in a similar way, expresses the feeling 
that one is a vacuum. Any contact with the external world threatens to fill this void, 
something that must be prevented at all costs since the vacuum (albeit negatively) is 
the only 'self that one has (Laing, pp. 45-46). Petrification holds, for Laing, the dual 
meaning of a fear of being 'turned to stone', of being made a thing rather than a 
person, and the state (being 'petrified') that this fear itself induces. As Laing points 
out, the result of this has been described by Sartre in Being and Nothingness 
(discussed in this thesis in Chapter Two, section on Sula). As Laing puts it, 'if one 
experiences the other as a free agent, one is open to the possibility of experiencing 
oneself as an object of his experience and thereby of feeling one's own subjectivity 
drained away' (Laing, p. 47). This may be counteracted by accepting afl others only 
as things, as objects of one's own consciousness. As Laing points out, 
those very dangers most dreaded can themselves be encompassed to 
forestall their actual occurrence. Thus, to forgo one's autonomy becomes 
the means of secretly safeguarding it; to play possum, to feign death., 
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becomes a means of preserving one's aliveness [ ... ] To turn oneself into 
stone becomes a way of not being turned into a stone by someone else 
[... while] the man who is frightened of his own subjectivity being swamped, 
impinged upon, or congealed by the other is frequently to be found 
attempting to swamp, to impinge upon, or to kill the other person's 
subjectivity. (Laing, pp. 51-52) 
Thus, the ontologically unstable person is in a permanent position of what 
Sartre calls Bad Faith, the vacillation between accepting oneself and accepting others 
that denies both a coherent existence and the possibility of coherent relationships. In 
the Freudian model, an individual can be seen to struggle to maintain his or her sense 
of a whole self, and to regain a balance recognised by that self as essential to well- 
being. In the Laingian, there exists no such centre around which to rebuild or regain a 
sense of balance, and the struggle is one of existential survival - to have a sense of 
self at any cost. 
This change in attitude to madness emerges, in part, from a relatively new 
concentration on the individual - and particularly the individual's internal and even 
unconscious states of mind - which seems to have developed in parallel with a type 
of mental illness which can be identified as specifically twentieth-century. 6A view of 
humanity arises (although there are many arguments for its appearance at odd times 
previously) that can be seen in philosophy (in Existentialism and Absurdism), in 
culture (what Christopher Lasch calls 'the culture of narcissism'), in literature (in the 
theatre of the absurd and elsewhere), indeed in every field of human endeavour, not 
just on the psychiatrist's couch. As Lasch observes, 
6 Roy Porter argues that madmen and mad doctors have always influenced one another to the extent 
that it is sometimes difficult to establish whose 'idea' a particular manifestation of madness is; 
A Social History oj'Madness: Stories of the Insane, 2nd edition (London: Phoenix, 1996), pp. 8-38. 
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Studies of personality disorders that occupy the border line between 
neurosis and psychosis, though written for clinicians and making no claims 
to shed light on social or cultural issues, depict a type of personality that 
ought to be immediately recognizable, in a more subdued form, to observers 
of the contemporary cultural scene: facile at managing the impressions he 
gives to others, ravenous for admiration but contemptuous of those he 
manipulates into providing it; unappeasably hungry for emotional 
experiences with which to fill an inner void; terrified of aging and death. ' 
Lasch says that clinical narcissism is not about self-love and the 'me' 
generation; instead, 'the new Narcissus gazes at his own reflection, not so much in 
admiration as in unremitting search of flaws, signs of fatigue, decay' (Lasch, p. 90). 
He points out that this image of madness as destabilisation or disintegration can be 
seen not only in broader society, but also in literature. 
The rise of the theater of the absurd, it has been argued, 'seems to mirror the 
change in the predominant form of mental disorders which has been 
observed and described since World War 11 by an every-increasing number 
of psychiatrists. ' Whereas the 'classical' drama of Sophocles, Shakespeare, 
and Ibsen turned on conflicts associated with classical neuroses, the 
absurdist theater of Albee, Beckett, Ionesco, and Genet centers on the 
emptiness, isolation, loneliness, and despair experienced by the borderline 
personality [ ... ] Instead of the neurotic character with well-structured 
conflicts centering around forbidden sex, authority, or dependence and 
independence within a family setting, we see characters filled with 
uncertainty about what is real. 
(Lasch, p. 89. It is unclear from the text who Lasch is quoting. ) 
Laing also points out this contrast in the 'basic existential position' between 
classical and modem authors, citing Lionel Trilling's comparison between 
Shakespeare and Keats on the one hand, and Kalka and Beckett on the other (Laing, 
pp. 39-41). 
7 The Culture of Narcissisim: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations, 2nd edition 
(London: Norton, 1991), p. 38. 
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This has enormous implications for the role of the Fool, since this figure relies 
for his or her power on a relationship with an other. If the lack of a coherent self 
undermines the possibility for such a relationship, the Fool's function collapses. As 
Enid Welsford points out, 
The King, the Priest and the Fool all belong to the same regime, all belong 
essentially to a society shaped by belief in Divine order, human inadequacy, 
efficacious ritual; and there is no real place for any of them in a world 
increasingly dominated by the notions of the puritan, the scientist, and the 
captain of industry; for strange as it may seem the fool in cap and bells can 
only flourish among people who have sacraments, who value symbols as 
well as tools, and cannot forever survive the decay of faith in divinely 
imposed authority, the rejection of all taboo and mysterious inspiration. ' 
That symbols are as important as tools is revealed in Lasch's analysis of the 
current fashion for dismantling iflusions and laying bare the means by which they are 
achieved. As he says, 
The urge to understand a magician's tricks, like the recent interest in the 
special effects behind a movie like Star Wars, shares with the study of 
literature a vMlingness to learn from the masters of illusion lessons about 
reality itself (Lasch, p. 87) 
However. ) 
literature that makes no claims to represent reality, that self- 
consciously presents itself as no more than an illusion, paradoxically undermines the 
traditional, assumption that such illusions are crucial symbols of reality. Lasch 
continues, 
a complete indifference even to the mechanics of illusion announces the 
collapse of the very idea of reality, dependent at every point on the 
distinction between nature and artifice, reality and illusion. This indifference 
betrays theý erosion of the capacity to take any interest in anything outside 
the self (Lasch, p. 87) 
8The Fool: His Social & Literary History (London: Faber and Faber, 1935), p. 193. 
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The anti-realist model of laughter, which expresses this disintegration of the 
relationship between the real and the illusory (between the external world and our 
internal vision of it) suggests the genre popularly known as Black Humour. However, 
as I shall discuss in a moment, this term is fraught with difficulty as regards both its 
critical definition and application, and its historical and geographical position. 
Instead, I propose to borrow a phrase from Patrick O'Neill, and call this model the 
Laughter of Entropy. 9 
As O'Neill points out, while there was an enormous increase in interest in the 
idea of Black Hurnour in the America of the nineteen sixties and seventies, not only 
do other occurrences of the phrase appear in both French and German critical texts 
which place its genesis much further back in time, but even within the specifically 
post-war American definition, very little consensus is evident as to what, exactly, the 
phrase refers to. 
Different writers use the term to mean humour which is variously grotesque, 
gallows, macabre, sick, pornographic, scatological, cosmic, ironic, satirical, 
absurd, or any combination of these. (O'Neill, p. 62) 
The writer of a Time Magazine essay of 1965 notes that the writers usuafly 
identified as being exponents of Black Humour form 'no cohesive school or even a 
wave -) 1) 
10 while Koji Numasawa, says the term is 'at once convenient and vague' 
although he does acknowledge that 'American writers on the whole appear to be 
more articulate about it, and American audiences more susceptible to the form'. 
" He 
9 'The Comedy of Entropy: The Contexts of Black Humour', in Black Humor. - Critical Essays, ed. 
by Alan R. Pratt (New York: Garland, 1993), pp. 61-88 (orig. publ. in Canadian Review of 
Comparative Literature 10: 2 (June 1983), 145-66). 
10 'The Black Humorists', in Pratt, pp. 3-9 (orig. publ. in Time, Feb. 12,1965). 
11 'Black Humor: An American Aspect', in Pratt, pp. 41-60 (p. 4 1) (orig. publ. in Studies in English 
Literature 44 (1968), 177-93). 
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suggests that the need for this form of hurnour in America is exacerbated by such 
things as the Second World War, materialism, nuclear threat and the decline of social 
taboos, with the result that 'human beings at their utmost grotesque now freely flit 
about the pages and stages without any concern for conventional decency' 
(Numasawa, p. 44). 
Numasawa identifies a readership that seems to have much in common with the 
Protagonists described here in Chapters One and Two; at odds with the closed 
system of an Institution they recognise but will not accept. Calling such readers 
'hipsters', Numasawa says that they 'recognize in these writers "cool" agents of 
destruction mercilessly assaulting the manners and moralities of the ignoble 
44squares... (Numasawa, p. 45). Thus, according to this argument, the author acts as 
Transcendent Fool, showing the reader, as Protagonist, another way of looking at the 
world. 
So far, then, Black Hurnour would seem to have much in common with 
revelatory or apocalyptic laughter (indeed, in these terms, it does not seem to be a 
different fonn of laughter at all). Moreover, Numasawa also points out that by using 
outsiders (as those writers designated as black humorists often do) an author can 
ýmaintain sufficient comic detachment and perspective; also that a certain freedom of 
movement [can] be secured for the characters, such freedom being essential for 
picaresque indulgence as well as for creating fantasy' (Numasawa, p. 5 1). Bruce Jay 
Friedman, in the foreword to his book, Black Humor, agrees with this, arguing that 
they say it is a critic's phrase [ ... 
] and besides, don't these fellows just write 
about outcasts? Fags, junkies, hunchbacks, 'perverts', Negroes, Jews, other 
assorted losers [... but] I have a hunch Black Humor has always been 
aro und [... and] it may be that you can govern by consensus, but you can't 
write anything distinctive by consensus. And it may be that if you are doing 
anything as high-minded as examining society, the very best way to go about 
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it is by examining first its throwaways, the ones who can't or won't keep in 
step. 12 
What is being described, as Friedman suggests, is a form of satire that has been 
in existence for as long as there have been human conflicts. The Made Fool, in 
particular, has a long history of taking the position of 'throwaway' through whom the 
dynamics of a society can be revealed. 
The apparent confusion between Black Humour as an extreme form of an 
existing type of comedy and as an essentially difierent type is also evident in the 
argument of J. Jerome Zolten. While taking the more delimited view that Black 
Humour is a term that defines a specific movement in nineteen- sixties American 
literature, what he describes sounds more like what I have defined as Laughter of 
Apocalypse. 
Joking about tragedy is a way to create 'community' in the face of disaster. 
Sharing a laugh provides release of anger and frustration. But joking also 
has meaning as a communicative act designed to enhance the teller's appeal 
with an audience. " 
Andre Breton, in the preface to his Anthologie de 1'humour noir, quotes 
extensively from Freud, who argues that humour is not only liberating, it also 
contains elements of the sublime and the elevated. 
The sublime evidently derives from the triumph of narcissism, from the 
invulnerability of the ego which affirms itself victoriously. The ego refuses to 
let itself be broken into, to let suffering impose exterior reality on it. It 
12 Toreward [sic]: Black Humor', in Pratt, pp. 19-24 (p. 23) (orig. pub]. in Black Humor (London: 
Transworld Publisher, 1965). 
13 'Joking in the Face of Tragedy: Why would people try to turn tragic events into humor? ', in Pratt, 
pp. 303-11 (p. 3 10) (orig. publ. in Etc. 45: 4 (winter 1988), 345-50). 
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refuses to admit that the shocks of the exterior world can touch it; much 
more, it shows that they can even become for it the sources of pleasure. 14 
Again, we see that, in associating Black Humour with ideas of the transcendent 
and the sublime, Breton considers it to be no different from the sense of overcoming 
opposition to regain balance that I have already described. Moreover, it should be 
noted that, by citing Freud, Breton is reinforcing the assumption that the self, the 
ego, is a coherent entity that uses laughter to assimilate experience. " Many critics, 
then, see Black Humour merely as a form of satire. As Numasawa notes, for 
example, both Conrad Knickerbocker and Bruce Jay Friedman 'envisage black humor 
as a sort of satirical protest against the world gone completely insane' (Numasawa, 
42). 
Louis Hasley, on the other hand, argues that Black Humour is a metaphysical 
rather than a social phenomenon, and cannot, therefore, be called satire. 16 He argues 
that evident in such work is distrust not in continuity, but 'in the intelligence that 
controls, or fails to control, the ongoing conditions of life' (Hasley, p. 109). He 
claims that earlier American writers differ in that 'they relived [sic] the gloom of their 
vision by a lambent play of light and of humor that has no need of special definition. 
In them there was a searching that never quite concluded that life is meaningless) 
(Hasley, p. I 10). The idea that Black Humour expresses a metaphysical anxiety - that 
life is meaningless and that, therefore, satire can have no coherent function - seems 
to suggest a reading of the term that does reflect a fundamentaffy different position 
"'Preface: Anthologiede I'humournoir', in Pratt, pp. 11-18 (p. 16) (orig. publ. in Anthologiede 
I'humour noir (Paris: [n. pub. ], 1950). 
" It should be noted that both Breton and Lasch use the term 'narcissism' in a way that is 
different 
from, or misunderstands, Freud's. 
16 'Black Humor and Gray', in Pratt, pp. 107-119 (p. 109). 
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from either the Laughter of Revelation or the Laughter of Apocalypse. It is this 
position that I propose to call Laughter of Entropy. 
Analysing Catch-22, a novel that most critics identify as an example of Black 
Humour, Numasawa. says, 'it is almost as if, the whole [ofl mankind having been 
deprived of the right to be either sane or mad, a man has to be simultaneously both 
sane and mad. Every positive value is cancelled out by the inherent negative, 
resulting in a paralyzing relativity' (Nurnasawa, p. 52). Although I dispute this as a 
reading of Catch-22, and, indeed, have already shown that that novel is an example 
of Laughter of Revelation, this argument makes the crucial distinction between 
Laughter of Entropy and satire. As we have seen, entropy involves the experience 
described by Laing as ontological instability and by Sartre as Bad Faith; the reduction 
of both the self and any relationship with an other to just such 'paralyzing relativity). 
Satire, on the other hand, is based on the conviction that life is Purposeful, that 
people can relate to one another in a meaningful way, and that criticism of 
inappropriate rules or behaviour can lead to progress. The 1965 Time essay considers 
(giving the film Dr Strangelove and the humour of Lenny Bruce as examples) that 
4commitment to satire has seemed to degenerate into a monotonous, self-destructive 
scatology' (Time, 1965, p. 4). Monotonous self-destruction implies just the sort of 
circling, solipsistic state that we shall see in the three novels discussed in this chapter. 
It is evidently not the same as satire, whose function seems rather to be to improve, 
through criticism, the state of society. 
Another Time essay, written in 1966, sums up the solipsism inherent in entropic 
laughter by using the example of television; 'TV has become a robot talking to itself, 
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giggling at its own jokes'. " The writer of this essay considers that 'the humorists 
who dwell on death and disaster today lean too often toward the narcissistic, 
reflecting images of themselves as helpless heroes in a world they can neither take nor 
leave' (Time, 1966, pp. 96-97). Numasawa uses this image of entrapment, 
unmitigated by the possibility of transcendence, to distinguish Black Humour (as 
Laughter of Entropy) even from traditional existentialism; 'if, it might be said, the 
whole attempts of existentialists have centred on creating something positive out of 
the omnipresent negative [ ... ] the new black humorists set up shop as mocking the 
futility of such processes in an I -told-you-it's-no -good spirit' (Numasawa, p. 45). 
Bruce Janoff agrees that there is a generic confusion between Black Humour (as 
Laughter of Entropy) and existentialism. While much of his argument centres around 
the obstructively subjective assessment that a crucial difference between the two is 
that Black Humour literature is fimny while existential and absurdist works are not, 
Janoff does highlight the distinction by arguing that, for the Camusian man, 
only when he is painfully conscious of the absence of meaning outside this 
world and the chaos inherent in it, and yet shoulder to shoulder with his 
fellow man continues the struggle, can he hoPe to endure. " 
He contrasts this position with that of Jacob Homer in John Barth's The End of 
the Road, where, he argues, 'affirmation simply means continuing to live rather than 
cornnutting suicide' (Janoff, p. 303). Following Ihab Hassan's analysis of the 
literature of silence, Janoff argues that Barth epitomises the outlook that I have 
described as entropic. 
17 'American Humor: Hardly a Laughing Matter', in Pratt, pp. 89-97 (p. 95) (orig. publ. in Time, 4 
March 1966). 
18 'Black Humor, Existentialism and Absurdity: A Generic Confusion', Arizona Quarterly 30 
(1974), pp. 293-304 (p. 298). 
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Convinced of the failure of words, of feeling, of art and of the efficacy of 
action in life or art, Barth [ ... ] is also convinced of the failure of failure. The horror of being inwardly blank is to the black humorist even more a cause 
for despair than struggling to write about the absurdity that surrounds him. 
In the end, black humor is aimed not so much at the affirmation of art and 
life as to the negation of silence and lifelessness. (Janoff, p. 304) 
This position has implications for the reader as weH as for the author. Writing 
of Barth's subversion of allusive literature in The Sot- Weed Factor, Elaine B. Safer 
considers that 
fluctuations between the reader's hope that allusions will culminate in a 
discovery of fundamental truths and his realization that the novel's 
references certainly do not move toward an anagogical level of meaning 
brings forth the disorientation and shamefaced laughter of black humour. '9 
Christopher D. Morris considers that much of the reader's sense of 
disorientation when confronted by such texts has to do with a stylistic undermining of 
the reader's desire to relate to a character. Discussing Barth's Lost in the Funhouse, 
I- 
he says that 
selfhood [ ... ] 
is altogether ignored, except as a farcical or sentimental entity, 
and the locus of the 'narrative' affliction is ultimately reduced to the purely 
linguistic problem of substitution. The situation is more disturbing than the 
early existentialist dilemmas because the Cartesian subject has been replaced 
as its center by meaningless, autonomous phonemes. The fimhouse world 
resembles the universally neurotic one described by the French post- 
structuralist Jacques Lacan. 20 
19 'The Allijsive Mode and Black Humor in Barth's Sot-Weed Factor', Studies in the Novel 13: 4 
(winter 1981), 424-36 (p. 426). 
'0 'Barth and Lacan: The World of the Moebius Strip', Critique: Studies in Modern Fiction 17: 1 
( 1975), 69-77 (pp. 69-70). 
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Thus, the work of those authors who hold an entropic world view has crucial 
implications not only for the kind of fictional narratives that are created, but also for 
the writer's position as artist and for the reader's position as interpreter of the text. 
There -are many examples of novels of this type that contain laughter which 
takes the sense of disintegration and solipsism to extremes, having little or no sense 
of a relationship between characters. In William Burroughs's Naked Lunch (1959), 
for example, the author's treatment of laughter is epitomised by the Sailor: 
He laughed, black insect laughter that seemed to serve some obscure 
function of orientation like a bat's squeak. The Sailor laughed three times. 
He stopped laughing and hung there motionless listening down into himself 
He had picked up the silent frequency ofjunk. " 
Here, the orientation that laughter facilitates serves the merely solipsistic 
function of enabling the Sailor to 'listen down into himself. Similarly, Guy Grand's 
taste for solitary practical jokes in Terry Southern's The Magic Christian (1959) is 
expressed in a laughter that is never shared with other characters in the novel. " The 
failure of rVvelatory or apocalyptic laughter is, however, best examined by analysis of 
texts that suggest such relationships, only to undermine thern. 
Slayghterhouse-5 
Vonnegut's sixth novel, Slaughterhouse-5 (1969) has been seen as a 'resolution of 
23 
sorts to themes and techniques developing throughout his previous work' . 
Although this is, to a certain extent, true, I shall argue that the conclusions Vonnegut 
21 Naked Lunch (London: John Calder, 1959), p. 52. 
22 The Magic Christian (London: Andr6 Deutsch, 1959). 
23 Jerome Klinkowitz and John Somer, 'The Vonnegut Statement', in The Vonnegut Statement, ed. 
by Jerome Klinkowitz and John Somer (St Albans: Panther, 1975), pp. 13-14 (p. 14). 
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comes to in Slaughterhouse-5 differ significantly not only from his previous work, 
but also from the novels thus far analysed in this thesis. VVhile the familiar pattern of a 
trapped Protagonist and a Transcendent Fool seems to exist, any sense of a 
meaningful, or constructive revelation is undermined by the lack of a coherent 
laughing relationship between them. 
That, this novel is the product of Vonnegut's twenty-year struggle to write 
about his experiences in the Second World War is particularly significant in this 
context, since previous attempts show clearly defined Fools and Protagonists. Many 
critics note religious overtones in Vonnegut's work, most often in the form of a 
prophet-figure bringing a message of hope to Mankind. Stanley Schatt, for example, 
points out that 'Vomegut's protagonists in at least four of his [pre-Slaughter- 
house-5] novels assume the role of a Jonah figure when urged to follow [ ... ]a course 
of action by a Messiah figure'. 24 Of these critics, most admit that no such characters 
exist in Slaughterhouse-5, as, for example, Glenn Meeter who argues that 'the voice 
that speaks to us in his tales does not seem that of a prophet; the reader has no 
feeling of being seized and held and overpowered by something unearthly, like 
Coleridge's wedding guest when the Ancient Mariner seized him with his skinny hand 
and held him with his eye'. 
25 
It would therefore seem that Vonnegut comes to the conclusion that such 
figures are inadequate to explain life as he had experienced it. The major event that 
Vonnegut tries repeatedly to explain, to himself and to his readers, is the fire- 
bombing of Dresden by allied forces, which kiJled 135,000 people in an undefended 
24 'The Whale and the Cross: Vonnegut's Jonah and Christ Figures", Southwest Review, 56 (winter 
1971), 2942 (p. 29). 
25 Wonnegut's Formal Otherworldliness: Cat's Cradle and Slaughterhouse-Five' in Klinkowitz and 
Somer, pp. 198-212 (p. 198). 
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and strategically unimportant city. A prisoner of war, kept in an underground 
slaughterhouse at night, Vonnegut was witness to this event (and, indeed, one of its 
few survivors). John Somer argues that 
Vonnegut found it difficult to write about the bombing of Dresden because 
it contradicted everything he was brought up to believe in; and it happened 
at an age, twenty-two, when a man's beliefs are most vulnerable [ ... ] Kurt Vonnegut could not rush home and knock out a masterpiece about the 
destruction of Dresden because his real subject was the destruction of Kurt 
Vonnegut, Jr. 26 
As Tony Tanner puts it, Slaughterhouse-5 'is not a novel simply about 
Dresden. It is a novel about a novelist who has been unable to erase the memory of 
his wartime experience and the Dresden fire-storm, even while he has been inventing 
stories and fantasies in his role as a writer since the end of that war'. 27 The 
implication of this is that horrific or disorientating memories can only be successfuRy 
integrated into one's experience if they can be 'told'. Slaughterhouse-5 is Vonnegut's 
sixth attempt at this telling, and by abandoning his previous reliance on the 
transcendent power of the prophet he seems to conclude that it is not actually 
possible to tell about experiences as large as Dresden. This leads to the paradoxical 
situation of a novel whose theme is the impossibility of writing a novel. 
One could argue that Vonnegut's work before Slaughterhouse-5 indicates in 
part an escape into fantasy similar to Yossarian's retreat into hospital or Shadrack's 
attempts to contain death in National Suicide Day. However, whereas Catch-22 and 
Sula both illustrate a final escape from these closed systems (in the former in the form 
26 'Geodesic, Vonnegut; or, if Buckminster Fuller Wrote Novels' in Klinkowitz and Somer, pp. 213- 
21 (pp. 213-14). 
27 'The Uncertain Messenger: A Reading of Slaughterhouse-Five', in Critical Essays on Kurt 
Vonnegut, ed. by Robert Merrill (Boston, MA: G. K. Hall, 1990), pp. 125-30 (p. 125) (orig. publ. in 
Crith-al Quarterly II (1969), 297-315). 
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of revelation, in the latter in the form of apocalypse), Slaughterhouse-5 does not 
provide an analogous escape from the closed system of fantasy. Meeter points out 
that the world of Slaughterhouse-5 is not allegory, where a fantastic world stands for 
(and therefore explains) some aspect of the real world. In this novel 'there is a 
different alignment of fantasy and reality. The two are portrayed side by side, as if 
both are equally fantastic and equally real' (Meeter, p. 199). This 'contamination of 
reality by dream' as John Barth has put it undermines the reader's sense of place; we 
have no more understanding of where we stand in relation to the world of 
Slaughterhouse-5 than Vomegut has (his novel suggests) of where he stands in 
relation to the universe (quoted by Meeter, p. 199). 
The central character of the novel is Billy Pilgrin-4 who, as a young soldier, like 
Vonnegut, was taken as a prisoner of war to Dresden shortly before it was destroyed. 
He has become 'unstuck in time', traveffing uncontroBably from one part of his life to 
another and existing 'in a constant state of stage fright' as he never knows where he 
28 
will be from one moment to the next. Additionally, and independently of being 
4 unstuck',, Billy is kidnapped, on the night of his daughters wedding, by aliens from 
the planet Tralfamadore, who take him back to their world as an exhibit for a zoo. 
Billy learns that the Tralfamadorians live simultaneously in all moments of time, 
seeing the past, the present and the future aH at once as a human being might see a 
stretch of the Rocky Mountains. From them he learns to accept an entirely 
deterministic view of the universe; that afl things and aH times just are and any 
attempt to change them is therefore meaningless. Death, they tell him, is not real in 
the sense that it is not an end; Tralfamadorians see people as giant miffipedes, with 
28 Slaughterhouse-5, (London: Cape, 1970), p. 20. Subsequent references appear in parentheses 
within the text. 
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young legs at one end and old legs at the other, with death being just one aspect of 
the whole. Billy finds this thought comforting, and when he returns to Earth he 
begins to tell others what he has learned so that they, too, may be comforted. Tanner 
argues that 
Vonnegut has [ ... ] total sympathy with such quietistic impulses [ ... ] Fantasies of complete determinism, of being held helplessly in the amber of 
some eternally unexplained plot, justify complete passivity and a supine 
acceptance of the futility of all action. (Tanner, p. 13 0)29 
A crucial characteristic of the Protagonist has been shown to be his or her 
willingness to take responsibility (at least in part) for the evils that he or she 
witnesses, creating a relationship not only with the Fool, but also with the society of 
which he or -she is a part. Billy, however, is in a position to accept the Tralfamadorian 
philosophy because it echoes a pre-existing detachment that he feels, not only from 
the rest of society, but even from himself The result of being unstuck in time is that 
Billy becomes merely an observer of his own life, rather than an active participant in 
it. Bifly seems quite resigned to this state of affairs even before meeting the 
Tralfamadorians, indeed, an episode from his early childhood implies that he has 
always felt that even the responsibility of being alive is too much of a burden for him. 
As Billy relives the day that his father tried to teach him to swim by throwing him 
into the deep end of the pool, we are told that 
[He] was numb as his father carried him from the shower room to the pool. 
His eyes were closed. When he opened his eyes, he was on the bottom of the 
pool, and there was beautiful music everywhere. He lost consciousness, but 
the music went on. He dimly sensed that somebody was rescuing him. Billy 
resented that. (S-5, p. 38) 
2' It should be noted that several critics disagree with the assessment that Vonnegut is quietistic, 
arguing instead that Billy acts as a negative example, serving as a critique of such passivity. 
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Significantly, this is the first occasion on which Billy becomes unstuck in time. 
Moments before, he had been struggling through a forest behind enemy lines, 
inadequately equipped, cold and hungry. The effort of simply staying alive is almost 
too much,, and shortly after he returns to the forest, he tells his companions to go on 
without him. Then, on waking from 'a delightful hallucination' that is 'the craziness 
of a dying young man with his shoes full of snow', My is forced to face the reality of 
his situation by a companion who tells him 'you shouldn't even be in the Army' (S-5, 
p. 42, p. 44). The irony of this, echoing as it does Billy's own feelings, causes him to 
start 'involuntarily making convulsive sounds that were a lot like laughter' (S-5, 
p. 44). That these sounds are involuntary and are like, rather than actually being, 
laughter indicates that Billy's detachment, while giving him the illusion of escape 
from his situation, prevents him from facing and dealing with it. A genuine laugh 
would express Billy's acceptance of his position and be an assertion that he can 
survive it, but such confidence in his self s resilience is something that Billy does not 
possess. 
Unable to face his own problems, to accept himself as an active participant in 
his own existence, Billy is totally unequipped to act on anyone else's behalf Charles 
B. Harris argues that, while in Vonnegut's previous work figures are present who 
care sufficiently about humanity to act as a contrast to absurdity and hopelessness 
elsewhere in the novel, 
in Slaughterhouse-Five, however, no such figure appears. 'There are almost 
no characters in this story, ' Vonnegut explains [ ... 
I So the pervasive 
hopelessness of the novel's tone remains unmitigated by any character who 
strives, no matter how futilely, to act in a meaningful manner. 
" 
'0 'Illusion and Absurdity: The Novels of Kurt Vonnegut', in Merrill 1990, pp. 131-41 (p. 137). 
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Several critics compare Slaughterhouse-5 with Catch-22 to make this point. 
Robert Martin, for example, argues that while in Catch-22 'there is a definite sense of 
conflict escalating towards a climax', that climax forming a resolution of the plot in 
Yossarian's escape, in Vonnegut's work there is little or no resolution, no turning 
point, and no building up to a climax'. " Similarly, Thomas Hartshorne argues that,, 
There is climactic action and intensity in Catch-22 because there are 
discernible goals for action; things move in a particular direction. In 
Slaughterhouse V they do not; things move in cycles; there is no progress. 
Catch-22 is more invested with feeling, with fear, terror, and at the end', 
exultation, because Yossarian feels himself to be free in a way that Billy is 
not and cannot be. Because he is free, he is responsible, and therefore to a 
degree, guilty [ ... ] Billy simply walks through things, feeling compassion for 
the sufferings of others, but not feeling guilt because he is not guilty; he 
knows he is not responsible. He feels no moral pressure beyond the necessity 
of being nice to other people. Yossarian's goals are wider. 32 
Not only does Billy's lack of a feeling of guilt keep him detached from his 
surroundings, the message that he thinks wiH comfort others actuafly alienates him 
still finther. With the transcendent knowledge of the Fool represented by the 
Tralfamadorian philosophy of total determinism, Billy cannot accept and pass on this 
message without losing all meaningful contact with his fellow beings. The 
implications of the message itself undernfine the possibility of communicating it to 
others. The idea that the purpose of telling a tale is to make one's audience see with 
new eyes in -order that they may develop is in total contradiction to the 'tale' that 
nothing can be done to change the way things happen. Nevertheless, Billy makes the 
'Catch-22 and Slaughterhouse-Five', Notes on Contemporary Literature, 15: 4 (September 1985), 
8- 10 (pp. 9- 10). 
32 'From Catch-22 to Slaughterhouse I- The Decline of the Political Mode', SouthAtlantic 
Quarter4v, 78 (1979), 17-33 (p. 26). 
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attempt, indeed he sees the communication of the Tralfamadorian philosophy to be 
his mission in life. 
He was devoting himself to a calling much higher than mere business. 
He was doing nothing less now, he thought, than prescribing corrective lenses for Earthling souls. So many of those souls were lost and wretched,, Billy believed, because they could not see as well as his little green friends 
on Tralfamadore. (S-5, p. 25) 
At first it may appear that My (an optometrist) is 'prescribing corrective 
lenses' so that, as a Protagonist, he may show the world the new,, Tralfamadorian, 
way of seeing that will lead them out of the closed systems of convention and into 
creative development. Moreover, he attempts to overcome even mortality by assuring 
people that death is not, after all, an end. However, in the quotation above and 
elsewhere, there are clear indications that it is Billy who is 'lost and wretched'. He 
merely 'thought' he was prescribing lenses for people who, he 'believed', could not 
see properly. This uncertainty is underlined by Vonnegut's use of the phrase 'little 
green friends' to describe the Tralfamadorians, so close to the clichd of 'little green 
men' of popular culture as to be ahnost indistinguishable. 
Vonnegut uses several techniques to suggest, then undermine, the idea that 
Billy is a holy, or Transcendent, Fool. For example, in knowing the future, 
particularly the time, place and manner of his own death, Billy is following the 
tradition of the prophet fool (seen, for example, in ancient Irish stories) who, having 
been scared literally out of his wits by warfare, runs away to the forest, from where 
he eventually emerges as a wise fool or holy madman, much valued by the king as an 
advisor (see, for example, Welsford, pp. 98-99, pp. 103-05). Bifly, traurnatised by 
war, runs not into the symbolic wilderness of the forest, but into outer space, its 
twentieth-century equivalent. The one feature that recurs again and again in these 
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stories is the fact that these characters foretefl their own deaths. At a conference, at 
which Billy will give his Tralfamadorian message to the world, he tells his audience 
about Paul Lazzaro, a fellow prisoner of war who threatened to kill him. 
'Many years ago, ' he said, 'a certain man promised to have me killed. He is 
an old man now, living not far from here. He has read all the publicity 
associated with my appearance in your fair city. He is insane. Tonight he win 
keep his promise. ' (S-5, p. 123) 
The mythic impact that this announcement seems to have is undermined by the 
fact that Billy claims to have seen his own birth and death, with everything in 
between, ruany times, so the significance of death as a final event is lost. Again, the 
message itself undermines the power of the messenger. Instead of assimilating the 
idea of mortality, of accepting it as an inevitable part of life, Billy tries to negate it. 
Where Shadrack, for example, tries to contain death by making it conform to certain 
rules, and Yossarian spends as much time as possible in hospital, where he thinks 
death can be made to behave itself, Billy simply denies that it is of consequence. 
That Billy's attempt to dismiss death is equivalent to Shadrack's attempt to 
contain it can, however, be seen in the shnilarity of the two men's relationships with 
their community. Where National Suicide Day can be seen to reflect the despair of 
the people of the Bottom, Billy's denial of the significance of death reflects the 
inability ofmilitary authority to accept responsibility for Dresden. During Billy's stay 
in the veterans' hospital after the war, we are told of his attempts to make Professor 
Rumfoord, a military historian who occupies the next bed, listen to the truth about 
the firebombing. Rumfoord claims that Billy is suffering from Echolafia, 
a mental disease which makes people immediately repeat things that well 
people around them say. But Billy didn't really have it. Rumfoord simply 
insisted, for his own comfort, that Billy had it. Rumfoord was thinking in a 
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military manner: that an inconvenient person, one whose death he wished for 
very much, for practical reasons, was suffering from a repulsive disease. 
(S-5, p. 166) 
In Rumfoord's insistence on the truth of the official version of what happened 
during the war, which contradicts Billy's actual experience of it, he appears to assert 
the authority of the Institution's language by interpreting Billy's speech as not only 
inaccurate, but diseased. 
There in the hospital, Billy was having an adventure very common among 
people without power in time of war: He was trying to prove to a wilfully 
deaf and blind enemy that he was interesting to hear and see. (S-5, p. 166) 
Faced with a dominant ideology that he knows to be false, Billy seems to be in 
the position of a Protagonist who is trapped within the conventions of an Institution, 
but has not yet found a means of escape. Ironicaffy, however, in an important sense 
Billy is simply repeating what Rumfoord says. The historian's denial that Dresden 
was an unnecessary massacre - that death on such a scale has actual-ly occurred - is 
mirrored in Billy's denial that those deaths, although he knows them to be fact, are of 
any significance. Furthermore, Protagonist and Institution seem to merge in a way 
that makes either acceptance of or resistance against the system impossible. Military 
authority, presented as a strong image of an Institution in Catch-22, is here 
undermined as an effective antagonist not only because Billy is unsuitable as a 
Protagonist, but because the exchange between Billy and Rumfoord takes place in a 
psychiatric hospital in which they are both patients. Assessing the 'truth' or 'sanity) 
of the utterances of either man is therefore problematic. 
Moreover, Catch-22 is presented as a single, coherent antagonist against which 
Yossarian struggles. In Slaughterhouse-5, on the other hand, several potential 
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Institutions appear. The English prisoners of war that BiRy encounters, for example,, 
are presented in a stereotyped form derived from contemporary films. To them, war 
is a game (and therefore a closed system). The American soldiers present an image of 
suffering that contradicts the cinematic myths, and therefore break the rules of this 
game. More significantly, mortality may appear to represent another Institution, in 
that death is presented as ever-present and inescapable. This undermines the sense of 
4monological control', as Jeanne Campbell Reesman puts it (after Bakhtin), " that is 
an essential aspect of the dialectical laughing relationship that I have described. The 
presence of more than one system implies existence between, rather than within, 
them, in which case the notion of transcendence (of the necessity for anti-system as a 
balance to system) becomes meaningless. The treatment of death ftirther destabilises 
the notion that it takes an Institutional role in the novel. Billy adopts the 
Tralfamadorian reaction -a resigned 'so it goes' whenever death is encountered - 
that apparently supports their deterministic philosophy. The persistent (almost 
intrusive) repetition of the phrase, however, constantly keeps the idea of death in the 
reader's mind, with the result that it takes on far more significance in the novel than 
this philosophy would suggest. This paradox is complicated by another; because the 
response to death in any form is the same, there is no sense in which the loss of a 
human fife is more important than, for example, a bottle of champagne that has gone 
flat. This vacillation between significance and insignificance makes a stable 
relationship with the concept of mortality impossible. 
33 'Riddle Game: Stephen King's Metafictive Dialogue', in The Dark Descent: Essays Defining 
Stephen King's Horrorscape, ed. by Tony Magistrale (New York: Greenwood, 1992), pp. 157-70 
(p. 166). 
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While Yossarian eventually attains control of his destiny, Billy is permanently 
trapped in a rootless and circling system; at the mercy of forces both external and 
internal. For example, at a party being held for his wedding anniversary long after the 
war is over, the singing of a barber-shop quartet provokes such a strong reaction in 
Billy that his wife Valencia thinks he has seen a ghost. 
He could find no explanation for why the song had affected him so 
grotesquely. He had supposed for years that he had no secrets from himself. 
Here was proof that he had a great big secret somewhere inside, and he 
could not imagine what it was. (S-5, p. 149) 
This is entirely different from Yossarian's suppression of Snowden's death, 
where Yossarian is perfectly aware of the 'great big secret' inside him, but tries to 
avoid it. Although Billy does work out what is wrong - the singers look exactly like 
tlk,: - he four guards on the morning after the Dresden fire-bombing, mouthing their horror 
at one another - this evidence that he does not have, or at least is not in control of, 
any special knowledge, even of himself, fin-ther undermines his position as a 
traditional soothsayer. 
Neither message nor messenger, then, seems suited to the task of 
communicating a meaningful revelation to humanity. Moreover, the possibility is 
clear throughout the novel that, traurnatised by his childhood and by war, Billy is 
delusional. As Leonard Mustazza notes, 'critics of Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five 
have long recognized Billy Pilgrim's psychological need to "create, " albeit 
involuntarily, his Tralfamadorian experience'. 34 The delusional world he creates is 
34 'Vonnegpt's Tralfamadore and Milton's Eden', Essays in Literature, 13: 2 (autumn 1986), 299- 
312 (p. 299). Other critics who argue this include: Wayne McGinnis, 'The Arbitrary Cycle of 
Slaughterhouse-Five: A Relation of Form to Theme', Critique: Studies in Modern Fiction, 17: 1 
(1975), 55-68 (p. 66); Robert Merrill and Peter Scholl, 'Vonnegut's Slaughterhouse-Five: The 
Requirements of Chaos', Studies in American Fiction, 6 (1978), 65-76 (p. 69); Kathryn Hume, 'The 
Heraclitean Cosmos of Kurt Vonnegut, ' Papers on Language and Literature, 18 (1982), 216-17. 
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different from, for example, Bromden's in One Flew Over The Cuckoo's Nest, in that 
Bromden's world is allegorical in the way Meeter discusses; he is attempting to find 
valid expression for a real experience. Billy's delusion, as I discuss above, is more 
akin to Shadrack's, in that it constitutes an attempt to contain reality, to 'make 
everything all right' rather than to confront and tell about it. This inability adequately 
to tell about his experiences leads to Billy's uncertainty as a Protagonist. 
There is much evidence for the different things that may have driven Bifly mad. 
Even as a child, as we have seen, he seemed incapable of accepting responsibility for 
his own survival in a normal manner. Moreover, he contradicts the image of the child 
that exists in romantic tradition seen, for example, in Stephen King's use of child 
Protagonists. This image sees the child as having the imaginative flexibility and 
freedom from conventional concerns to assimilate new experiences. Billy, however, 
in an ironic reversal of an experience of the sublime, cannot cope when he 
experiences Nature, in the form of the Grand Canyon, which he visits as a twelve- 
year-old with his parents. 
The little human family was staring at the floor of the canyon, one mile 
straight down. 
'Well -' said Billy's father, manfully kicking a pebble into space, 'there 
it is. ' They had come to this famous place by automobile. They had had 
several blowouts on the way. 
'It was worth the trip, ' said Billy's mother raptly. 'Oh God - was it ever 
wort it. 
BiRy hated the canyon. He was sure that he was going to faR in. His 
mother touched him, and he wet his pants. (S-5, pp. 76-77) 
Again, reliving this experience reinforces Billy's feelings at a particular moment 
of his narrative. This time, he is 'flung back into his childhood' by the Traffamadorian 
spaceship entering a time warp. Although he appears to accept the experience of 
being kidnapped by aliens without difficulty, the juxtaposition of this confrontation 
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with the unknown with his previous inability to assimilate the vastness of the Grand 
Canyon implies that Billy is actually refusing to face the implications of this much 
larger experience. As before, Billy's consciousness returns almost immediately to the 
war. He isbeing deloused at a German prison camp and when he is dressed in an 
ostentatious coat that is far too smaH for him, the guards '[find] him to be one of the 
most screamingly funny things they had seen in all of the Second World War. They 
[laugh] and [laugh]' (S-5, p. 78). The war is, we come to suspect, the vast experience 
that Billy is really failing to assimilate, and again this failure is associated with 
laughter. This time Billy, who has already shown himself unable to use laughter to 
give himself a new perspective on his situation, is the victim of mockery, as the 
guards, acting as demonic presences, ridicule his human frailty. 
After the war, 'every so often, for no apparent reason, Billy Pilgrim would find 
himself weeping. Nobody had ever caught Billy doing it. Only the doctor knew'(S-5, 
p. 53). The obvious assumption is that it is the war that has damaged him. However, 
in the boxcar on the way to Dresden with the other prisoners of war Billy yells, kicks 
and whimpers in his sleep. This is before the fire-bombing, when Billy is very new to 
the war, and the implication (supported by the assessment of the psychiatrists in the 
veterans' hospital) is that Billy's experiences as a child have scarred him. 
Nobody else suspected that he was going crazy. Everybody else thought he 
looked fine and was acting fine. Now he was in the hospital. The doctors 
agreed: He was going crazy. 
They didn't think it had anything to do with the war. They were sure 
Billy was going to pieces because his father had thrown him into the deep 
end of the YMCA swimming pool when he was a little boy, and had taken 
him to the rim of the Grand Canyon. (S-5, p. 86) 
Vonnegut, therefore, continually implies that the war - in which Billy witnessed 
death on a massive scale - has caused his madness. The suggestion is, however, 
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invariably undermined by the alternative and conflicting reasons that the text offers. 
Years after he has returned home, Billy is in a plane crash which fractures his skull,, 
and his wife, panic-stricken at the news of the accident, is kiRed trying to get to the 
hospital to see him. While the psychiatrists in the veterans' hospital think Billy's 
childhood has sent him mad, his daughter, Barbara, thinks his delusions about outer 
space (which he only begins to talk about after this accident) have been caused by 
brain damage and (implicitly) by repressed grief She concludes that this damage has 
made him senile, in a state of second childhood that makes him incapable of looking 
after himself Finding that he has let the furnace in his basement go out, Barbara says, 
'Oh my God, you are a child. If we leave you alone here, you'll freeze to 
death, you'll starve to death. ' And so on. It was very exciting for her, taking 
his dignity away in the name of love. (S-5, p. 114) 
Ironically, both the doctors and his own daughter see Billy's madness in terms 
of childhood. Billy, who keeps the childish diminutive of his name even in adulthood, 
avoids any sense of adult responsibility, and his dependence on others for day-to-day 
necessities, together with his frequent weeping, identify him more as an infant than as 
a grown man. Barbara, therefore, is not 'taking his dignity away', since the point that 
Billy has missed is that dignity is not possible without responsibility. 
Billy's final attempt at a laugh is not preceded by an escape into time travel. 
Instead, he is temporarily relieved of his worries in the real world. After several days' 
gruelling journey by train, the American prisoners of war are, for a short time, 
billeted on a crowded prisoner of war camp with the stereotypically jolly English 
prisoners mentioned above. They welcome their 'guests' with as much hospitality as 
they can muster, providing not only food and warmth but such luxuries as razors, 
soap, chocolate and cigarettes. Billy, apparently Wed into a false sense of security by 
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this paradise, answers the questions put to him by an Englishman who is horrified at 
the condition of the American prisoners. 
'My God - what have they done to you, lad? This isn't a man. It's a broken 
kite. ' [ ... ] 'What became of your boots, ladT 
'I don't remember. ' 
'Is that coat ajokeT 
, Sir?, 
'Where did you get such a thing? ' 
Billy had to think hard about that. 'They gave it to me, ' he said at last. 
'Ohhhh - Yank, Yank, Yank, ' said the Englishman, 'that coat was an 
insult. ' 
, Sir?, 
'It was a deliberate attempt to humiliate you. You mustn't let Jerry do 
things like that. ' 
Billy Pilgrim swooned. (S-5, p. 84) 
Suddenly forced to confront reality by the other soldier's questions, and to 
acknowledge the meaning of the German guards' laughter at his coat, Billy faints. 
When he comes to, he is still in the prison camp, but the sense of a fantasy world has 
been exacerbated by a pantomime that is being performed for the Americans' 
entertainment. Recovering from his swoon, Billy finds himself watching Cinderella. 
Some part of him had evidently been enjoying the performance for quite a 
while. Billy was laughing hard. 
The women in the play were really men, of course. The clock had just 
struck midnight and Cinderella was lamenting: 
Goodness me, the clock has struck - 
Alackaday, and fuck my luck. 
Billy found the couplet so comical that he not only laughed - he shrieked. 
He went on shrieking until he was carried out of the shed into another, 
where the hospital was. (S-5, p. 85) 
Unable to assimilate the contrast between the dreadful conditions on the train 
and this apparent paradise, Billy is reduced to screaming hysterics as soon as he 
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realises where he is. It is, paradoxically, only when he is not conscious that he is able 
to laugh. This laughter, totally unlike the shared laughter between Fool and 
Protagonist, is not just solipsistic, it is at one remove even from Billy's own 
consciousness. Significantly, since the Tralfamadorians do not laugh (in their holistic 
universe, there is nothing to laugh at), Billy never learns its value, and so remains 
lost, stuck forever in uncontrollable, futile circles. In this example, Billy leaps in time 
after his failure to laugh. Under morphine in the prison hospital, he dreams of giraffes 
and wakes 'with his head under a blanket in a ward for nonviolent mental patients in 
a veterans' hospital near Lake Placid, New York' (S-5, p. 86). Billy, it seems, has 
finally faced his reality and, unable to laugh, he has retreated into a 'nonviolent' and 
'placid' state which remains long after the war is over. Although he cries often after 
this, he never again attempts to laugh. 
Vonnegut, therefore, may seem to have provided a familiar structure in 
Slaughterhouse-5; the closed system of an Institution within which a Protagonist, 
trymg to escape, encounters a Transcendent Fool who teaches the means of this 
escape. However, it is clear throughout the novel that Billy is merely a potential 
Protagonist, and the Tralfamadorians merelypotential Fools. The laughing 
relationship that would make a true, meaningful, revelation of the Tralfamadorian 
message is absent, and the message itself is one that can have no meaningful effect on 
human development. Moreover, because of the evidence given in the text that Billy is 
delusional, it is possible that the Tralfamadorians are merely a projection of his 
internal state. As such they act not as transcendent beings who are in a genuine 
relationship with Billy, but as a ftirther expression of his detachment and sofipsism. 
Sirnilarly the Institution - shown in previous chapters of this thesis to have a crucial 
role in providing a stable system that can be either resisted or defended - 
is never 
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given a distinct identity within the novel. Consequently, Billy has no context within 
which to function and exists instead in an entropic state which is neither order nor 
disorder. Unlike Yossarian or Bromden, there is no sense of Billy being cured (there 
is, indeed, no sense of him having progressed through time in any coherent way, so 
there is no time when he possibly could be cured). 
Billy's position is reflected in the very structure of the novel, illustrated by the 
endlessly circling rhyme about Yon Yonson that appears in the first chapter. 
Vonnegut, having abandoned the idea that Fools or prophets in literature can usefully 
offer solutions to human problems, seems to suggest by this technique that the novel 
can never be anything other than a self-referential system that communicates nothing 
but a sense of 'failure' (S-5, p. 19). Vonnegut has often argued in interview that the 
Artist has a crucial role in society that involves encouraging the human race to search 
for meaning. However, unlike the novelists this thesis has addressed so far,, he seems 
to see this search as futile, 'for the depression he acknowledges in his own history 
testifies to the terrible effort men must make if they would commit themselves to an 
all but impossible task' (Merrill and Scholl, p. 69). His conclusion, then, seems to be 
the opposite of Nabokov's. Where Lolita suggests that literature can portray a 
meaningful revelation, even though Nabokov himself has claimed this to be 
impossible, Vonnegut claims that the Artist must strive for development and 
creativity, while both the plot and the structure of Slaughterhouse-5 suggests that to 
do so is futile. 
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American Psych 
Bret Easton Ellis's notorious novel about Patrick Bateman, a good-looking, rich 
twenty-something who works on Wall Street by day and is a serial killer by night, has 
provoked extreme reactions since its publication in 199 1. " Early reviews of the 
novel, particularly in The New York Times, were, on the whole, scathing; it is 
described as being 'of the tiresome enfant terrible school of fiction' by Anna 
Quindlen, 36 as 4 nonsense' by Roger Rosenblatt, 
37 
as 'pea-brained' by Caryn James, 
38 
and as 'snobbish and callow' by Ken Tucker. '9 
As Nancy and Joe Applegate point out, however, many critics (including those 
quoted above) seem concerned, not with the book's worth as literature, but with its 
'supposed political and moral agenda', citing reviews that call it 'base, misogynous 
and dangerous', and 'exploitative, sensationalist junk' . 
40 This is reflected in a long 
debate in The New York Times letters Page in the early months of 1991, which 
concerned itself chiefly with issues of pornography, censorship, and the cowardice of 
publishers, rather than with the novel itself Applegate and Applegate point out that 
much negative criticism seems 'to be quoting the same one or two offensive 
35 Even publication of the novel caused furore, as the original publishers, Simon & Schuster, 
dropped the novel on receipt of adverse pre-publication reviews, breaking the contract with Ellis 
(who eventually found a willing publisher in Random House) and provoking accusations of 
censorship and cowardice. This controversy, even before the book appeared in shops, produced 
streams of opinion from people who, often, had read only the excerpts of violent scenes leaked prior 
to publication, including the Los Angeles chapter of the National Organization for Women (NOW), 
who called for a boycott of the novel on the strength of these few scenes alone. 
36 'Public & Private: Publish or Perish', The New York Times, 18 November 1990. 
37 'Snuff This Book! Will Bret Easton Ellis Get Away With MurderT, 7-he New York Times, 
16 December 1990. 
31 'Now Starring, Killers for the Chiller 90's' The New York Times, 10 March, 199 1. 
39 'The Slatterpunk Trend, And Welcome to It', The New York Times, 24 March, 1991. All the 
above New York Times articles are available on the internet at http: //archives. nytimes. com/archives. 
40 'Prophet or Pornographer: An Evaluation of Black Humor in American Ps ho', Notes on YC 
Contemporat?, Literature, 25: 1 (January 1995) 10-12 (p. 10); citing the reviews of Peter Plagens, 
Newsweek, 4 March 199 1, p. 58 and Pagan Kennedy, The Nation, April 199 1, p. 426 respectively. 
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passages, without attempting to read the entire book [ ... ] instead of offering His a 
fair chance to present his satire, [critics] have skipped through looking for the "dirty 
parts"' (Applegate and Applegate, p. 10). Rosenblatt, for example, even goes so far 
as to recommend that readers jrefuse] to buy this book. Thumb through it, for the 
sake of non-nal prurience, but don't buy it', claiming with breathtaking hypocrisy that 
only in thiý -way can we show our disgust with 'the gratuitous degradation of human 
life' and maintain 'standards'. 
Increasingly, however, the irnportance of American Psycho as a work of 
literature has come to be recognised, although, as David Price notes, relatively few 
serious analyses of the novel have so far been published .41 His 1998 study considers 
only four previous articles to 'conduct a genuinely sustained scholarly engagement 
with the novel'; those by Frances Fortier, Carla Freccero, Thomas Irmer, and Robert 
Zaller, of which, as Price points out, only Freccero's, published in Diacritics, is 
reasonably accessible to an American readership. 42 Price considers that 
it is unfortunate that American Psycho has been dismissed in this fashion 
because this work of fiction, through its very style and structure, raises 
41 ( Bakhtinian Prosaics, Grotesque Realism, and the Question of the Carnivalesque in Bret Easton 
Ellis's American Psycho', Southern Humanities Review, 32: 4 (1998), 321-46 (p. 32 1). Interestingly 
enough, almost as many analyses of the novel have appeared in unpublished doctoral theses as in 
academic journals: Stephen William Busonik, 'Epistemic Structuralism in the Postmodern Novel: 
The Examples of William Gaddis, J. G. Ballard and Bret Easton Ellis' (Ohio State University, 1993); 
Rosa A. Ebury, 'Novel Controversies: Public Discussions of Censorship and Social Change' 
(Pennsylvania State University, 1994); Joseph B. Applegate, 'The Serial Killer as Postmodern Anti- 
Hero and Harbinger of Apocalypse in Contemporary Literature and Life' (Florida State University, 
1997); Clare Weisenberg, 'This Is Not An Exit: Reading Bret Easton Ellis' (University of Essex, 
1997). During the writing of this chapter James Annesley's thesis (University of Sussex, 1997), has, 
however, been published; 'Blank Fiction: Consumerism, Culture and the Contemporary American 
Novel' (London: Pluto Press, 1998). 
42 Frances Fortier, 'L'esth6tique hyperr&aliste de Bret Easton Ellis', Tangence, 44 (1994), 94-105; 
Carla Freccero, 'Historical Violence, Censorship, and the Serial Killer: The Case of American 
Psycho', Diacritics, 27: 2 (1997), 44-58; Thomas Irmer, 'Bret Easton Ellis's A merican Psycho and 
its Submerged References to The 1960s', Zeitschrififtir Anglistik und Amerikanistik, 41: 4 (1993), 
349-56; Robert Zaller, 'American Psycho, American Censorship, and the Dahmer Case', Revue 
Franqaise d'budes Am&icaines, 16 (1993), 317-25. 
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pivotal questions about the novel and its history as a genre, as well as its 
role in contemporary culture. (Price, p. 32 1) 
He notes, and agrees with the assessment, that aU four of these critics interpret 
'American Psycho [as] a type of satirical novel that condemns the dominant culture 
of the 1980s', although - while Irmer sees this as the result of estrangement from 
1960s ideals, and Zaller and Freccero place their analyses within the context of 'legal 
definitions of pornography and censorship' - only Fortier assesses the novel within a 
broader literary context (Price, p. 322). 
Fortier [ ... 
] sees Ellis's novel as enacting a postmodern aesthetic that 
undoes the traditional 'effets de reel' associated with nineteenth-century 
realist fiction through a superabundance of referential citations to the real, 
material world represented in the novel. According to Fortier, this excess of 
the real fosters a sense of derealization such that we are left wondering, 'Ou, 
est l'insupportable? Dans la violence merne ou dans le recit qui la banalise? 
[What is unacceptable? The violence itself or the narrative which popularises 
(banalises) it? ]' [Price's translation]. This, for Fortier, makes American 
Psycho a quintessential postmodern narrative that undoes the tenets of 
modernist literature which had established protocols for distinguishing the 
true from the false. (Price, p. 322) 
An im. portant aspect of this, which most early critics ignored or dismissed, lies 
in questions about the reality of the very violence that so incensed them. The editor's 
comment that precedes Price's article considers that, 'as for the [ ... ] murders and 
dismemberments, one hesitates to say that they may or may not be actual'. Having 
provided much evidence for the argument that Bateman's 'epics of slaughter and 
rape I are (. compensatory flights of drugged-out fantasy' this editorial then goes on, 
strangely, to conclude that such a reading is 'unlikely to be the usua. one'. 43 
Christopher Lehmann-Haupt, however, considers that Ellis has intentionally created 
" Southern Humanities Review, 32: 4 (1998), ii-iv (jv). 
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an unrealistic world in order to prevent the reader from identifying with Bateman. He 
compares Ellis to 
a cartoonist trying to animate Tales From the Crypt, the comic book of the 
1950's that tried in its clumsy way to make black humor of human 
physicality. 
Since the people involved are unreal and the physiology of what is done to 
them impossible, it is not so difficult to conceive of their scenes as a Tom 
and Jerry cartoon with human body parts. 44 
Ellis himself has suggested as much in interview with Roger Cohen, saying that 
'the murdpr sequences are so over the top, so baroque in their violence, it seems hard 
to take them in a literal context'. 
45 
Equally difficult to take literally is the way other characters in the novel ignore 
all signs of Bateman's secret life. Taking some blood-soaked sheets to 'the Chinese 
dry cleaners I usually send my bloody clothes to', for example, Bateman is frustrated, 
not by any questions about what the stains are and how they got there, but by the fact 
that he cannot make the owner understand that the sheets are very expensive and 
fi must be cleaned care Ull Y. 
46 His problem, and it is a problem of far more significance 
in the novel than that of getting blood-stained sheets clean, is one of communication; 
he and the owner do not speak one another's language. Misunderstandings and 
failures of communication fill the novel. Having dinner with Paul Owen, Bateman 
intersperses his conversation with such comments as 'I'm utterly insane' and 'I like to 
44 'Books of The Times; Psycho: Whither Death Without LifeT, The New York Times, March 11 
199 1. Also available at http: //archives. nytimes. com/archives. Lehmann-Haupt gives as an example 
of physiological impossibility the infamous scene that involves 'a construction [made] out of a rat, a 
Habitrail and a female torso', to which might be added the use of a nail gun to fix a woman to the 
floor by her fingers and Bateman's carrying a severed head about on his erect penis. 
'Bret Easton Ellis Answers Critics of American Ps cho', New York Times, March 6,199 1. y 
46 American Psycho (London: Picador, 1991), pp. 81-82. Subsequent references appear in 
parentheses within the text. 
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dissect girls', but the other nmn, too drunk to listen properly, does not react (AP, 
p. 216). On other occasions, in nightclubs whose noise level prohibits conversation, 
Bateman is able to shout sadistic plans into the ears of potential victims who are 
unable to hear a word he is saying, as when he says to a girl serving him drinks, 'quite 
clearly but muffled by "Pump Up the Volume" and the crowd, "You are a fucking 
ugly bitch I want to stab to death and play around with your blood"' (AP, p. 59). 
Although it is possible to take such examples at face value - Bateman really 
says these things but they go unheard or misunderstood - Eflis introduces confusion 
as to what is real and what unreal, as when the detective, Kimball, turns up at 
Bateman's office to talk to him about Paul Owen's disappearance. He tells him that 
Owen's diary records that he was due to meet Marcus Halberstam on the night he 
vanished. Sensing a trap and giggling nervously (for he has recently hacked Owen to 
pieces with an axe), Bateman asks if Halberstarn has an alibi, only to be told that "'he 
was at Atlantis with Craig McDen-nott, Frederick Dibble, Harry Newman, George 
Butner and" - Kimball pauses, then looks up - "you... (AP, p. 274). In a way the 
reader expects this sort of mix-up, since all these young men are constantly mistaken 
for one another. As sightings of Owen in London increase, however, it becomes 
likelier that Bateman has fantasised murdering him. Having telephoned his lawyer, for 
example, leaving a message that constitutes a full confession, Bateman later sees him 
at a party. Typically, the lawyer, Harold Carnes, mistakes Bateman for someone else, 
and, much to Bateman's chagrin, teUs the man he thinks is cafled Davis that his joke 
would have been better if he had chosen someone who was less of a 'bloody ass- 
kisser [... ] a brown-nosing goody-goody' to be the supposed murderer (AP, p. 387). 
When Bateman screams that he has, indeed, kifled Owen and many other people 
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bes 
be ides, Carries responds that this is not possible, as he had dinner with Paul Owen in 
London some days before (AP, p. 388). 
Ellis is careful to maintain this series of ambiguities throughout his novel. 
Perhaps Bateman is delusional, fantasising these murders; perhaps he inhabits a world 
so evil that nobody really cares what he does; perhaps he is just lucky never to be 
caught; perhaps neither he nor anyone else in the novel is intended to 'exist' in a 
traditional novelistic sense, the whole being merely an exploration of the issues of 
surface and artifice. The single element that remains unchanged in all these possible, 
but contradictory, interpretations of the novel is the lack of a coherent sense of self 
and communication with an other. This holds true on a metafictional level as well as 
within the narrative; if Ellis is underlining the fact that none of his characters are real 
and that coherent communication among them is therefore neither meaningful nor 
necessary, he is denying the reader the sense of the novel as a 'self (as Bakhtin 
would have put it) with which he or she can communicate in any traditional sense. 
This issue is addressed, often tangentially, by many critics. As Applegate and 
Applegate argue, 'the violence in American Psycho does not seem to be what 
disturbs critics most; [... Bateman] is never caught, never punished. What seems to 
threaten many readers is that Ellis created a monster but never put him to rest' 
(Applegate and Applegate, p. 11). Rosenblatt particularly sees this as an important 
defect in the novel. 
Of course you will be stunned to learn that the book goes nowhere. 
Characters do not exist, therefore do not develop. Bateman has no 
motivation for his madness [ ... ] No plot 
intrudes upon the pages. Bateman 
is never brought to justice, suggesting that even justice was bored. 
(NYTimes) 
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Lehmann-Haupt, while offering a more considered analysis of the novel, agrees 
with this, saying that 
American Psycho lacks [ ... ]a moral framework. Mr. Ellis teases us near the 
end into believing that Patrick Bateman may finally be brought to justice. 
But he isn't; at the books close, he is still at large. The author is saying that 
today such monstrous criminality is indistinguishable from the general 
behaviour of society. But Mr. Ellis's true offense is to imply that the human 
mind has grown so corrupt that it can no longer distinguish between form 
and content. (NYTimes) 
By this the critic seems to mean that the problem with American Psycho is not 
simply that it -uses violence to suggest that no one human activity is more important 
or meaningful than any other. By presenting graphic violence, without further 
comment, in the same tone as descriptions of popular music or designer clothes, Ellis 
is breaking a narrative rather than a social taboo; the suggestion is that the novelist 
may describe as many social ifls as he or she desires, so long as the 'form' has a 
certain moral integrity. This, of course, is exactly the point that leads to Fortier's 
assessment of the novel as 'a quintessential postmodern narrative'; Ellis not only 
dismantles the cultural rules concerning appropriate content, he also dismantles the 
literary rules that enable the reader to orientate his- or herself with respect to that 
content. 
Freccero argues that 'for these critics, there needs to be an inner truth', but that 
the novel demonstrates that there is no truth to be found beneath 
appearances, and the accumulation of Bateman's successful, unnoticed, and 
ultimately deeply unsatisfying torture-murders that do not teach him - or the 
rest of us - anything, proves this point. 
Even Bateman's confession [ ... 
] succeeds in revealing absolutely 
nothing, not because anything remains hidden, but because there is no truth 
to be revealed, extracted, and expiated in confession. (Freccero, p. 52) 
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The author of a 1965 Time essay, 'The Black Humorists' cites, among others, 
James Purdy as one of the main exemplars of nineteen-sixties Black Humor. Purdy's 
novel, Cabot Wright Begins (1964), is in many ways sirnflar to American Psycho, in 
that its central character is a well-educated, wealthy, serial rapist. As Ellis does with 
Bateman, Purdy uses Wright, and those around him, to satirise contemporary 
American culture. As the author of the essay notes, 
Purdy has an uncanny ear for American cliche, both the chch6s of speech 
with which people eliminate the need for thinking and feeling and the equally 
standardized clich6 roles in which people take refuge from their motives. He 
gets his effects by subtle dislocations and dizzying juxtaposition of these 
clich6s, so that his characters talk past each other, and soon every human act 
seems equally ain-Jess and unlikel Y. 47 
This effect, the use of banality to avoid or confuse real communication (and, 
indeed, identification) between characters is, of course, familiar to readers of 
American Psycho, but there is an important difference between the two novels which 
calls into question the status of Cabot Wright Begins as black, or at least as entropic, 
humour. The latter is, as the essayist observes, 'an exploration of psychological 
anesthesia, the inability to feel anything - sexually, sensually, emotionally, artistically 
or morally', but crucial-ly, at 'the book's end [Wright] is freed by learning, for the first 
time in his fife, to laugh unrestrainedly' (Time essay, pp. 6-7). This discovery of 
laughter, this beginning, is a revelation of hope both for Wright himself and for the 
culture that he represents, and is totally at odds with the inescapable circles 
experienced by Bateman, who never learns to laugh in this way. 
47 'The Black Humorists" in Pratt, pp. 3-9 (p. 7) ( orig. publ. in Time, 12 February, 1965). 
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Ellis has claimed in interview that everything he writes is a monologue . 
4' This is 
a crucial observation for our understanding of American Psycho, as it highlights the 
solipsism that precludes the possibility of communication between characters, of the 
shared laughter that enables transcendence of untenable convention. Instead, the 
novel abounds with laughter that is either false or threatening. Unable to orientate 
himself witbin his world, Bateman is constantly trying to attain what he perceives as 
heaven - by wearing the 'right' clothes and pursuing the 'right' activities - while 
being constantly haunted by the hell of the degradation and corruption that seems the 
only alternative. Trying to get a reservation at the exclusive restaurant Dorsia, for 
example, Bateman's hopes are raised when a pause at the other end of the line makes 
him think the maitre d' is looking for a cancellation, 'but then he starts giggling, low 
at first but it builds to a high-pitched crescendo of laughter which is abruptly cut off 
when he slams down the receiver' (AP, p. 75). This sense of exclusion from the 
world he just wants 'to ... 
fit 
... 
in' to (AP, p. 237), is contrasted with the world of 
prostitutes, beggars and homosexuals that terrifies and angers him, and again 
threatening, mocking laughter is what illustrates this: 
A couple of skinny faggots walk by while I'm at a phone booth checking my 
messages, staring at my reflection in an antique store's window. One of 
them whistles at me, the other laughs: a high, fey, horrible sound. A torn 
playbill from Les Miserables tumbles down the cracked, urine-stained 
sidewalk. (AP, p. 128) 
At other times Bateman seems disturbed by the falseness and superficiality of the 
world he is trying so hard to inhabit in a meaningful way, as when Evelyn, his fianc6e, 
'laughs, actually says, "Ha-ha-ha but she's serious, not joking' (AP, p. 122), and 
48 Mark Amerika and Alexander Laurence, 'Interview with Bret Easton Ellis', The Write Stuff, 
http: //altx. com/interviewsibret. easton. ellis. html. 
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when Paul Owen 'keeps guffawing, which I find totally upsetting' (AP, p. 216). 
Bateman's own laugh, in consequence, is equally unreal, and becomes merely the 
stereotypical laughter of the lunatic. He claims to 'laugh maniacally' while being 
given a facial, although the beautician, 'leaning close to the face' does not seem to 
hear him (AP, p. 116), and, having just forced a woman to have an abortion, he 
4 resist [s] the impulse to start cackling hysterically' (AP, p. 38 1). In this, Bateman is 
like Humbert in the early stages of Lolita, mocked from both above and below, with 
only a self-created persona - that of a 'maniac' - to protect him from chaos. 
Bateman's self-image might even be modelled on Humbert's, as, for example, when 
he draws a frightened waitress towards him, 'grinning like an idiot, but a handsome 
idiot' (AP, p. 47) . 
49Because Bateman never learns the value of 'laugh[ing] 
unrestrainedly', however, the epiphany that frees Humbert is denied him. 
Ellis does, nevertheless, tease the reader with the possibility of a laughing 
relationship, as Vonnegut does in Slaughterhouse-5. Potential Transcendent Fools 
appear in Bateman's relationships with Tim Price and, to a lesser extent, with his 
secretary, Jean. Jean has fallen in love with Bateman, something that he recognises 
and initiaRy mocks, as we see in his reaction to her at work: 
She places the file on top of the desk before asking, "Doin' the crossword? " 
dropping the g in "doing" -a pathetic gesture of intimacy, an irritating stab 
at friendliness. I gag inwardly, then nod without looking up at her. 
(AP, p. 257) 
As the novel progresses, however, her genuine affection and concern for him 
prompts not a return of intimacy, but a series of desperate, self-analytical monologues 
49 Compare this, for example, to Humbert's description of himself as having 'a cesspoolful of rotting 
monsters behind his slow boyish smile' (Lo, p. 45). 
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that explore the very reasons for his inability to reciprocate human feeling. Having 
confessed that she is in love with him, Jean, embarrassed, tells Bateman, 'I can't 
pretend these feelings don't exist, can IT, which provokes the fol-lowing: 
... there is an idea of a Patrick Bateman, some kind of abstraction, but 
there is no real me, only an entity, something illusory, and though I can hide 
my cold gaze and you can shake my hand and feel flesh grippmig yours and 
maybe you can even sense our lifestyles are probably comparable: I simply 
am not there. [... ] My pain is constant and sharp and I do not hope for a 
better world for anyone. In fact I want my pain to be inflicted on others. I 
want no one to escape. But even after admitting this - and I have, countless 
times, in just about every act I've committed - and coming face-to-face with 
these truths, there is no catharsis. I gain no deep knowledge about myself, 
no new understanding can be extracted from my telling. There has been no 
reason fpr me to tell you any of this. This confession has meant nothing ... (AP, p. 377) 
Instead of intimacy, the closest Bateman can achieve is a negative fonn of 
affection; he does not kill Jean. Incapable of humour, of the intimacy of shared 
laughter, he is, I would argue, therefore incapable of love. 
In a sirnflar way, Ellis sets up the potential for a revelatory relationship between 
Bateman and Tim Price, whose ranting opens the novel. Showing Bateman that day's 
newspaper, Price complains that 
'In one issue - in one issue - let's see here ... strangled models, babies 
thrown from tenement rooftops, kids killed in the subway, a Communist 
rally, Mafia boss wiped out, Nazis' - he flips through the pages excitedly - 
'baseball players with AIDS, more Mafia shit, gridlock, the homeless, 
various maniacs, faggots dropping like flies in the streets, surrogate mothers 
r ... ] and the joke is, the punch line is, it's all in this city - nowhere else, just here, it sucks'. (AP, p. 4) 
Bateman, able to see all the filth and suffering around him, reacts by inflicting 
the pain he feels onto others in an attempt to cope with it. Price, although he too is 
aware of conditions outside their closed and privileged world, responds, not by overt 
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acts of violence, but by a symbolic descent into hell. Early in the novel he and 
Bateman are in a nightclub called Tunnel, constructed out of an old subway station 
with the track and tunnel intact but railed off. Typically, Bateman does not 
understand the significance of what Price is saying. 
'I'm leaving, ' Price shouts. 'I'm getting out. ' 
'Leaving whaff I shout back, confused. 
I This. ' he shouts, referring to, I'm not sure but I think, his double Stoli. 
'Don't, ' I tell him. 'I'll drink it. ' 
'Listen to me Patrick,, ' he screams. 'I'm leaving. ' 
'Where toT I really am confused. 'You want me to find RicardoT 
'I'm leaving,, ' he screams. 'I ... am ... 
leaving! ' (AP, p. 60) 
Unable to make Bateman understand, Price gives up and 'just keeps staring 
past the railings, trying to find the point where the tracks come to an end, find what 
fies behind the blackness' (AP, p. 6 1). Finding him a bore, Bateman wanders off 
through the crowd, until an acquaintance draws his attention to something behind 
him. Turning, he sees 
Price perched on the rails, trying to balance himself, and someone has 
handed him a champagne glass and drunk or wired he holds both arms out 
and closes his eyes, as if blessing the crowd. Behind him the strobe light 
continues to flash off and on and off and on and the smoke machine is going 
like crazy, gray mist billowing up, enveloping him. He's shouting something 
but I can't hear what [... ] and during a perfectly timed byte of silence I can 
hear Price shout, 'Goodbye! ' and then, the crowd finally paying attention, 
'Fuckheads! ' Gracefully he twists his body around and hops over the railing 
and leaps onto the tracks and starts running, the champagne flute bobbing as 
he holds it out to his side. He stumbles once, twice, with the strobe fight 
flashing, in what looks like slow motion, but he regains his composure 
before disappearing into blackness. (AP, pp. 61-62) 
As in the scene with the stove-valve in Catch-22, in which Orr tries to reveal 
his secret but Yossarian does not understand him, Price here seems desperate for 
Bateman to grasp the importance of what he is doing, to listen to him. In a world 
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where communication is impossible and identity confused, this is a crucial attempt,, 
and it is significant that Price calls Bateman by name; these two characters alone in 
the novel never mistake one another for somebody else. Bateman responds to Price 
as Yossarian initiafly does to Orr, and as Sergeant Knight does when he tefls the story 
of Orr in the lifeboat; he laughs at him. When Price says he is leaving, Bateman's 
closed worjd provides him with only two possible destinations, beyond which he is 
unable to see; "'Where to? " I'm still laughing, still confused, still shouting. "Morgan 
Stanley? Rehab? What?.. (AP, p. 60). Like Yossarian, though, Bateman perceives 
something eerie, otherworldly, in what Price is doing, and, while the other clubbers 
merely stand and applaud, he fights his way through the crowd shouting at him to 
come back. Bateman's description of Price, blessing the crowd, surrounded by 
flashing fights and billowing smoke, is reminiscent of the Hollywood image of an Old 
Testament prophet. His flock, however, treat him merely as entertainment, laughing 
and clapping, and so - anointing them ironically with their own chosen holy water, 
champagne - he abandons them and runs into the darkness. 
Also like Orr, Price is barely mentioned again in the novel until its end. 
Although Bateman thinks he can see 'a smudge on his forehead' (AP, p. 384), Price 
is otherwise unchanged when he reappears, as Bateman puts it 'for the sake of form' 
(AP, p. 383). Here again Ellis teases the reader. Because of the ambiguities present 
throughout the novel, it is unclear whether Bateman means social or narrative form. 
Only the latter really makes any sense in the context; Ellis has led the reader to expect 
the triumphal return of a prophet, so he provides it, only to undercut it immediately 
afterwards. Price's absence is never explained. His reappearance, rather than 
clarifying anything for Bateman (as news of Orr's escape does for Yossarian), serves 
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only to confuse matters further. 'Where have you beenT, Bateman asks when Price 
suddenly turns up at his office. 
'Oh, just making the rounds. ' He smiles. 'But hey, I'm back. 
'Far out. ' I shrug, confused. 'How was ... iff 'It was ... surprising. ' He shrugs too. 'It was ... depressing. ' 'Hey, how are you, BatemanT he asks. 
'I'm ok#y, ' I tell him, swallowing. 'Just ... existing. ' 'You've been gone, like, forever, Tim. What's the storyT I ask, again 
noticing the smudge on his forehead, though I get the feeling that if I asked 
someone else if it was truly there, he (or she) would just say no. 
(AP, p. 384) 
Although the repetition of 'it' implies that nothing of any consequence wifl be 
revealed by Price's return, he displays the Mark of Cain that identifies him as a 
scapegoat, while the fact that only Bateman can see it suggests that he will take the 
role of Protagonist, learning Price's 'story' so that he may tell it to others. 
Several pages later, however, in the last passages of the novel, a group of 
friends that includes Bateman and Price sits in a bar called Harry's watching an old 
Ronald Reagan speech on the television. Only Price seems disturbed by this, although 
it is still unclear whether Bateman understands him or not. 
The first and really only one to complain is Price, who, though I think he's 
bothered by something else, uses this opportunity to vent his frustration, 
looks inappropriately stunned, asks, 'How can he lie like that? How can he 
pufl that shit? ' (AP, p. 396) 
Effis, through Price, suggests a direct link between Bateman's acts of mayhem 
and the consumer culture of 1980s America, personified by Reagan. Price is horrified 
that Reagan 
207 
'looks so ... normal. He seems so ... out of it. So ... undangerous' [ ... 
] 
'I just don't get how someone, anyone, can appear that way yet be 
involved in such total shit, ' Price says He takes out a cigar and studies 
it sadly. (AP, p. 397) 
Although the parallel is obvious, Bateman's extreme physical violence 
mirroring the damage such men as Reagan are perceived to have done to their 
society, in a move that takes American Psycho out of the reahn of traditional satire, 
the formerdoes nothing to suggest a solution to the latter. Ellis is showing that 
Bateman and Reagan are interchangeable, and that nothing can be done about either. 
Not only does the Mark of Cain that Price seems to bear (and which is repeated three 
times, implying that it should have significance) remain unexplained, the conversation 
continues, 
'How can you be so fucking, I don't know, cool, about iff Price, to 
whom something really eerie has obviously happened, sounds genuinely 
perplexed [ ... ] 
'Oh brother. ' Price won't let it die. Took. ' he starts, trying for a rational 
appraisal of the situation. 'He presents himself as a harmless old codger. But 
inside 
... ' He stops. My interest picks up, flickers only briefly. 'But inside 
... ' Price can't finish the sentence, can't add the last two words he needs: doesn't matter. I'm both disappointed and relieved for him. (AP, p. 397) 
The answer, as Freccero argues, is that there is no answer, 'there is no truth 
beneath appearances'. The conversation continues in the same superficial vein as 
many throughout the novel, and the revelation that Ellis leads the reader to think 
Price will provide (and which, in other novels in this thesis, takes the form of shared 
laughter) is reduced to 'a slight shrug and [a] sigh' and the sign in Harry's that reads 
'THIS IS NOT AN EXIT' (AP, p. 399). Bateman remains trapped within the 
limitations of the secret revealed to Yossarian by Snowden's entrails, his acts of 
violence showing him nothing more than that 'man [or woman] is matter'. Without 
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the perspective, the laughter, that Price might have provided, Bateman is given no 
way out of his endless cycle of meaningless violence. Given that these are also the 
fimal words of the novel, we find ourselves, as readers, equally trapped by this 
nihilistic conclusion. There is no way out of this text, no way to assimilate and so 
transcend Bateman's sense of hopelessness. 
David Price's analysis of American Psycho is interesting in this context. 
Applying the theory developed in The Dialogic Imagination, Price argues that Ellis's 
book illustrates all but one of the constituents of the novel as outlined by Bakhtin 
(only polyphony is absent): it contains and parodies other forrns of discourse; it 'has 
maximum contact with the present'; it presents 'multi-languaged consciousness' as 
opposed to one authorial discourse; it is possible to read the discourses present in the 
novel as being the utterance of someone other than Ellis himself (Price, p. 323). 
Using these techniques, Price argues, Ellis builds up a comprehensive and interrelated 
series of parodies of the dominant discourses of 1980s American culture, using 
violence to force the reader's attention to the comparisons he is drawing. Thus, Price 
concludes, American Psycho fits within the traditional pattern of a satirical novel, 
encouraging confrontation with society's ifls so that they may be improved. 
The more interesting aspect of Price's analysis comes, however, when he 
moves on to read American Psycho in the context of another of Bakhtin's works, 
Rabelais and His World. Price's contention is that 'in American Psycho His 
attempts to destroy the culture he represents', and he thus sees similarities between 
Ellis's use of violence and Bakhtin's idea of the 'carnivalesque', developed from 
analysis of Rabelais's Gargantua and Pantagruel. As Price points out, 'the irritation 
that both Rabelais and Ellis feel with respect to their cultures becomes translated into 
an outpouring of violence', but he dismisses the crucial difference between the forms 
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that this violence takes. Bakhtin's interpretation of the violence in Rabelais concerns 
the 'grotesque body', the con-& presentation of, and emphasis on, the processes of 
copulation, birth and death. This shows the body 'in the act of becoming, in a state of 
transformation', which, as Price points out, accounts for the 'carnival laughter' that 
Bakhtin identifies (Price, p. 334). Rather in the manner of Laughter of Apocalypse, 
this communal, shared laughter, though ambivalent, is therefore at root positive; it 
celebrates the possibility for transformation and transcendence while at the same time 
attacking the dominant, and corrupt, ideology. The profound difference between this 
approach and Ellis's is that the violence in American Psycho is actually a product of 
the dominant ideology, not a reaction against it. Although Price notices this, saying 
that 'in Rabelais, violence is used to destroy the dominant ideology', while 'in Ellis, 
the violence of the dominant ideology is used in a hyperbolic, exaggerated style and it 
repels us', he resists drawing the obvious conclusion that 'attempt[ing] to destroy the 
culture he represents' is exactly what Ellis is not doing. The very absence of carnival 
laughter in American Psycho precludes the possibility of either destruction (with its 
implications of rebirth) or improvement. 
In effect, Bateman never passes beyond the position of Made Fool. He takes 
the role (defined by Martineau in the Introduction to this thesis) of the jester Hans 
Miesko, at whose funeral 'the preacher exhorted his congregation to treat such 
creatures kindly and use them as looking-glasses for their own weaknesses' 
(Welsford, pp. 148-49). Bateman, therefore, merely reflects, with horrifying 
distortion, the true conditions of his society. Moreover, he is like the medieval clown 
Til Eulenspiegel ('Owhnirror'), whose name clearly refers to his role as a reflecting 
medium for society, but whose reputation was formed in the main by his 
predisposition for violent and humiliating practical jokes (Welsford, p. 46). If one 
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takes Bateman's acts of torture and murder to be an extreme form of practical joke, it 
is possible to interpret these acts as mirroring, without further comment or 
judgement, the violence of his society. As a Made rather than a Transcendent Fool, 
therefore, Bateman (and, through him, Ellis) is offering merely a representation of 
1980s America, suggesting thereby that there is no way out of this meaningless cycle 
of corruption. 
Closing Time 
Closing Time (1994), Heller's long-awaited sequel to Catch-22, while, naturally, 
-having much 
in common with its predecessor, differs from it in several important 
respects. 50 The first of these is its setting. Where the action of Catch-22 occurs 
chiefly in the relatively self-contained and separate wartime community on the island 
of Pianosa, Closing Time is set in America, chiefly in New York, in the 1980s. 
Secondly, Closing Time contains elements of the fantastic and the supernatural 
entirely absent from the first novel. Thirdly, Heller has introduced many references to 
other works of literature and to music, and has given Yossarian ambitions to be a 
writer, playing overtly with ideas of the fictional and the real. Finally, and, I shall 
argue, underpinning these first three, Heller has removed the laughing relationship 
that, as I show in Chapter One, is so crucial to Catch-22. To give clarity to my 
discussion of these themes, an initial synopsis of the complex plot is necessary. 
50 Despite the mass of Catch-22 criticism, Closing Time has provoked very little critical response, 
and Heller, up until his death in December 1999, firmly resisted offering his own explanations of the 
text. 
211 
Yossarian, now in his seventies and twice divorced, is living in a luxurious 
apartment building close to New York's Port Authority Bus Terminal (PABT), 
where drug addicts, pan-handlers and prostitutes live in the dark stairwells 
surrounded by their own filth. He works as a part-time consultant for M&M 
Enterprises, whose offices are in the old Tirne-Life building. Albert Tappman, the 
group chaplain in Catch-22, now living in retirement in Kenosha, Wisconsin, has 
started to urinate heavy water (deuterium oxide), a main ingredient of nuclear 
armaments, and is 'disappeared' by a shadowy government department to be 
observed and interrogated in an underground railway system that, apparently, 
stretches beneath the entire country. Contacted by a distressed Mrs Tappman, 
Yossarian attempts throughout the novel to find and save the chaplain, while at the 
same time working with Milo Minderbinder and ex-PFC Wintergreen, who run 
M&M Enterprises, to sell to the goverm-nent a stealth bomber that, running on the 
very power that the chaplain is producing, could destroy the world. Meanwhile, 
Yossarian is also asked to suggest a suitably fashionable venue for the huge society 
wedding between Milo's son, M2. and the daughter of some important multi- 
miflionaires, the Maxons. As a joke, Yossarian suggests the PABT - an idea which is 
leapt at as being suitably unusual and impressive - and spends a large part of the 
novel organising this wedding and exploring, for security purposes, a series of 
strange sub-basements beneath the bus terminal that do not appear on any of the 
maps. Also lying some levels beneath the PABT is an old Coney Island fairground, 
Steeplechase, which, still fully functional, has gradually sunk beneath the streets of 
the city, where it is run as a version of purgatory by its long-deceased proprietor, 
George C. Tilyou. In contrast to this demonic businessman, whom even Satan cafls 
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Mr. Tilyou, " is the mysterious private detective, Gaffney, whose apparent 
omnipresence and omniscience alternately worries and enrages Yossarian, and who 
may or may not be God. 
Alongside this surreal narrative occurs a more straightforward one, told by 
Sammy Singer, his best friend, Lew Rabinowitz, and Lew's wife, Claire. Sammy, a 
Coney Island Jew, was the young tail-gunner who, unnamed, fainted repeatedly as 
Yossarian tried to save Snowden in Catch-22. He is a widower, also living in an 
apartment in New York, having been, before his retirement, an advertising-promotion 
writer in the old Tirne-Life building now occupied by M&M Enterprises. Lew was as 
a young infantryman taken prisoner during the battle of the Bulge and kept in an 
, A., abandoned underground slaughterhouse in Dresden, where he witnessed the 
firebombing of that city by allied forces. Now a rich and successftil scrap metal 
dealer, he has moved out to the wealthy suburbs of Orange Valley, New York. Lew 
is dying of Hodgkin's disease, and visits Sammy in the city when he comes to consult 
his oncologist. Claire takes up Lew's story towards the end of the novel, after his 
death. Much of this narrative concerns the two men's memories of childhood in 
Coney Island, their wartime experiences and developing careers, and their thoughts 
about the onset of old age. 
These two narrative strands occur in roughly alternate chapters, and are kept 
stylistically independent of one another. Thus, an image is built up of two New Yorks 
- one realistic, one fantastic - occupying the same space and time. By placing the 
narratives side by side without giving either dominance over the text Hefler reminds 
the reader that the realistic and the fantastic are equally fictional. This strategy, 
" Closing Time (Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 113. Subsequent references appear in parentheses 
within the text. 
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though unusual, provides the reader with no real difficulties, as there are accepted 
traditions in place for the interpretation of realistic and fantastic texts; one could by 
this means read Closing Time as actually containing two novels, each from a different 
genre. However, Heller further undermines the reader's expectations by having the 
two narratives interrelate at certain points in the novel. Yossarian, for example, meets 
Sammy, appearing in the Coney Island narrative as a 'realistic' friend from Sammy's 
war years, while Lew, when he dies, disappears (naturally) from the Coney Island 
narrative, only to appear in the Yossarian narrative as one of the inhabitants of 
Tilyou's subterranean fairground. Moreover, by setting his novel in New York, 
Heller is able to confuse the reader's expectations still ftulher by introducing 
elements of autobiography. Heller, also a Coney Island Jew, and of the same 
generation as his central characters, appears in his own text as 'little Joey Heller', a 
childhood friend of Sammy's and Lew's. 52 As David Craig points out, citing an 
interview between Heller and Barbara Gelb, 
of the many autobiographical details and observations, Heller himself says 
that they supply a factual dimension to an essentially fictional work. Indeed 
they do, but they also inextricably connect the novelist and the novel, 
making him simultaneously an embodied and a hovering presence in the 
novel. " 
Although they five in 'different' New Yorks, Yossarian and Sammy have much 
in common. They both five alone, they both have sons called Michael about whom 
52 While Catch-22 is, of course, partly based on Heller's own experiences, it also falls within the 
American novelistic tradition of setting an allegorical text in a foreign land, thus distancing 
American readers from it, as, for example, James does with Daisy Miller and Poe does with many of 
his gothic tales. 
53 Tilling at Mortality: Narrative Strategies in Joseph Heller's Fiction (Detroit: Wayne State 
University Press, 1997), p. 213. Craig is referring to 'Catching Joseph Heller' New York Times 
Magazine, 4 March 1979. 
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they worry (Sammy's, a stepson, commits suicide), and they both worry about 
getting old and dying. Between them they echo many of the concerns expressed by 
Yossarian alone in Catch-22. Sammy, for example, remembering how the war was at 
first perfect for him, 'dangerous and safe, exactly as I'd hoped' describes how 
Not until I saw a kid my own age, Snowden, bleed and die just a few 
yards away from me in the back of a plane did the truth finally dawn that 
they were trying to kill me too, really trying to kin me. People I did not 
know were shooting cannons at me almost every time I went up on a 
mission to drop bombs on them, and it was not fumy anymore. After that I 
wanted to go home. There were other things that weren't funny either. 
(CT, pp. 227-28) 
These sentiments repeat almost verbatim Yossarian's feelings early in Catch- 
22, when, having attempted to argue with Clevinger that everyone is trying to kiR 
hini, he Points out that 
strangers he didn't know shot at him with cannons every time he flew up 
into the air to drop bombs on then-4 and it wasn't ftmny at all. And if that 
wasn't funny, there were lots of things that weren't even funnier. 
(C-22, pp. 17-18) 
Early in Closing Time Yossarian has been malingering in the same hospital that, 
unknown to him, Lew visits for his chemotherapy. He is trying to escape not warfare 
this time, but old age, and notes on leaving that 
outside the hospital it was still going on. Men went mad and were rewarded 
with medals. Interior decorators were culture heroes, and fashion designers 
were the social superiors of their clientele. (CT, p. 49) 
This again is an almost direct quotation from Catch-22, this time from the 
beginning of the chapter from which the above passage is taken. Driven out of the 
hospital by an affable Texan whom nobody can stand, Yossarian notices that 'outside 
215 
the hospital the war was still going on. Men went mad and were rewarded with 
medals' (C-22, p. 16). Thus Heller draws attention within both narratives to the 
social allegory he created in Catch-22. Instead of using the bureaucracy of warfare as 
an analogy to criticise his society, in Closing Time he uses references to his own 
allegorical novel to criticise that society directly. By doing this from both narrative 
viewpoints, Heller conflates his narrative voices, leaving the reader with no real idea 
of who is speaking these words. 
This introduction of his own previous work into the novel is a more complex 
strategy than is normally to be found in a sequel, as Catch-22 is only one of many 
novels that Closing Time refers to. Again, this occurs in both narratives. Lew, for 
example, as a prisoner of war, not only meets a man 'whose name was Vonnegut and 
who later wrote books' (CT, p. 278), but also a 'good soldier Schweik' (CT, p. 122, 
from Jaroslav Hasek's novel of that name). Lew's status as a 'realistic' fictional 
character is undermined, in different ways, by both these examples. The reader must 
attempt to rationalise the relationship between a real man (Vonnegut), a realistic 
character (Lew), and an aflegorical character (Schweik). 
Yossarian has long had ambitions to write a play and a comic novel. The play 
would portray Charles Dickens's dysfunctional domestic arrangements in terms of 
that author's most famous example of 'sentimental good feeling', A Christmas Carol. 
His plan for a novel, in a similar vein, is derived from Thomas Mann's Doctor 
Faustus,, and concerns the legal battle between Mann's heirs and those of his creation 
Adrian LeverkWm over the rights to Leverkiihn's opus Apocalypse (CT, p. 162). The 
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status of this fictional piece of music becomes increasingly confused as Yossarian 
begins actually to hearit . 
54 
Heller's use of setting, the relationship between the real and the surreal, and the 
interrelation of fictional worlds, then, all serve to disorientate the reader. No one 
reading strategy is sufficient to encompass the events of the novel, and one is left 
without any accepted means of navigating oneself through the text. The various 
techniques Heller employs are similar to Ellis's sustained use of ambiguity, therefore, 
and both texts overtly confront and question the status of the novel as fiction, and the 
reader's relationship with it. Before I go on to analyse how this affects the end of 
Closing Time, which carries this sense of disorientation through to its logical 
conclusion, I shall first explore how Heller's use of laughter in the novel underpins 
these techniques. 
As in American Psycho, there are many examples in Closing Time of mirthless 
laughter. M2 develops a 'traumatic aversion' to, among other things, people who 
'smiled an awful lot, even when nothing humorous was said' (CT, p. 192). The two 
'bullying interrogators' who question the Chaplain are described, one as having 
'manic eyes that seemed ignited by hilarity(emphasis added), the other as a man 
'who smiled and winked a lot with no hint of merriment' (CT, p. 264). Raul, one of 
the agents who accompany Yossarian in an investigation of the sub-basements 
beneath the PABT, 'joked [ ... ] but 
did not laugh' (CT, p. 339). 
54 James Nagel, in his analysis of Heller's 'Note Cards', the means by which the author planned 
Catch-22, notes that Heller had originally intended an episode in which Yossarian and Dunbar plan 
to write a Herningwayesque war novel about their experiences. The fact that Heller dropped this idea 
from his first novel, only to return to and elaborate on it in Closing Time is further evidence that a 
major theme of the latter, unlike Catch-22, is the status of fiction itself. 'The Catch-22 Note Cards' 
Studies in the Novel 8 (1976), 394-405 (repr. in Nagel 1984, pp. 51-6 1). See also Nagel's 'Two 
Brief Manuscript Sketches: Heller's Catch-22', Modern Fiction Studies, 20 (1974), 221-24. 
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Also appearing, frequently associated with the strange occupants of the PABT, 
is an eerie, demonic laughter that haunts much of the Yossarian narrative. In the bus 
terminal's police station, for example, 
even the prisoners seemed ideally acclimated to the turbulent environment 
and vigorous procedures. Many were bored, others were amused and 
contemptuous, some ranted crazily. Several young women were hooting 
with laughter and shrieking obscenities brazenly in taunting debauchery, 
baiting and incensing the frustrated guards, who had to endure and cope 
with them without retaliating. (CT, p. 89) 
One recurring image in Closing Time combines the ideas of mirthless and 
demonic laughter; the advertising hoarding in front of Tilyou's fairground, which, like 
the eyes of Dr T. J. Eckleberg in The Great Gatsby, develops increased significance as 
the novel develops. 
Bold on every front of Steeplechase was the unforgettable trademark, a 
striking, garish picture in cartoon form of the grotesque, pink, flat, grinning 
face of a subtly idiotic man, practically on fire with a satanic hilarity and 
showing, incredibly, in one artless plane, a mouth sometimes almost a city 
block wide and an impossible and startling number of immense teeth. 
(CT, p. 12) 
The Steeplechase Park is established as a microcosm of a society that makes no 
distinction between participant and audience, between victim and victimiser. 
Yossarian (although no other evidence is given to suggest that he comes from New 
York) thinks about the ride he remembers best; the Human Pool Table. 
There, an iron handrail circling the viewing enclosure had been rigged 
electrically to administer stinging shocks of harrnless voltage to unwary 
patrons whenever one of the red-suited attendants in green jockey caps 
thought the timing appropriate. That sudden onrush of tiny prickling needles 
bursting into the hands and arms was intolerable and memorable, and all 
who observed that half second of fright and panicked embarrassment of 
others laughed; the victims laughed too, afterward. There was laughter 
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bursting from loudspeakers as well. Not many blocks away were freak 
shows featuring people with small heads. (CT, p. 99) 
This strange juxtaposition of images - laughter at others' discomfort, laughter 
of embarrassment, mechanical, unreal laughter, and freak shows - suggests that 
laughter has lost its power to orientate and guide. Those watching, and laughing at, 
the discomfort of others as they are thrown willy-nilly about the 'Human Pool Table" 
become themselves discomforted and laughed at, and the reader is similarly 
disorientated by being asked to assimilate his or her own laughter at these victims 
i with the contemporary resistance to finding freaks fimny. 
The ambivalence of fairground laughter is echoed in a series of confrontations 
that Lew has with Gen-nan soldiers during the war. The sour punch-line of Lew's 
recurrent joke - having engaged Germans in conversation in their own language - is 
to tell them that he is a Jew so that he may watch their reaction (see, for example, 
CT, pp. 43-44, pp. 121-28, p. 278). As Lew remarks bitterly after one of these 
exchanges, 'when I saw him fold I wanted to laugh out loud, although I didn't find it 
ftmy' (CT, p. 124). 
Crucially, Yossarian seems affected by this general loss of meaningful laughter. 
Early in the novel, when Yossarian is released from hospital and goes home with 
r___* 
thend and ex-lover, Frances Beach, she notices a change in him and remarks, 'You 
sound so bitter these days. You used to be funnier' (CT, p. 52). 
Yossarian seems to have become completely absorbed by Catch-22, now 
represented by M&M Enterprises, and the bitterness that Frances notices reflects his 
knowledge of this. This vast multinational, which eventual-ly controls even the 
government, is now jointly run by Milo Minderbinder, the mess officer in Catch-22 
who began the company as a means of providing food for the squadron, and ex-PFC 
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Wintergreen, who, as a mailroom clerk, had enormous power during the war, since 
he simply destroyed those messages he did not like. Between them, these two 
characters personified the principles of Catch-22 in the earlier novel - Milo's 
syndicate representing the impersonal and unstoppable power of capitalism for which 
Catch-22 is an analogy, Wintergreen representing its arbitrary power over language. 
Yossarian, therefore, seems to be in the same position as at the start of Catch-22, but 
in Closing Time, although he occasionally feels uncomfortable about his situation, he 
no longer rebels and is therefore unable to take the role of Protagonist. When Milo 
and Wintergreen beat Yossarian in a logically illogical exchange typical of the way 
Catch-22 functions, for example, he is 'enraged with himself for being bested in 
argument. It never used to happen that way' (CT, p. 320). M&M Enterprises, 
therefore, seems, by its association with Catch-22, to act as an Institution. 
Similarly, the demonic laughter that recurs throughout Closing Time seems to 
suggest the presence of an Apocalyptic Fool. Heller uses echoes from other texts to 
reinforce this idea. While he overtly refers to the work of Dante, Mann and Wagner 
in his novel, the influence of Hermann Hesse's Steppenwolf (1927) is also evident. 
Harry Haller, the wolf of the title, is a scholar and writer who is constantly plagued 
by 'the laughter of the immortals', most often expressed by his long-dead heroes 
Goethe and Mozart. " Harry enters a nightmare, visionary world, the whole purpose 
of which, as the demonic Pablo tells him, is 'to teach [him] to laugh', principally at 
himself (Steppenwoýf, p. 206). His sin has been, he is told, in taking both himself and 
Art too seriously. Consequently, he is shown a mirror in which his hidden self - the 
evil Steppenwolf - is revealed to him, and which he can destroy by laughing at 
it 
55 Steppenwoýf, trans. by Basil Creighton, (rev. by Walter Sorell) (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965), 
p. 18 1. 
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(Steppenwolf, p. 207). Although he finds this liberating, Harry is unable to summon 
an equivalent attitude when asked to confront the grotesque face of the music he 
holds so dear. Mozart plays him, to his 'indescribable astonishment and horror', a 
piece of Handel corrupted by a 'mixture of bronchial slime and chewed rubber'. ) and 
Harry cries to the giggling composer, 
what are you doing Mozart? Do you reaffy mean to inflict this mess on me 
and yourself, this triumph of our day, the last victorious weapon in the war 
of extermination against art? (Steppenwolf, p. 246) 
Yoss, arian encounters similar confrontations in Closing Time. Investigating the 
sub-basements to the PABT, he eventuaRy enters Tilyou's fairground, where he finds 
himself in a hafl of mirrors, facing distorted images of himself 
He perceived that he was close to laughing, and the novelty of that surprise 
tickled him more. In no two mirrors were the deformities alike, in no one 
lens were the anomalies consistent. His authentic appearance, his objective 
structure, was no longer absolute. He had to wonder what he truly looked 
like. (CT, p. 342) 
Having apparently accepted the fact that his self, his image, is relative and 
ambiguous, Yossarian then finds that Steeplechase is peopled by authors whose art 
has destroyed them. Ernest Hemingway and William Faulkner sit in 'a packed area 
populated by heavy drinkers', Henry James, Joseph Conrad and Charles Dickens are 
in 'the area of those with late-life personality disorders embodying depression and 
nervous breakdowns', while Jerzy Kosinski, Virginia Woolf, Arthur Koestler and 
Sylvia Plath inhabit 'the populous zone of the suicides' (CT, p. 344). The impfication 
seems to be that Steeplechase stands for Dante's Inferno, the various authors being 
punished in different ways for their sin of attempting to reveal truths through 
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fiction. 56 Like Haller, Yossarian is unable to accept the implied corruption of art (or 
its necessary destruction of the artist) and responds 'inwardly with a "Fuck You! "' 
(CT, p. 344). 
This vision of hefl as a chaflenge to Yossarian's desire to be a writer - which 
evokes the Apocalyptic Fool's strategy of mocking the innermost feelings of its 
victims - is, however, undermined by the fact that heR is not presented in Closing 
Time as a stable entity. Instead, references to it appear throughout the text in a 
variety of conflicting guises. It is the PABT, for example, that is overtly identified 
with Dante's Inferno. Going down in one of the its lifts, Yossarian and his son 
discuss the similarity 
'Except, ' amended Michael, as they descended, 'the PABT building is out in 
the open. Like something normal. ' 
'That makes it worse, doesn't itT said Yossarian. 
'Than heH? ' Michael shook his head. [ ... ] 'We get used to this one, ' said 
Michael. 
'Doesn't that make it worseT Do you think in hell they don't get used to 
itT Yossarian added with a laugh. 'In Dante they answer questions, pause in 
their tortures to tell long stories about themselves. Nothing God did ever 
came out right, did it? Not hell. Not even evolution. ' (CT, pp. 232-33) 
A coherent concept of heff is undemiined in the novel, not only by Yossarian's 
observation, but by the confusion about what and where it is. Not only do the bus 
terminal and the fairground both function as hell, one above ground and one beneath, 
Tilyou's park is itself surrounded by the fields of pitch and wild animals that appear in 
Dante's original work, indicating a third possible site. Also, the levels beneath the 
PABT - which comprise a system of metal tunnels, staircases and lifts - are described 
ý6 There are also obvious associations between these passages and the scenes in which Ambrose 
considers the role of the author in the title story of Barth's Lost in the Funhouse (New York: 
Doubleday, 1968). 
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in terms that evoke the depiction of the demonic policemen's underground realm in 
Hann O'Brien's The Third Policeman 57 . This affusion reinforces the sense of 
ambiguity that these conflicting images create. In O'Brien's novel, the mechanical 
underworld is both heaven and hell. While it can provide anything that one wants, 
nothing can be taken back up to the surface, so one is either trapped underground 
with one'sd-esires, or free above without them. This ambiguity, moreover, 
undermines the idea of M&M Enterprises as a stable Institution, since eventually all 
the key spaces in the novel seem to merge into one another. Instead of the essential 
dialectic opposition of system and anti-system, therefore, the Time-Life building and 
the PABT, Steeplechase and the govermuent's railway system, form an Escheristic 
image of undelimited interrelation. 
As in Slaughterhouse-5, the issue of mortality is also treated in this ambiguous 
fashion. Immediately after his discussion with Michael, Yossarian's attention is drawn 
to 'a red-headed man with a walking stick and a loose green rucksack' whom he 
thinks he recognises from a 'famous Mann novefla': 
the mysterious red-haired man whose presence and swift disappearance had 
been unsettling to Gustav Aschenbach - one glimspse and he was out of 
sight, gone from the story. This man flaunted a fuming cigarette recklessly, 
as though equally contemptuous of him and cancer. And while Yossarian 
stared back at hiirn in defiant and indignant scrutiny, the man grinned 
brazenly, and Yossarian suffered an inner shudder. (CT, p. 235) 
Of course, in Death in Venice (1897), the novella referred to, this figure does 
not simply appear once and disappear - he continues to haunt Aschenbach, in 
different but recognisable guises, throughout the book and prefigures his death. In 
Mann's novella. while the character thus described has the imperious air and 
The Third Policeman ([n. p. ]: MacGibbon & Kee, 1967). 
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aggressive stare that so unnerves Yossarian, what Yossarian interprets as a brazen 
grin is described by Mann in the foflowing manner: 
whether it was because he was dazzled into a grimace by the setting sun or 
by reason of some permanent facial deformity, the fact was that his Ups 
seemed to be too short and were completely retracted from his teeth, so that 
the latter showed white and long between them, bared to the gun-is. 58 
This image caHs to mind (as, no doubt, Mann intended) the skuff more than the 
grin, although the two become inextricably linked in Heller's description, especially 
since it is 'a chorus of chittering laughter behind him', that attracts Yossarian's 
attention to the man. This chorus of disembodied giggling is again invoked by HeNer 
in the form of the other Mann novel that haunts Yossarian, Dr Faustus (1947). Lying 
in a motel bedroom listening to Wagner on the radio, Yossarian realises that a local 
electrical storm is interfering with the transmission. 
As that chorus of anvils diminished into static, he heard faintly in the 
static an illogical musical pandemonium of primitive wild laughter ascend 
through the scales in tune and in key and then, nebulously, beneath a hissing 
layer of electrical interference, a very different, lonely, lovely, angelic wail of 
a children's chorus in striking polyphonic lament he believed he recognised 
and could not place. He remembered the novel by Thomas Mann about 
which he had once thought of writing and wondered in his fuzziness if he 
was losing his bearings and dreaming he was listening to the Leverkuhn 
Apocalypse of which he had read. (CT, p. 309) 
When the narrator of Dr Faustus describes 'that pandemonium of laughter [] 
the mocking, exulting laughter of the Pit' that he hates and fears, noting that it is 
followed in Apocalypse by a chorus of children - 'a piece of cosmic music of the 
spheres, icily clear, glassily transparent' - he goes on to make a crucial observation; 
58 Thomas Mann, Death in Venice & Other Stories, trans. with intro. by David Luke (London: 
Vintage, 1998), p. 199. 
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that 'this piece, which has won, touched, and ravished even the reluctant, is in its 
musical essence, for him who has ears to hear and eyes to see, the devil's laughter all 
over again'. 59 That this confusion between cosmos and chaos, between heaven and 
heU, is an important theme in Closing Time, is prefigured by the combination of 
images in the 'chorus of chittering laughter' that draws Yossarian's attention, 
essentially, to death. Rather than simply disappearing, as he does in Death in Venice, 
the man with the skullish grin that confronts Yossarian is obscured by 
a long pearl-white limousine with smoked windows [ ... ] 
longer than a 
hearse, with a swarthy driver. When the limousine drove forward again, he 
saw wide streaks of red on the ground disfigured by tire treads, like blood 
dripping from the wheels, and the man with red hair and green rucksack was 
gone. (CT, p. 235) 
This image provides another echo between the Yossarian and Coney Island 
narratives. Lew,, refusing to travel by ambulance, is in the habit of travelling to 
hospital for his treatment 'in a pearl-gray stretch limousine with black windows that 
aflowed us to see out but nobody to see in, with me stretched out in back in a space 
big enough to hold a coffin, maybe two' (CT, p. 149). However, as is mentioned 
above, Lew's death is not portrayed as a final event, since he reappears later in the 
novel, enjoying the rides at Tilyoul s amusement park just as he did as a child. 
Heller, then, describes a world in which system and anti-system are 
indistinguishable, and, as in Slaughterhouse-5, in Closing Time no revelation is 
provided to enable Yossarian to escape. When Yossarian meets Sammy, they discuss 
people they knew on Pianosa, and both admit that Snowden has become a major 
influence on their fives. Orr, on the other hand, is mentioned only briefly; 
59Thomas Mann, Dr Faustus, [translator not named] (London: Minerva, 1996), p. 378. 
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'I remember them all. Remember Orr? He was in my tent. ý 
'I remember Orr. They say he made it to Sweden in a raft after he ditched 
after Avignon, right before we went home. ' 
'I went down to Kentucky once and saw him there, ' said Yossarian. 'He 
was a handyman in a supermarket, and we didn't have much to say to each 
other anymore. ' (CT, p. 353) 
As Yossarian. predicted in Catch-22, after the war Orr is engulfed by the 
everyday world, and his 'thousand valuable skills [will] keep him in a low income 
group afl his life' (C-22, p. 321). Sammy, it transpires, was in the lifeboat with 
Sergeant Knight when Orr sprinkled shark repellent in the sea and made tea for them 
all, and it is this (Orr's role as Made Fool) that the two men remember, rather than 
the significance of his rowing to Sweden. Yossarian is no longer a Protagonist - the 
system he now inhabits is too amorphous to resist coherently - and he and Orr do not 
'have much to say to each other anymore'. 
Instead, Heller provides Yossarian with Gaffney, whose status is never clear 
and whose power is undermined, rather than conformed, at the end of the novel. 
Gaffney seems to have the potential to be a Transcendent Fool, as his constant 
laughter and supernatural knowledge indicate. Unlike Orr, however, he remains a 
shadowy character, and his jokes are never explained, as in the following exchange, 
before which Gaffney tells Yossarian that the latter's planned flight will be delayed 
because of 'unpredictable blizzards in Iowa and Kansas': 
'You predict them already? ' 
'I hear things and see things, John. It's how I earn my living. May I try 
out my joke now? ' 
'I'll bet you do. And you have been listening, haven't you? Maybe 
watching too. ' 
"Listening to what? ' 
-You think I'm simpleminded, Gaffney? Would you like to hear my joke? 
Jerry, go fuck yourself' 
'That's not a bad one, Yo-Yo, ' said Gafffiey, sociably, *although I've 
heard it before. ' (CT, p. 294) 
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Yossarian suspects that the private detective is really God, although Gaffney 
deflects questions about his identity by making another of his ambiguous and 
misleading jokes: 
'You seem to know all that's happening on the face of the earth. You 
know enough to be God. ' 
'There-7s more money in real estate, ' answered Gaffney. 'That's how I 
know we have no God. He'd be active in real estate too. That's not a bad 
one is 0' 
'I've heard worse. ' 
'I have one that may be better. I also know much that goes on under the 
earth. ' (CT, p. 316) 
The ýoke 'that may be better', it is implied, is Gaffney's knowledge about 
Tilyou's fairground and the government's underground railway systern, both of which 
he visits regularly, although the extent of his knowledge is never revealed. Although 
Yossarian thinks that Gaffney may be God, the fact that he is a private detective 
might be taken as another reference to The Third Policeman. As ambiguous a figure 
as O'Brien's demonic policemen, it seems just as possible that Gaffney is a devil. 
Moreover, it becomes clear that Gaffney is not, in fact, omnipotent when he 
loses control of a computer simulation of the Minderbinder-Maxon wedding. 
Yossarian watches this simulation in one of the PABT's offices, and finds it so 
convincing that he becomes confused about whether or not he is witnessing a real 
event. There is, however, a 'glitch' in the program, which keeps turning the sun black 
at the end of the wedding. This glitch takes the form of the Apocalypse as described 
by St John, as Yossarian notices that 'on the central screens, the sun indeed was 
black in a sky that was blue, the moon had turned red again, and all of the ships in the 
harbour [ ... ] were again upside 
down' (CT, pp. 433-34). Just as Yossarian and 
Gafrhey are discussing this fault, the President accidentally presses the button that 
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launches M&M's secret stealth bomber, which automatically sets off a nation-wide 
four-minute warning and heralds an equally apocalyptic third world war. 
The end of the world in some form, therefore, seems certain at the end of the 
novel. However, not only is the biblical apocalypse the product of a simulation which 
has been watched many times without any ill-effects (as the repetition of 'again' in 
the quotation above indicates), it is not entirely clear whether or not the President is 
playing his favourite video game, 'Triage', which is designed to simulate all-out war 
for training purposes. Just as Heller creates confusion about the status of such figures 
as God and Satan, and of such places as heaven and hell, he also denies the reader a 
clear sense of what, exactly, is happening in the closing pages of the novel. Not only 
is the 'reality' of the apocalypse uncertain, the stealth-bomber, which has been 
guaranteed by its designers not to work, is piloted by Kid Sampson and McWatt, two 
pilots killed long before on Pianosa. Again the text's ambiguous representation of 
mortality is clear. While it seems possible that everybody may shortly be killed, since 
previous characters have suffered death without any apparent M-effects this 
possibility becomes meaningless. Invited to comment on the ending of the novel, 
HeRer responded, 
Either the world is ending or it's not. Yossarian doesn't know what he'll 
find when he goes outside, and I don't know either. Whether the end is 
taking place right there on that page, or whether it will take place in a week 
or two when the missiles come back, or whether it will take place in a billion 
years when the sun explodes, it's going to take place. [ ... ] 
I deliberately included contradictions between what Sammy and 
Yossarian see and think. I don't know the answer I have no idea, and I 
don't want the reader to have any idea. 60 
60 Charlie Rei I ly, 'An Interview with Joseph Heller', Contemporary Literature, 34: 4 (1998), 507-22 
(p. 5 17). 
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Thus, the failure of laughter to orientate and guide, exemplified by the absence 
of a laughing relationship between Yossarian. and Gaffney, reflects the way that 
Heller has consciously undermined the reader's expectations as to character and plot, 
and even the expectation that a novel should have an ending. 
David Craig argues that 
the omniscient narrator [of the Yossarian narrative] provides a satiric vision 
of the America in which Yossarian, Sammy, Lew, and Claire live. He sees 
society as having become the n-fflitary-industrial complex that President 
Eisenhower forecast and seeks to expose from the inside out the life-denying 
logic of capitalism that is responsible for this transformation. (Craig, p. 230) 
However, by also arguing 'that everything is connected: the Time-Life Building 
and the Port Authority sub-basements; the Pentagon (Heller's MASSPOB) and 
Kenosha, Wisconsin; the Coney Island on which Lew, Sammy, and Heller grew up 
and its infernoesque re-creation', Craig in fact gives evidence that what this narrator 
is saying is that in such conditions of complete relativity, no one thing can be said to 
satirise any other (Craig, p. 23 1). As in American Psycho, the constant confusion 
about what is real and the converging images of system and anti-system show that 
using one set of behaviour to criticise another is not possible in the world that Heller 
describes. Like the echo in Forster's A Passage to India, aU attempts at action are 
reduced to a meaningless 'boum'. 
Conclusion 
It seems, then, that these three novels provide examples of a treatment of laughter 
that is significantly different fi7om the Laughter of Revelation and the Laughter of 
Apocalypse that are analysed in Chapters One and Two of this thesis. Where the 
revelatory and apocalyptic models posit a reality outside the closed system of an 
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Institution, from which it is possible to learn and develop, the failure of the laughing 
relationship in Slaughterhouse-5, American Psycho, and Closing Time seems to 
argue that no such reality exists - or, at least, is accessible - with the result that the 
potential Protagonist in each novel remains trapped within a state of endless futility. 
Where the dialectical relationship between system and anti-system allows for 
constructive synthesis, the absence of either a coherent Institution or a coherent Fool 
in these novels creates a shifting and ambiguous world in which progress is 
impossible. 
Laughter of Revelation and Laughter of Apocalypse site and orientate one in 
the universe, facilitating both a sense of one's identity and a relationship with an 
other. Such laughter acknowledges that pain is inevitable given one's necessarily 
paradoxical position as both dependent on and independent of things external to 
oneself Laughter of Entropy, by contrast, has been shown to express either the 
inability to assimilate difficult experiences or a reliance on superficiality that implies 
detachment from them. Billy Pilgrim, for example, abandons all attempts at a laughter 
that expresses the acceptance of the fact of mortality, while Bateman's adoption of 
the stereotypical laugh of the maniac, ironically, denies the genuine contact with 
others that his acts of violence try to achieve. Yossarian - whose laughter at the end 
of Catch-22 expresses the existential assertion that it is possible to five with the 
knowledge that death and pain are inevitable - has become 'bitter' (CT, p. 52) in 
Closing Time. With no Fool-figure to give him a sense of perspective in a world of 
'paralyzing relativity' (Numasawa, p. 52), Yossarian, too, has lost the facility for 
authentic laughter. 
The confusion between reality and unreal-ity, and between life and death, that 
Laing describes as symptomatic of ontological instability appears in these entropic 
230 
texts as a clear statement of the human condition as a whole. Burton Feldman, using 
the phrase 'Black Humor' to indicate the laughter I have defined as entropic, 
criticises this attitude, saying that it involves a level of detachment that undermines its 
mtended effect: 
The stage groans with the wreckage of bewildered innocents and sinister 
megalomaniacs, cannibals, and intellectual rapists. But the Black Humor 
manner short-circuits any strong response to this. The novels stay coolly 
'humorous', murderously farcical, coldly zany, cosmically slapsticky. 61 
What Feldman seems to be arguing is that such a degree of detachment from 
one's subject matter may protect one from its painful implications, but it also isolates 
the author from the reader. What results, he continues, 'is an enigma. Instead of 
much blackness of humor, there is a nightmarish neutrality and grotesque deadpan, 
and elaborate novelistic impasse to feeling and judgement' (Feldman, p. 102). 
Feldman argues that this neutrality is the result of a loss of philosophical courage by 
the authors of such work. Where, he says, Black Humour (Laughter of Entropy) 
attempts to be 'pitiless', and 'utterly remorseless', it is actually 'disappointingly mild, 
even harmlessly "fiterary"'. For this he blames the extremes of the modem world, and 
authors who are not prepared to go far enough to encompass them. He argues that 
the phenomenon I have called Laughter of Entropy 'seems to be wrestling with 
something subtler, more insidiously shapeless [than 'unmistakable horrors' such as 
Auschwitz] - American culture in all its permissive restrictions and glossy emptiness). 
Comparing modem authors to Melville and Sinyavsky, Feldman argues that these 
61 'Anatomy of Black Humor, in Pratt, pp. 10 1-06 (p. 10 1) (orig. publ. in Dissent Magazine 15 
(March/April 1968), 158-60). 
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days no-one is prepared to risk obscurity or jail to make their point (Feldman, 
pp. 102-03). 
As its reliance on parody shows, Black Humor [Laughter of Entropy] does 
not unmask the illness hidden under our bland surface; it merely mimics the 
violence in front of the scene. Melville's ferocity could convey awesome 
energy because it was an active force. But Black Humor's violence, though 
tiresomely inflated, is passive. It is violence, stylized, theatricalized, 
overblown - but static. (Feldman, p. 103) 
He suggests, therefore, that a better term for the genre would be 'Affluent 
Terrorism', in that it risks nothing; 'it wishes to reform but also to indulge us; to 
scourge us -and yet to leave us comfortably what we were, neutralized' (Feldman, 
p. 104). 
Taking a similar position, Michael Morrison predicts that the current fashion 
for fiction about serial killers will be short-lived because of the limitations of 
addressing the reader's fears by 'realistic' means. 
Non-supernatural creatures lack attributes that enlarge and empower 
narratives about supernatural beings: their potential for ambiguity, their 
metaphorical resonance, and their access to a reader's sense of the numinous 
and transcendent. The serial killer tends to slash his way through the surface 
of narrative - vivifying in text rather than subtext the fears of the culture. 
62 
Gerald Nicosia argues that contemporary authors, rather than dedicating 
themselves to an artistic principle, have become limited by the necessity to achieve 
commercial success. Quoting George Steiner, he says that 'American artists have 
abdicated their traditional high-cultural role, "the commitment of one's life to a 
62 'After the Danse: Horror at the End of the Century', in A Dark Night's Dreaming, ed. by Tony 
Magistrale and Michael A. Morrison, pp. 9-26 (p. 24). 
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gamble on transcendence, " in favour of "the pursuit of happiness" in the form of 
making money'. 
63 
Carla Freccero, by contrast, argues that the entropic view evident in these texts 
derives from the authors' commitment to the idea that it has become impossible to 
write about anything but the mechanics of writing. As she puts it in her analysis of 
American Psycho, "'art for art's sake" can be seen precisely to resemble the 
nonproductivity of obscenity' (Freccero, pp. 44-45). Thus an anti-realist position can 
result, not in the production of novels designed simply to be commercially successful 
(as Nicosia suggests), but in a literature whose form is as culturally taboo as much of 
its content. 
'Where Did This Guy Come From Anyway? ', The Review of Contemporary Fiction 3: 2 (1983), 
72-75 (p. 74). Quoting from 'The Archives of Eden', in The Pushcart Prize VI. - Best of the Small 
Presses, ed. by Bill Henderson (New York: Avon, 1982), pp. 206-07. 
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CONCLUSION 
At the start of this thesis I argued that two fundamentally opposed world views 
are evident in post-war American Literature. The first I have called realist in that it 
assumes a real world independent of human perception, contact with which can be 
both meaningful and necessary to human development. The second, anti-realist, 
position, by contrast, holds that experienced reality is an arbitrary construct, and that 
the idea of a relationship with anything beyond individual thought is therefore 
meaningless. 
I have illustrated these philosophical stances by the application of the terms 
(revelation' and 'apocalypse' to reflect the realist position, and 'entropy' to reflect 
the anti-realist. The words revelation and apocalypse, I have shown, are commonly 
employed in literature to indicate the positive and negative aspects of a continuous 
cycle of creation and destruction, the processes or truths of which can be revealed to 
an individual. The concept of entropy, by contrast, assumes a state from which 
neither creation nor destruction is possible. In literature, this view is most commonly 
apparent in the representation of human endeavour as entirely relative - no one 
action having more significance than any other - with the result that life is seen as 
ultimately purposeless. 
Further, I proposed that the shift between these two stances can be identified 
by analysing different texts' treatments of the relationship between laughter and 
madness. In the Introduction to this thesis I outlined theoretical approaches in which 
laughter emerges as a key element in the creation, stability and defence of social 
groups. It also, however, enables the individual to maintain a flexibility of response 
(both conceptually and emotionally) that is vital to survival. I have argued, therefore, 
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that laughter fundamentally serves an orientating function, facilitating a sense of 
one') s place both in society and in the wider world, while at the same time 
encouraging the constant testing of boundaries and limitations. The social nature of 
laughter is essential to this, as it is through shared laughter (a 'laughing relationship') 
that new opportunities and possibilities can be revealed to an individual. 
Initially taking the realist position, I defined madness as represented in the 
literature at hand as an inability to recognise or accept the continuous cycle that 
maintains balance between system and anti-system, between order and chaos. For 
both individual and society, this inability results in stagnation, since system alone 
creates so rigid a structure that no ffirther development is possible, while anti-system 
alone is too disordered to be called purposeful. Thus, in the realist model, the 
concept of an independently existing reality is crucial to sanity, since it enables the 
transcendence of the self, or of the conventions of society, that is the means by which 
such balance may be maintained. This model also relies on the idea of a coherent and 
continuous self that is able to recognise such imbalances to the extent that it strives to 
confront and rectify them. 
I then considered three instantiations of this definition of madness. The 
Institutionis a social organisation that is mad in the sense of being so bounded by 
ritual and rule-systems that it has reached the point of stasis. It is a closed system, the 
only purpose of which is self-perpetuation, and it therefore resists the introduction of 
any new element that might produce change or development. Instead, innovation is 
interpreted simply as deviancy, which the Institution must punish or fight in order to 
maintain the status quo. In contrast to this manifestation of system, the Fool 
expresses the madness of anti-system. Free of the limitations that define the 
Institution, the Fool represents creativity in that he or she personifies the newness 
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that is crucial to growth, but also represents destruction and chaos. The third 
instantiation of madness occurs when a member of the Institution becomes aware of 
its constraints, but is unable to find another model by which to live. These misfit 
characters, perceived as mad by the Institution, are flexible enough to understand the 
potential of the Fool, while at the same time remammg structured enough to learn 
from, and communicate, the Fool's example. While the Institution and the Fool in 
literature, therefore,, embody the theoretical extremes of order on the one hand and 
chaos on the other, it is this third type of character who personifies the idea of the 
self that seeks to synthesise the two. Acting as Protagonists, such characters mediate 
between system and anti-system and represent the continuation of the overall cycle. 
Creativity, in the sense of communicable and useful innovation, therefore derives 
from the relationship between the Fool and the Protagonist, typically expressed 
through shared laughter. 
I have identified two types of laughing relationship: Laughter of Revelation and 
Laughter of Apocalypse. Laughter of Revelation is explored in Chapter One by 
analysis of three novels in which a Protagonist, trapped in the closed system of an 
Institution, is given a sudden insight into an alternative mode of existence by the 
laughter of a Fool. The Fool transcends the restrictions of the Institution and thus 
exists independently of it, and, by example, enables the Protagonist to do so. 
Crucially, it is the laughter of the Fool, and the understanding of it by the 
Protagonist, that communicates this possibility. In this way, revelation has been 
described as analogous to 'getting the joke'). 
Afl three of the novels considered in Chapter One use different techniques to 
explore the possibility of communicating transcendence in literature. Heller shows 
that language can function as a closed system, overtly presenting this apparent 
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obstacle to the portrayal of transcendence as the logical conundrum of Catch-22. 
However, the actions of the Fool Orr, whose laughter expresses an independence 
from the Institution, shows Yossarian, and therefore reveals to the reader., that escape 
from such closed systems is, after all, possible. What Heller achieves is the 
communication of the idea of transcendence without being bound by the systems of 
language. Because Orr's escape occurs 'off-stage' and Yossarian's is implied rather 
than shown, Heller is able to argue, by sleight of hand as it were, that even when 
restricted by the self-referential limitations of language, genuine communication with 
a world outside such limitations is possible. Kesey, similarly, uses fantasy to 
communicate ideas and impressions that 'mere truth' cannot. By sifting Bromden's 
words and trying to understand his delusional world, the reader is able to see through 
the narrative to the story that Kesey is teffing. Kerouac, on the other hand, attempts 
to portray transcendence by changing the accepted syntactical forms of language 
itself in an effort to make it more open and flexible. Each of these approaches, I 
would argue, only succeeds insofar as it is contextualised by the laughing relationship 
between a Fool and a Protagonist that mediates between these opposing forces of 
order and incoherence. 
In the novels analysed in Chapter Two, the Fool typically appears as a monster 
or demon, a force of destruction. What the Protagonist learns from this type of Fool 
is not how to escape the Institution, but how to take responsibility for those things 
that exist within all of us but are conventionally repressed. Thus the Apocalyptic Fool 
teaches us, through mockery, to remain balanced by accepting our selves, with both 
their positive and negative aspects, in their entirety. 
Again, the texts analysed in Chapter Two illustrate different methods of 
communicating the idea of transcendence. Both Blatty and King personify the 
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irrational as demons, enabling a confrontation with chaos through which the 
Protagonists can reassert a sense of self and of conununity. The identification of the 
Fool as supernatural is crucial to these accounts, since they must exist outside normal 
laws adequately to embody the idea of anti-system. This poses the problem of 
coherent communication between Fool and Protagonist, which both authors solve by 
means of the ambivalence of laughter. The Fool's mockery of its victims is reflected 
in the Protagonists' laughter that recasts the demonic Fool as merely ridiculous and 
so defeats it. In Morrison's novel Sula's difference is such that, even though she may 
have things to teach the community, communication with or understanding of her 
seems impossible. Morrison also takes advantage of ambivalence, showing how 
Sula's transcendent laughter can be contextualised by its transposition into the tears 
that Nel sheds for her lost friend. In Lolita Nabokov presents an Apocalyptic 
laughing relationship from a number of points of view. By offering different 
perspectives within the text - from which Lolita, Humbert and Nabokov himself may 
appear to act as Fool - he forces the reader to make their own interpretation. While 
some critics have argued that this technique suggests that the novel is self-referential, 
With no connection to reality, others have argued that Nabokov - particularly in his 
employment of parody to reaffirm the validity of clich6d modes of discourse - argues 
for a sense of transcendence for which the reader must take responsibility. 
In Chapter Three I suggested an anti-realist position that explores how an 
entropic world view affects laughing relationships in literature. A second definition of 
madness proved necessary to this analysis, since the idea of madness as loss of 
balance relies on confidence in a coherent external reality. Instead, what emerges in 
entropic literature is an image of madness as the loss of an integrated sense of self, a 
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loss described by Laing as ontological instability, that results in the feeling that 
everything, including the concept of a coherent personality, is an illusion. This in turn 
leads to the belief that - with no one thing having any more intrinsic existence or 
importance than any other - experience is inherently disordered and arbitrary. 
Entropy assumes a state which is both static (in that it cannot undergo any further 
change) and disordered (in that complex structures cannot exist). When applied to 
human endeavour, the implication of this is that the distinctions between entities 
collapse and the dialectic that produces creative synthesis disappears, with the result 
that nothing new is possible. 
Laughter of Revelation and Laughter of Apocalypse occur in novels that 
contain opposing influences. As I suggest in the overview to this thesis, using 
Ketterer'sanalysis of the term 'apocalypse', the idea of the opposing forces of system 
and anti-system 'allows for a dialectic, conflict, or tension of oppositions', which, 
Ketterer argues, is the 'stuff of literature'. Without the contrast that the Institution 
and the Fool provide this dialectic is not possible, and the mediating role of the 
Protagonist collapses. Neither Billy Pilgrim nor Patrick Bateman communicates 
anything to the reader beyond the futility of human existence, while the conflicting 
narrative voices in Closing Time produce a contradictory and ambiguous account 
from which it is impossible to derive the sense that an argument has been concluded. 
There appears to be a similarity between, for example, the Combine or the 
community of the Bottom on the one hand and the states that obtain in the texts 
analysed in Chapter Three on the other. Characters such as Billy or Bateman appear 
trapped within systems in much the same way that the Protagonists are in the early 
stages of the texts analysed in Chapters One and Two. One might conclude from this 
that the despair evident in entropic texts derives from the conviction that, with reality 
239 
perceived as an arbitrary construct, one is forced to exist solely within the 
institutionalised' limitations of one's own perceptions. Alternatively, it may be 
suggested that, with no coherent integration of the self, existence is analogous to the 
attempts of the Apocalyptic Fool to divide and isolate. The constant threat of 
annihilation experienced by the ontologically unstable person results as much from a 
feeling of inner emptiness - equivalent to the feelings of worthlessness that the 
Apocalyptic Fool exposes - as it does from the fear that the recognition of others, or 
of an external reality, will. engulf or destroy one. It may seern, then, that the absence 
of a coherent laughing relationship in entropic texts is due to the fact that they 
describe a world in which only system, or only anti-systern, obtains, unrelieved by the 
presence of its balancing opposite. It would therefore seem a simple matter to 
mterpret such texts as describing a world gone mad according to the realist definition 
I suggest, and those novels analysed in Chapter Three would then fit into a long 
tradition of works that suggest this (as, for example, in the claim of medieval satirists 
that numerus stullorum est infinitus). 
There is a crucial difference, however, between the realist and anti-realist 
definitions of madness that is revealed when one tries to identify either an Institution 
or a Fool in the final three texts analysed in this thesis. Where, as I suggest in the 
Introduction, solipsism may be seen to be equivalent to the madness of systen-4 and 
nihilism to the madness of anti-system, entropic texts embody both. If it is asserted 
that what is called the self is actually a precariously maintained void, then this 
assertion seems nihilistic. If it is claimed that an individual has no recourse to 
anything other than subjective interpretation of his or her own perceptions, this 
position seems solipsistic. However, when the two are combined in the proposal that 
this solipsistic self consists of nothing but the attempt to maintain a vacuum, the 
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result is an unresoluble vacillation between being and non-being. In the novel that 
presents this as an image of madness there is simply no place for the concepts of 
system and anti-system. While it is possible to conceive of a text that as a whole 
reflects the idea of the world gone mad in a realist sense, the balancing opposite being 
highlighted by its absence, in entropic texts the terms system and anti-system cease to 
have meaning, 
Since I have argued that the sharing of laughter - by enabling orientation 
between system and anti-system and the assertion of a newly balanced self - is the 
means by which sanity can be regained, this second definition of madness has 
profound implications for the place of laughter in the text. Laughter, I have 
suggested, serves a twofold purpose; it both binds a community together and 
liberates the individual from the constraints of that community. It acknowledges a 
relationship with others while asserting a sense of self As such, laughter is a 
phenomenon that relies on ambivalence, since it involves the recognition and 
assimilation of two apparently contradictory ideas. There is a crucial difference 
between this function of laughter and the Laughter of Entropy, a difference that relies 
on the distinction between ambivalence and ambiguity. Ambivalence involves two 
clearly defined but contradictory propositions held simultaneously. Ambiguity, by 
contrast, entails a loss of clarity, a wavering or vacillation between potential 
interpretations. This can be seen when the treatment of laughter in the novels 
discussed in Chapters One and Two is contrasted with that of those discussed in 
Chapter Three. Faced with the opposmg forces of system and anti-systern, and 
recognising that both are necessary for a sane existence, characters such as Yossarian 
laugh to express their acceptance of this paradox and their ability to act in spite of it. 
In an entropic state in which order and disorder merge, however. laughter fails, as we 
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see in the many examples of abortive or false laughter that occur in Slaughter- 
house-5, American Psycho and Closing Time. 
I have suggested that the processes involved in laughter are analogous to the 
process of revelation in the idea of 'getting the joke'. It seems possible to argue, from 
an anti-realist position, that by simply rearranging old ideas one gains nothing but the 
illusion of newness, or at best a clearer picture of the limits and structure of human 
thought. Many of the authors whose work is analysed in this thesis seem to suggest, 
however, that the Presentation of existing ideas in a new relation to one another or 
from a different perspective produces synthesis - the creation of a new idea; that a 
perspective beyond the boundaries of any given system is both possible and 
necessary. 
Throughout this thesis several models of the Artist have been indicated. In the 
first of these, the role of the Artist in society emerges as equivalent, or at least 
analogous, to the role of the Transcendent Fool. By virtue of his or her special 
perceptive powers, the Artist is not expected to conform to everyday convention and 
is instead a shamanic figure, existing at once in the material and the spiritual worlds 
and guiding society towards a greater understanding of fundamental truths. Another 
account suggests that Artists have more in common with the Made Fool, given 
license to deviate from norms of propriety in order that they may expose social ills 
and so help to maintain the long-term equilibrium of a community. Often, however, 
the Fool exists as an embodiment of the abstract notion of anti-systen-4 set against the 
instantiation of system in the Institution, and it is the Protagonist, mediating between 
the two and communicating this process to the reader, who takes the Artistic role. 
Where these comparisons become significant is in their appfication to entropic 
texts. Since the idea of transcendence is meaningless here, there can be no analogy 
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between the Artist as Author and the Transcendent Fool. Similarly, if the absence of a 
dialectic between system and anti-system causes the role of Protagonist to collapse, 
failed Protagonists such as Billy Pilgrim can only be said to reflect the paradoxical 
image of the Author who has nothing to tell the Reader. It seems possible to draw an 
analogy between the entropic Author and the Made Fool, in that by breaking 
narrative (rather than social) taboos each actually serves to reinforce a more 
conservative norm. In the novels discussed in Chapter Three, for example, it could be 
argued that by parodying the sense of transcendence expected by the reader, the 
author is acting as Made Fool to the literary establishment. I have argued, however, 
that creativity occurs as a dynamic process between the Fool and the Protagonist, 
which is expressed in a laughing relationship. The Fool cannot function as either 
Made or Transcendent without this reciprocal relationship, so that texts in which this 
dynamic has collapsed actually provide no analogy for the Author, just as they offer 
no traditional relationship with the Reader. The question then is whether an 
equivalent of the laughing relationship is necessary between the Author and the 
Reader in order for a text to function as a novel. The fact that entropic novels exist at 
all suggests that it is not, although the reader in these circumstances seems forced to 
adopt an ambiguous, rather than ambivalent, attitude to them. 
A crucial problem for the reader, and the critic, then, fies in establishing the 
status of such texts as those I have described as entropic. If the exploration of a 
dialectic is indeed necessary for a work to be called literature, these novels cannot be 
included in that category. If, on the other hand, the presentation of one clear 
expression of the hw-nan condition - for example its futility or its ambiguity - can be 
said to constitute a valid artistic statement, then 'literature' must be defined 
differently. The strenuous attempts of many critics to find meaning in entropic texts, 
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or their dismissal of them as being something other than (or less than) literature, may 
suggest, however, not that the presentation of a single idea is invalid (it could be 
argued that it occurs in both music and painting), but that the idea so presented is 
seen as undermining the very idea of art. Authors who offer the single image of 
existence as either futile or ambiguous lay themselves open to the accusation that, if 
this is true, it is meaningless to attempt to communicate the fact. Those critics who 
argue that authors must not make this claim in their work, however, seem thereby in 
danger of admitting not that art is in a crucial relationship with life, but that it takes 
the form of a fantasy that bears no resemblance to reality. 
Is literature, then, nothing more than a comforting illusion that allows us to 
believe in coherence and purpose? Many contemporary theorists appear to think so, 
and many contemporary authors attempt to strip away such illusions to expose our 
dependence on the closed systems of thought and language. As the foregoing 
argument about the creative power of laughter shows, however, there is also a body 
of contemporary authors who continue to strive for transcendence, and attempt to 
use language as a tool to reveal reality rather than regarding it as constituting reality 
itself Given laughter's evidently crucial role in daily life, its failure in entropic texts 
seems to suggest, ftirthermore, that an entropic world view is of limited use as a 
model of reality. 
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